21 January 2009: Imperatives for Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is notorious for having a highly politicised and partisan security sector. Before the controversial 2002 elections, the commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) General Vitalis Zvinavashe issued a thinly veiled threat of a military coup if opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai were to win the elections. “Let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute anyone, with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people,” he declared. (Business Tribune, 16 January 2002). Not to be outdone, Zvinavashe’s successor, General Constantine Chiwenga also prophesied in March 2008: “Elections are coming and the army will not support or salute sell-outs and agents of the West before, during and after the presidential elections ... We will not support anyone other than President (Robert) Mugabe, who has sacrificed a lot for this country” (IRIN, 12 March 2008). Hot on his heels, the prisons chief, retired Major General Paradzai Zimondi said to gathered prison officers, “I am giving you an order to vote for President Mugabe…” (The Herald, 29 February 2005).

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Ominously, these unnerving, blatant threats of unconstitutional takeover of government seemingly did not raise the ire of African governments or the African Union. Even the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, was not willing to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. These statements, which have been repeated in various forms and choreographed at various fora by elements of the security services, resonate with Mugabe’s (and ZANU PF’s) rhetoric that, as ‘the’ party of liberation, only ZANU PF can guarantee the gains of the liberation struggle. This rhetoric has been recycled repeatedly, even in the face of compelling evidence to the contrary. From the Gukurahundi massacres, ‘Zanufication’ of the state, Murambatsvina forced removals, the violence accompanying the June 2008 one-man ‘presidential’ election, to abductions, systematic torture and assassinations by ‘unknown’ persons, through to the blatant contempt of the courts with impunity, and everything foul in-between; ZANU PF is not and may never have been what it claims to be.

Writing in ANC Today (Volume 8, No. 19 May 16 2008) in reply to an article on Zimbabwe by Eddie Maloka and Ben Magubane (City Press, Sunday 4 May 2008), ANC’s Pallo Jordan argues, quite rightly, that “perhaps the most alarming suggestion of all is that opposition to ZANU PF, irrespective of its merits, is ipso facto illegitimate and necessarily counter-revolutionary, and therefore pro-imperialist”. He goes further: “Offering it (ZANU PF) uncritical support because it is anti-imperialist will not help ZANU PF to uncover the reasons for the steep decline in the legitimacy it once enjoyed. That party would do well to return to its original vision of a democratic Zimbabwe, free of colonial domination and the instruments of that domination - such as arbitrary arrests, police repression of opposition, intimidation of political critics, etc”. And then, the punch line: “Given the outcome of the recent elections, ZANU PF should surrender power to the party that has won … any attempt by ZANU PF to cling to power through overt or covert violence will only compound its problems by stripping it even further of the legitimacy it won by leading the Zimbabwean people in their struggle for independence, freedom and democracy!’ Wise counsel indeed, but is anyone listening?

When Tsvangirai signed the flawed, still-born, strangely-titled Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 15 September 2008, - thereby signing away the people’s mandate, according to some - Mugabe retained control of the security services - less the police, which SADC rather outlandishly advised should be co-managed with Tsvangirai. Obviously, Mugabe would have preferred that the police remain under his exclusive control, to continue as it has done for close to three decades, to do the bidding not of the State, but of ZANU PF. The notorious Central Intelligence Organisation on the other hand, far from being a state security agency, is an extension of Mugabe’s personal security apparatus. Add to that the so-called war veterans and state-sanctioned militias running riot in support of ZANU PF.

Over the past decade or so, state and quasi-state institutions, including the judiciary have been militarised. At the last count, strategic institutions such as the Grain Marketing Board, the National Railways of Zimbabwe, and even the Electoral Commission, among others, were headed by active (and not so retired) military officers. No one knows for sure how many spanners the Joint Operations Command (JOC) has thrown into the GPA. The JOC, comprising chiefs of the army, air force, police, intelligence and prisons advises government on security matters. It would seem however, that its functions have been ‘re-defined’ to include ensuring that Mugabe and ZANU PF remain in power by means other than the ballot. Consequently, Zimbabwe has become a police state, and the security services an ‘occupying force’.

The myriad of political statements by men in uniform (thanks to rampant gender inequality there are not many women in the upper echelons), and their partisan conduct in a highly charged political environment, raise critical questions about the constitutional role of the security services in a democracy. In the event that the 19th constitutional amendment leads to a successful, forced marriage of convenience between Tsvangirai and Mugabe, (with Mutambara, as the elevated bridesmaid); one of the top priorities of the transitional government should be to urgently reform the security sector.

The mandate of that government should be no more than about:

Returning the country to the rule of law
Resuscitating the economy and returning it to productive capacity
Restoring civil and political liberties
Getting a new, people-centred constitution in place and
Organising democratic elections at the earliest opportunity.

In that mix, security sector reform and a comprehensive overhaul and professionalisation of institutions of the State should be high on the agenda. As it is, the security sector, or sections thereof, could be one of the biggest obstacles to meaningful democratic reform in that country. It cannot be right that private citizens, including elected members of parliament, scurry for cover at the sight of those that are supposed to protect them from harm. As the legitimate arena of people-centred governance, parliament must, oce and for all, re-assert its authority over all arms of the executive. The security sector must be apolitical and accountable to the public through the legislature.

Takawira Musavengana, Senior Researcher, Security Sector Governance Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)