Hopes for a Settlement in Somalia Fade
blurb:isstoday:010808somalia
1 August 2008: Hopes for a Settlement in Somalia Fade
The Somalia peace agreement signed in Djibouti on 9 June appears to be in serious trouble just as the ceasefire terms it contained were meant to be coming into effect one month later. It appears that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) had signed this accord in the hope of preserving some semblance of credibility to add to the shaky international recognition they enjoyed. The representatives of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) had hoped to achieve the negotiated withdrawal of Ethiopian
forces propping up the TFG in preparation for a new power-sharing agreement. This would then lead to a new political dispensation in their country that has been without an effective national government since 1991.
Neither sets of signatories enjoyed the unalloyed support of their constituencies: the TFG delegation was dominated by allies of the prime minister, not the president, and the ARS delegation was representative of a faction that had left Eritrea after having accused its government of meddling in the Alliance’s affairs. It was pilloried as traitorous by hardline elements of the movement who remained based in Asmara and militant and Jihadist fighters on the ground.
Key to the implementation of the accord was the replacement of the Ethiopian military by a UN-sanctioned stabilisation force. This always seemed unlikely, since the UN had already spelled out the high quality of the troops required – self-sustaining, experienced in the use of minimum force but capable of effective but controlled combat if necessary. Those that are in a position to contribute such troops understandably are reluctant to do so in
an environment in which losses are inevitable.
Nevertheless, however improbable such a deployment, it seemed that a visit by the UN Security Council to Djibouti to bolster the talks in June sent a signal that this matter had received serious thought and that plans might well be advanced towards fulfilling this condition. Certainly the urgent encouragement of the Security Council might have been expected to lead to something better than the virtual silence from that body that has followed.
As was to be expected, no sooner had the agreement been signed than the spoilers on both sides intensified their efforts to thwart its realisation. As the violence ratcheted upwards, the humanitarian situation on the ground deteriorated still further and made international relief less likely for the two million or so Somalis now dependent upon it for survival.
In political terms, for the Security Council to have raised hopes and then basically walk away from the ensuing mess will be disastrous. Indeed, under such circumstances it might have been better had there been no agreement at all, because an aborted accord simply would make the positions of the moderates on both sides untenable and play directly into the hands of those who see a military stalemate or outcome as desirable.
The report of the UN Secretary General a forthnight ago speaks of sending a security assessment mission to Somalia only in September, so any hope of a peacekeeping deployment within a timeframe in which it might pave the way fro Ethiopian withdrawal seems out of the question. In the meantime the militias fighting to evict the Ethiopians appear to be extending their operations and adopting an increasingly aggressive posture, completely rejecting the idea of a negotiated settlement. This, of course, suits Eritrea’s government, which seeks to enmesh Ethiopia in an unwinnable war of attrition in Somalia that proves embarrassing to the authorities in Addis Ababa and a distraction from the unfinished business of settling their protracted border dispute.
There are credible accounts of Mogadishu warlords rearming to reassert their interests in the local war economy against the revival of the fortunes of the Islamic courts and the political ambitions of the Jihadist el-Shabaab militias.
In short, the situation resembles that prevailing before the Ethiopian intervention of 2006, except hat now the possibilities of a peaceful outcome are much more remote. The military defeat and dispersal of the Islamic courts of south central Somalia in December 2006 and January 2007 have resulted in the destruction of a tenuous civil peace in the area, the exacerbation of Darod-Hawiye competition and the emergence of a resistance movement with increasingly radical credentials. Unintended consequences have emerged on a massive scale, not least the further erosion of the TFG’s local legitimacy.
In the meantime much of the population of Mogadishu has fled, as have people from other centers embroiled in chronic conflict. Aid agencies are unable to reach the needy with adequate assistance, both because of warlordism and conflict on land and new forms of organised piracy along Somalia’s extensive coastline.
The valiant attempts of Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, the special representative of the UN Secretary General, to galvanise the international community to provide the physical and material backing for the Djibouti peace accord appear to have been in vain. Barring developments scarcely short of miraculous, the agony of the Somali people seems set to continue and deepen.
Richard Cornwell, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
