Has the merger of governance and security worked for the AU?

The proliferation of crises in Africa calls for a more cohesive, capable and better-equipped AU Commission.

Published on 26 November 2025 in ISS Today

By

Paul-Simon Handy
Regional Director East Africa and Representative to the African Union, ISS Addis Ababa

One of the most visible dimensions of the African Union (AU) Commission reform was the creation of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) in 2020. Marking a turning point in the reform process, the new department was formed by merging Political Affairs with Peace and Security.

Similar mergers had taken place in the United Nations and Economic Community of West African States. Architects of the AU Commission reform hoped the amalgamation would position the AU as best placed to respond to multidimensional crises.

But five years on, PAPS’ cohesiveness and capability are in question. Although an AU summit on the reforms planned for 26 November was postponed, it is essential to assess the impact of the merger. PAPS remains the AU Commission’s largest department in terms of staffing and budget. Its trajectory could shed light on the successes and limitations of the broader reform effort.

From the start, the way the merger was achieved raised concerns. Beyond the absence of an overall framework needed for policy and bureaucratic coherence, some analysts identified technical inconsistencies. The first relates to the dissolution of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) created by the protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol).

The regional desks lack the capacity to absorb the Continental Early Warning System’s preventive mandate

The CEWS was absorbed by the regional desks, significantly reducing its capacity to monitor and anticipate emerging threats. This weakened early warning by shifting the focus to crises already on the PSC’s agenda, leaving emerging or latent risks insufficiently addressed.

With only three officers typically assigned to each of the five regional desks, their capacity to absorb CEWS’ preventive mandate was clearly inadequate. The legality of the CEWS’ dissolution was also questioned as it happened without a review of the PSC Protocol.

The second technical issue is the exclusion of the AU Border Programme from the PAPS structure. This is particularly striking given the AU’s adoption in 2018 of protocols on the African Continental Free Trade Area and Free Movement of Persons. Both require coherent continent-wide approaches to border governance, which were centralised within the Border Programme.

Also, the transnational character of terrorism and organised crime calls for innovative border management. The removal of this programme from PAPS reflects a troubling disconnect between institutional structure and continental policy priorities.

These two technical oversights raise deeper questions about the rationale behind the merger. They suggest that the reform may have been driven more by the need to reduce costs and project an image of rationalisation, than by a coherent vision to integrate governance, peace and security.

AU reforms may have been driven more by the need to reduce costs than by a coherent vision

While the merger intended to improve coordination and efficiency, it failed to introduce the necessary mechanisms to realise this ambition. Specifically, it did not strengthen the capacity of the AU Commission to address governance issues in Africa.

Other shortcomings include the absence of a coordination mechanism between the two previously separate departments, which are inextricably linked and require consistent operational integration. The responsibility for coordination appears to rest with the PAPS Commissioner, an elected official whose role is inherently political.

In the previous structure, dedicated directors managed coordination and reported to their respective commissioners. This ensured that technical collaboration, particularly between the governance and peace and security functions, was institutionally embedded. By contrast, the current structure risks fostering institutional rivalries and working in silos.

Another missing element is a unified policy framework. Although there have been some interactions between the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and PSC since the merger, these exchanges have yet to yield a clear process for connecting governance with peace and security.

The African Governance Architecture and African Peace and Security Architecture remain institutionally distinct. While the PSC Protocol covers both, the merger has not combined instruments such as the APRM and the Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment. More fundamentally, there have been limited efforts to articulate a shared policy direction or clarify how PAPS should function as an integrated structure.

These gaps underline the need for a comprehensive review of the merger. A useful starting point would be to reintegrate CEWS and the AU Border Programme into the department’s organisational structure. However, what is ultimately required is a fundamental rethinking of PAPS’ architecture.

Adequate staffing and resourcing are key – AU member states must invest in structures that match their mandates

One option could be to establish a PAPS chief of staff, or secretary, to oversee coordination across the two directorates. The secretary could manage partnerships, supervise the PSC Secretariat, and ensure financial oversight. This would help bridge the gap between political leadership and the operational level. It would also allow the PAPS Commissioner to focus on strategic direction and high-level representation.

To ensure greater thematic and functional coherence, the department's internal configuration should be reconsidered. A restructured PAPS might include three directorates. One could cover conflict prevention and management, and integrate the regional desks. A second could focus on security affairs and operations, and include all forms of field deployments. The third could be dedicated to governance, democratic institutions, human rights and related issues.

None of these changes will succeed without adequate staffing and resourcing. The persistent mindset of ‘doing more with less’ has reached its limit. If the AU is to meet its continental objectives on peace, governance and security, member states must commit to investing in structures that match their mandates.

Ultimately, the success or failure of the PAPS merger will be determined by whether it is a cohesive and capable institution. Five years on, this remains an open question – one that deserves careful reflection and bold corrective action by the Commission’s new leadership. The multiplication of governance and security crises in Africa requires a better equipped AU Commission.


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