Double Political Assassinations in Guinea Bissau: What Future for the Country?
blurb:isstoday:040309guineabissau
4 March 2009: Double Political Assassinations in Guinea Bissau: What Future for the Country?
On Sunday, 1 March 2009, Guinea Bissau’s Army Chief of Staff, General Batista Tagme Na Waie was killed by a group of unknown soldiers that attacked his office at the army headquarters. It was reported that six other people were killed and part of Waie’s office destroyed by rocket propelled grenades. On Monday, in what looked like an act of revenge, the country’s president João Bernado “Nino” Vieira was killed by military elements as he attempted to flee his house following threats by officers loyal to the assassinated Chief of the Army to revenge his killing. This seems to have thrown Guinea Bissau and, possibly, the West African region into yet another cycle of instability.
However, the immediate concern is whether these developments over the past weekend are likely to bring the post-conflict reconstruction process in that country to a halt. In the minds of many actors, both in and outside Bissau, this begs the question as to what does the future hold for the tiny West African country. It seems to pose tremendous challenges to regional institutions and development partners as far as the peace building process is concerned.
While there has not been any official justification of the attacks, the deterioration of the political situation in Guinea Bissau since 2007 and the ill-feeling between President Nino Vieira
and the Army Chief of Staff in recent months might shed some light on the two incidents just a few hours from one another. It is difficult to pinpoint where the direct cause for this political instability lies. The country of just over 1.6 million inhabitants is very poor and weakened by chronic political violence, over-dominance of an ill-disciplined and ageing army and deep-rooted drug trafficking networks that provide the political elite and the army hierarchy with enough resources to manipulate the political process to their advantage. But it could be argued that the country’s chronic political instability and the recourse to political violence to settle disagreements point to the fragility of the state and its institutions in Guinea Bissau.
Since the country held the legislative elections in November 2008 amidst a political crisis following the collapse of the 2007 Pact of Stability signed by the major political actors, it was expected that the electoral process would provide for a new leadership required to ease political tensions and put back on track the peace building process. Of course President Nino Vieira,
in an attempt to regain control of the political machinery in the country, unsuccessfully sought to weaken his former party, the Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) - by extension the opposition - by creating and supporting a dissident Republican Party for Independence and Development (PRID) that contributed to the polarisation of the political landscape. PRID performed poorly in the November 2008 legislative elections, wining only three seats out of 100 while the PAIGC won 67 seats and former President Kumba Yala’s Party for Social Renovation (PRS) secured 28 seats. The remaining two seats went to independent candidates. But, hardly had the dust settled on the elections that a group of armed officers allegedly under the leadership of Alexander Yala, the nephew of Kumba Yala, attacked the residence of President Vieira
in an attempted military coup or assassination.
Viewed from the perspective of country’s political environment, the defeat of President Vieira’s sponsored political party was a clear sign of his fading popularity and the reshaping of the political landscape in Guinea Bissau to the advantage of the PAIGC under a new leadership. Though Vieira
was to remain as the country’s president until 2010 when his five-year mandate was supposed to end, he was forced to share his executive authority with a Prime Minister from the opposition PAIGC, his former political home. In such a dispensation, the control of the presidency alone was no longer enough in ensuring control over the distribution of resources and strengthening his bargaining power within the army largely dominated by the Balante ethnic group. Vieira himself is a member of the Papel ethnic group, which comprises approximately 5% of Guinea-Bissau's population. Normally, complete control over the State can only be ensured if the President has a majority in parliament, which would then allow him to have a Prime Minister from his own political camp, and avoid having to cohabitate with someone from the opposition.
This being the case, and though Vieira
promised support to the opposition Prime Minister, it was expected that the cohabitation between the three centres of power – the Prime Minister Carlos Gomez Junior and his party controlling Parliament and sharing the executive with the President, the army holding the key for political (in)stability and a marginalised presidency - would not favour Vieira. In both military and political terms, the President found it difficult to manoeuvre.
This said, it is important to stress that the events of the weekend are the outcomes of the constant antagonism between President Vieira
and the Army chief of staff who frequently accused Vieira
of being involved in drug trafficking and corruption - an excuse enough for the military establishment to plot a coup. For one, General Tagme Na Waie was a member of the military junta that overthrew President Vieira
in 1999. This followed a dispute over the implementation of the political reforms as part of the recommendations of the peace agreement that put an end to a year-long civil war in the country (1998-99). The civil war had started following a standstill between Vieira
and his then Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Ansumane Mane. Even though for many years Gen. Na Waie had been supportive of Vieira
, a veteran of the independence war (1962-1974), the relations between the two leaders had turned sour lately. In January this year, the army chief narrowly escaped an assassination attempt and accused the President and his reported 400 militiamen for being behind it. The assassination of the army Chief of Staff on Sunday and a retaliation by his supporters on Monday resulting in the killing of the President once again highlight the danger of a fractionalised army that had resisted every attempt at reform and a polarised political elite failing to implement proper and genuine political reforms.
Although the military have vowed to respect the constitutional order by allowing the Speaker of Parliament to take over as caretaker president and organise fresh elections as stipulated by the Constitution, the weekend’s double assassination is likely to have serious implications for the future of the peace building process in Guinea Bissau. As the international community and regional organisations are striving to define the right formula to propel Guinea Bissau from chronic political instability, and free the country from the scourge of drug trafficking, this incident has brought to the fore two key challenges.
On the one hand, it exposes the precarious socio-political environment in Guinea Bissau with an army fractured around factions, each aligned behind political leaders and prepared to go to the extremes to preserve their interests. All the factions are prepared to resort to political violence as a tool to gain control and undermine any political process aiming at restoring credibility to state institutions if such reforms are not in their narrow selfish interests.
On the other hand, the army in its current shape and configuration may no longer be relied upon either to ensure the security of the citizens or to defend the state and its institutions. There is a deep concern amongst the countries and the West African region that the internal rivalry within the army, which manifested in such a dramatic manner, might reignite the armed conflict again if regional institutions do not react immediately to save the post-November 2008 elections dispensation.
While awaiting the reaction of the Economic Community of West African States, the AU and the extra-regional development partners, it is only prudent to suggest that any lasting solution to the perennial crisis in Guinea Bissau should be based on three key priorities. Key among these is the Security Sector Reform, mainly the reform of the army that requires urgent attention from both local and international actors. The second focus should be on the consolidation of state institutions that supersede the personalities of the leaders. It is already a good thing that the political elite and the army have decided to respect the constitutional order. The third priority is the need to enable the ensuing government to provide the basic needs of the population who have clearly expressed their exasperations about political intrigues in Guinea Bissau.
If the constitutional provisions prevail and peaceful, free and fair elections are held at the end of the transitional period, the PAIGC is likely to regain the control of the presidency to seal their November 2008 parliamentary victory. It remains to be seen whether or not the PAIGC’s return to full power will be translated into the rebirth of Guinea Bissau and the fulfilment of the ideals fought for by the liberation hero, Amilcar Cabral in the 1960s. In Guinea Bissau, nothing should be taken for granted. The victory or the consolidation of the PAIGC influence on the national scene could be an opportunity to address the past wrongdoings but also a recipe for promoting political patronage. As they deliberate on the situation, ECOWAS and other partners should take these dimensions and dynamics into consideration.
Dr David Zounmenou, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
