Democracy Should Accompany Disarmament in South Sudan
Following the death of SPLA-defector Colonel Gatluak Gai on 23 July 2011, the author argues that efforts to reform the army and make peace in South Sudan should be accompanied by a democratisation process.
Hallelujah Lulie, Junior Researcher, Security Sector Governance Programme, ISS Addis Ababa Office
On 23 July 2011 one of the main rebel leaders in South Sudan, Colonel Gatluak Gai, was confirmed dead by government officials after he was shot at Pakur where his forces were temporarily assembled. Colonel Gai, who was active in the oil rich Unity State, was shot dead only three days after he signed a peace deal with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
Gai defected from the SPLA and rebelled against South Sudan’s government after he cried foul at the April 2010 elections. He had since controlled different parts of Unity State and rejected the public amnesty to all those who took up arms against the government in Juba.
The ceasefire was signed on July 20, 2011 after months of negotiations with Unity State Governor Taban Deng Gai. According to the agreement he was promised the rank of Lt. General in the SPLA. The SPLA confirmed the killing and accused Gai’s deputy, Marko Chuol Ruei, of murdering his own boss, following a disagreement on the terms of the peace deal.
Many doubt the SPLA’s claims about the murder. An official from another rebel group active in Unity State contradicted the statement by the SPLA, stating that the rebel leader was lured to the peace process and attacked by the same forces with which he signed the agreement. The family of the late rebel leader has also accused the government and its army, the SPLA, of involvement in Gai’s death. His brother, Gai Gatwich Kuey said the plot to kill Gai was out of anger about the SPLA rank of Lt. General that he was granted in the negotiations.
Gai’s mysterious and controversial death, has further escalated the tension and mistrust between the government and the armed rebel groups in various regions of the country. The murder may also hamper the future of such negotiations and is likely to make the remaining rebel leaders less likely to accept the amnesty offered by President Salva Kiir. The rebellion still affects many of the nine states of South Sudan. These include Jonglei (where two armed groups led by George Athor, and Gabriel Tang-Ginye, took up arms against the SPLA/M); Unity (where Peter Gatdet Yak and the late Gatluk Gai had also launched two insurrections); Upper Nile (where Captain Uluak Olony initiated another armed rebellion); and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (where Abdel Bagi Agyii started yet another rebellion). Clashes between these armed groups and the SPLA have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the displacement of many more.
The death of Gai and the proliferation of rebel groups in South Sudan demonstrate the mammoth and complicated process of building a professional, disciplined and democratic national army and security sector.
The struggle for the liberation of South Sudan under the leadership of the SPLM, the political wing, and the SPLA, the military wing, began three decades ago and resulted in the deaths and displacement of millions of people. Since the end of the war in 2005 and the independence of South Sudan three weeks ago, the government of South Sudan has become the sole legal institution for the provision of security in the new state. However, issues related to reform of the army and the creation of an inclusive security apparatus, remain highly challenging tasks for the government in Juba. Ensuring the ethnic balance and regional representation at all levels of the army will be another important consideration.
The test of transforming a guerrilla movement into a convention national army with the right professionalism, structure and discipline is time consuming, even in the presence of a genuine political will for such change. Lack of a progressive democratisation process and institutions would further complicate and deepen the problem of security sector reform (SSR). Countries like Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Rwanda, which have national armies that evolved from victorious rebel groups, are facing the same challenges of building inclusive and independent armed forces.
It should be remembered that both the leaders of the political and military wings of the government of South Sudan were part of a single movement for decades. Such a legacy complicates the realisation of independence of institutions and the democratic and civilian control of the armed forces. The priorities of the armed forces in South Sudan have been determined by the political leadership and there is significant political interference in military matters. This undermines not only the independence and merit-based system of promotion and appointments within the military, but also negatively affects the legitimacy of the institution amongst the wider public.
The SPLA has been unable to deliver security to the wider South Sudanese population. This has complicated and prolonged the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process affecting the various ethnic and tribal militia groups. In a post conflict country where there are still ongoing resource based inter or intra-ethnic clashes, civilians still resort to local militias or arming themselves for security. The Geneva-based Small Arms Survey estimated that in 2007, between 1.9 and 3.2 million firearms were in circulation in Southern Sudan, two-thirds of which were in civilian hands.
The security sector is crucial to political control. Resistance to transformation and lack of political will and leadership for reforming the security sector is often encountered by those actors that should be driving the process. The challenge varies from opposition to democratisation and change by national political leaders and opposition to change by factional and local leaders, to personal considerations such as maintaining power, influence and patronage. The consequences are often misunderstanding and confusion. South Sudan is facing all the above challenges in its endeavour to reform the army. According to some reports the South Sudanese Army has more than 800 generals, compared to for example the Ethiopian Army which has around 50. Such hierarchical imbalance makes any attempt to restructure the army, and make it more effective and efficient, a very difficult task as the existing number of high ranking officers would tend to hamper a harmonised chain of command and institutional structure.
SSR must be understood and pursued as a democratic process. Most rebel groups are active in South Sudan because of discontent and frustration with the national democratic and political processes. Many rebels, including Gai, defected from the army following the election which witnessed serious irregularities. This fact reinforces the view that the success of SSR in transitional countries like South Sudan ought to rely heavily on the higher goal of entrenching democracy at state level. Army reforms can only be the reflection of efforts by the civilian administration to democratize the state.
In an anticipated decision on 27 July 2011 the African Union (AU) officially admitted South Sudan as its 54th member state. Admission to the AU is decided by a simple majority of the Member States and no other criteria are required. The AU needs to closely monitor, guide and assist the new state to ensure that the new nation implements the ideals and values of the Union.
It is clear that the GoSS inherited a litany of complex problems upon assuming power. The new government needs a national dialogue and reconciliation process as a basis for a final and comprehensive political settlement, both for ending the proliferation of armed rebel groups and launching a successful nation-building process which also includes an effective SSR.
