Chad-Sudan Proxy Wars Could Lead to Overt Confrontation
blurb:isstoday:05062008chad
05 Jun 2008: Chad-Sudan Proxy Wars Could Lead to Overt Confrontation
The attack on Omdurman, on the Western banks of the Nile River, by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on May10th have brought diplomatic tensions between Chad and Sudan to a boiling point and increased the probability of an overt confrontation. The question arises why relations between N’Djamena and Khartoum have deteriorated to such an extent that overt confrontation now seems a possibility? Why have friends suddenly become foes and how does the latest diplomatic tension impact on the crises in Chad and Darfur?
At the heart of the Chad-Sudan crisis, is the quest for political surivival of the regimes in both Khartoum and N’djamena. Against the backdrop of the absence of democratic institutions to manage elite contestation in both countries, the diplomatic tension is the residue of the political strategy of aligment and re-alignment.
Consequently, Western Darfur and Eastern Chad have become an extension of Chad and Sudan’s domestic political arenas. The present crisis has its roots in the domestic politics/crisis in Chad and Sudan. Presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Idriss Déby of Chad could definitely survive - at least for now - if they could cooperate and desist from supporting rebellions in each other’s backyard. However, if they both decide on a proxy war, depending on military and diplomatic assymetrics, one of them might pay the ultimate price.
As president Déby was preparing to change the constitution to stay on beyond the two-term limit imposed by the constitution, he was faced with a political delimma. How to maintian cohension and manage ambitions within the ruling elite; respond to calls from Darfurian rebels for support, but most importantly keep his strategic alliance with Khartoum? Khartoum and Sudanense Zaghawas who were instrumental in his ascedance to power have over time parted ways. Déby’s attempt to refuse refuge and support to the Darfur rebels provided opportunity to some of his close collaborators such as Timane Erdimi to strengthen their political base and present themselves as people the Zaghawas can count on. In an attempt to remain relevant to Khartoum, and strengthen internal support, president Déby engineered division amongst the Darfur rebels and reluntactantly supported some. In response Khartoum started supporting Chadian rebel groups who has sought sanctuary in Darfur.
This in no way to suggest that JEM - one the Darfur rebel groups being supported by N’djamena - is a surrogate of Déby. The reality is Déby’s precarious security dilemma has made JEM an indispensable partner in Déby’s military calculus and in the process limiting his manouvering space to contrain JEM. Thus, did N’djamena support the offensive on Omdurman? If the answer is yes, what was the nature of its support? Did they know about and consent to it? Clearly Déby would prefer a harmonious relationship with Sudan, as it would spare him political and military energy to engage his enemies. However, since JEM has become an indispendable partner in Déby’s military strategy, there is little doubt JEM is no more a junior partner in the alliance. While it might seems Chad did consent to or at least had knowledge of the Omdurman attacks, it is highly unlikely it provided soldiers and effective military support considering its army is overstreched. Thus, while the Omdurman attack could be an attempt by JEM to establish itself as the most credible Darfur rebel group it seems to have changed the military assymetrics of the proxy wars between Chad and Sudan.
In the space of over three years, Chadian rebels supported by Khartoum have come close to toppling Déby, but this has not been the case with the rebels fighting Khartoum.
From a strategic perspective, continued crisis between Chad and Sudan has played into the hands of Déby and Bashir. The crisis in Chad for example is increasingly beeing looked upon through the prism of a regional crisis and in the processes given precedence over policy aimed at stabilisation which in effect has benefited president Déby. For example, N’djamena views EUFOR as additional protection, strengthening the usual French support, sparing its own forces the cost of protecting civilians, and allowing them to concentrate on fighting the rebels instead.
As for Sudan, the hightened tension with Chad seems to have diverted attension from the faltering Comprehensive Peace Agreement with South Sudan. Moreover, the recent crisis has once more hightened the humanitarian cataptrophy of continued crisis in Darfur. While Western media and NGOs have played to this gallery, it is important to note that emphasis on the humanitarian crisis in Darfur have overshadowed the political grievaces that led to the war in the first place.
Though president Omar al-Bashir might have given up his Islamic expansionist agenda to break international isolation, his recents ranting that Chad is an Isreali agent shows how far the present crisis with Chad has afforded him a mobilising ground to enlist Moslem and Islamic support both within and outside his country.
From a policy perspective, the diplomatic squabbles between Chad and Sudan seems to suggest that though the rebellions in Chad and Darfur do have their specifics, sustainable peace cannot be achieved in Darfur without ensuring Déby’s political security, nor can peace be achieved in Chad without guarantees of President Bashir’s survival - at least for now.
Chrysantus Ayangafac,
Senior Researcher Direct Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa
