Can Mozambique’s new counter-terrorism centre deliver?
The centre fills a major counter-insurgency gap in the north, but the challenge will be translating good intentions into results.
In November 2025, Mozambique established the National Centre for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism (CTC) to coordinate its responses to terrorism. This is a long-overdue step after nine years of torment by Islamic State-backed insurgents, during which over 6 700 people have been killed in nearly 2 500 attacks in northern Mozambique.
Terrorist groups exploit local grievances to recruit and radicalise youth who carry out attacks. These grievances arise from social and economic inequalities, youth unemployment, ethnic tensions, elite corruption and the exclusion of local communities from the benefits of vast natural resource extraction.
Despite the array of causes, Mozambique’s government has pursued an overly militaristic response, without much attention to the political and socioeconomic dimensions of terrorism. Private military companies, local militia, and Rwandan and Southern African Development Community (SADC) security forces that have been deployed have failed to defeat the insurgency.
One of the biggest gaps has been the absence of a national strategy and a centralised coordination mechanism, leading to fragmented and competing responses from various government agencies.
On the ground, there was competition between the police’s Rapid Intervention Unit and Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) for overall command of counter-terrorism operations in Cabo Delgado. When FADM Deputy Chief of the General Staff Bertolino Capitine questioned the police’s dominant role early on, he was dismissed by then president Filipe Nyusi.
Weak security force coordination was the main reason operations failed to prevent the insurgency’s growth
Coordination among the SADC Mission in Mozambique, Rwanda Defence Force and Mozambican security forces was also weak, which was the main reason counter-terrorism operations failed to prevent the growth of the insurgency.
Recognising this challenge, the government approved the National Strategy for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in March 2025. The CTC was one of its key provisions and marks a turning point in Mozambique’s counter-terrorism coordination. The strategy and centre also fulfil Mozambique’s international commitments under the United Nations, African Union and SADC counter-terrorism strategies.
The CTC comprises two specialised units. One is responsible for scientific research and data analysis; the other for coordinating operations, conducting risk analysis and security. CTC analysts are drawn from the military, intelligence services, police, prosecution and Financial Intelligence Unit. The centre may also include resident and non-resident researchers, as well as national and international experts.
Its tasks include periodic assessments of vulnerabilities, modes of radicalisation and drivers of violent extremism. It will run community awareness and social integration programmes to prevent the recruitment and radicalisation of young people. Terrorist financing will be countered by working with financial and investigative institutions to identify and block illicit capital flows intended to fund insurgents in Mozambique.
The defence minister appoints the CTC’s director in consultation with the operational command of the army and police. The centre’s current head is Brigadier-General Aníbal Manuel Fernando, a career military officer. His appointment shows that the military maintains control of counter-terrorism coordination. That, in turn, suggests that a military-focused approach will continue at the expense of broader responses.
The military is neither transparent nor flexible enough to coordinate with multiple agencies, particularly civilian ones
The military is not transparent or flexible enough to coordinate with multiple agencies, particularly civilian ones. Basing the centre in a transparent and dynamic civilian or higher state authority, such as the presidency, with national convening power would be a better arrangement.
The CTC is an important step in resolving Mozambique’s terror threat. However, six challenges could hamper success.
First, it has yet to establish a presence outside the capital, Maputo. The CTC currently operates only at the central level, over 2 400 km by road from the areas affected by recruitment, radicalisation and attacks.
Second, the complexity of terrorism requires multidisciplinary and specialised expertise, as well as financial resources. But the centre presently relies on personnel seconded from various security departments who continue to represent their parent institutions, thereby replicating the inter-agency competition already observed in Cabo Delgado. Another risk is that staff are recalled before they have mastered their functions, or just as they are settling into their new roles.
A third challenge is the shortage of financial resources and technological capabilities to conduct research and disseminate information on preventing and combating terrorism. Mozambique already faces severe budgetary constraints, including delays in paying wages in key sectors, such as soldiers deployed in Cabo Delgado. The CTC must secure funds to pay its approximately 40 staff.
The centre must address the root causes of terrorism, but its design and structure do not reflect that aim
Fourth is the need for better coordination between various state and civil society actors. Mechanisms will be required to harmonise security operations and policies, and share information. Since 2021, the various militaries have led counter-terrorism operations, but competition between government security agencies persists.
There is also a lack of coordination and mistrust between the FADM and Rwandan forces, particularly due to suspicions that Mozambican forces have leaked operational information, compromising missions. There have also been claims that Rwandan forces have become lax, leading to more terror incidents, which in turn reinforces the need for multinationals in Cabo Delgado to be provided with security.
The fifth challenge is perhaps the most complex. The centre must address the root causes of terrorism, but its design and structure do not reflect that aim. Tackling social, ethnic and religious factors, unemployment, exclusion and state absence in the north, requires a whole-of-society response. The CTC is not set up to ensure the participation of private actors, local communities, civil society organisations, religious leaders and other stakeholders.
Last, disrupting the financing and recruitment networks that sustain terrorism requires technological and digital tools, specialised drones and air power. So far, the CTC lacks the budget and a strategy to procure these technologies.
Establishing the centre is one positive step, but enabling it to succeed is another. Real political will to counter terrorism requires fully equipping the CTC, departing from its military-centred approach and uniting citizens and stakeholders behind a strategy that balances security, political and socioeconomic needs.
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