Africa 2009: Some Preliminary Observations
blurb:isstoday:120109africa2009
12 January 2009: Africa 2009: Some Preliminary Observations
The recent shocks emanating from the banking sub-prime crisis and the contraction in global economic prospects serve as a timely reminder of the dangers of predicting the future. However, there are certain indicators to go by. Though Africa in general is likely to experience little direct damage to its banking sectors as a result of the crisis, the knock-on effect of growing risk aversion and the immense fiscal commitments made by governments across the world in an attempt to mitigate its effects will undoubtedly be felt in Africa and elsewhere. Foreign direct investment in emerging markets and areas regarded as politically challenging will be reduced, and aid budgets cut. This will put pressure on the balance of payments positions of many African countries. The decline in oil prices will provide welcome relief to many poorer countries, but will severely affect states overly dependent upon oil exports.
Compounding these problems has been the descent into recession of the major industrial economies with the fall of commodity prices. The contraction of consumer markets in Europe and the Americas will be felt badly in China, a major importer of African raw materials. Although Beijing has announced a massive financial package to stimulate domestic growth by way of compensating and avoiding the worst effects of trade contraction, this will take time to realise. Many African states will therefore see an alarming fall not only in exports by volume but especially by value. This will have a considerable effect on governments’ ability to meet their revenue requirements, and continued volatility in the markets will make for difficulties in budgeting. Social expenditure, already under pressure in many states, will be especially vulnerable to austerity policies, with obvious consequences for human security.
Countries such as Zambia, with its excessive dependence on copper exports, and oil producers such as Nigeria will find their budgets thrown into turmoil. In some countries the difficulties of paying civil service and security forces’ salaries may be aggravated, with potentially dangerous political consequences. There is some good news, however, in that food and fuel prices have declined from their historic highs, and this creates a breathing space for more sustainable policies to be introduced in these sectors.
On the political front it is fairly safe to predict that a number of current crises will remain essentially unresolved. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) will continue to resist attempts to consolidate anything resembling a democratic state with effective administrative control over the national territory.
Sudan, too, will continue to exercise the imaginations of international diplomats and domestic politicians, in terms both of the Darfur catastrophe and the looming deadlines in the process initiated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). On the latter score there are likely to be delays built into the election schedule, and possibly some slippage on the date for the South’s referendum, though this would be preferable to the total collapse of the CPA.
Somalia is another country with little prospect of state reconstruction, though the new year may see a radical realignment of political forces following the Ethiopians' withdrawal, which has left the Transitional Federal Government to its own inadequate devices. A new and even more complex balance of internal forces will determine the immediate future.
Zimbabwe is another state that will continue to feature in the headlines, and it is possible that attention will shortly begin to focus on the internal rifts within the ruling ZANU-PF, possibly paving the way for some kind of post-Mugabe dispensation in conjunction with elements of the MDC. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe’s economic recovery will be a long and painful one, even given the most favourable of political contexts.
Some countries emerging from conflict will continue to deserve the international community’s support: Sierra Leone and Liberia come immediately to mind, but Chad and the Central African Republic will certainly need further international attention.
A number of elections are due to be held in 2009. South Africa’s parliamentary contest should be the most interesting since the advent of democracy in 1994. A new party has emerged from within the ranks of the dominant ANC, and though its popularity remains untested, South Africa’s system of proportional representation may see inroads made upon the existing majority.
Ghana has opened the year with a second peaceful change of leadership at the ballot box, setting an example that has drawn deserved praise. Even Guinea’s coup towards the end of the last year may prove an unlikely harbinger of democratic transition in that country, though the international community finds this difficult to acknowledge publicly. Elsewhere the prospects for democratic consolidation seem somewhat precarious, as a number of aging leaders seek either to prolong their stay in office or impose their choice of successor, often from the ranks of their own family. The constitutional change in Algeria that will allow President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to run for a third mandate, will also confirm the banalisation of constitutional manipulation in Africa. Although it is too early to draw conclusions about the impact of these constitutional changes on the democratisation process in the continent, they certainly indicate the resilience of “fathers of the nation” in democratising countries.
The election of Barack Obama, an African-American, as 44th President of the United States was hailed by many in this continent as heralding a possible upturn in Africa’s global profile. A more sober assessment would remind us that on 20 January he will become the US President, not the President of Africa, or even Kenya. He will take office at a time of troubles virtually unmatched in the last half century. Not only will President Obama have to steer a policy course between the rocks of economic depression and heightened expectations of many who voted for him, he faces a foreign policy environment that would be daunting in even the best of circumstances. Israel’s violent reactions to Hamas provocations in Gaza will provide him with an early opportunity to test his diplomatic skills.
Certainly we can look forward to a better informed and more humane US policy towards Africa and a view that sees the continent less as a threat or a theatre of operations. Countries with poor human rights records may find it less easy to trade support for the war against terror against their treatment of their people. But Africa will remain largely marginalised in global economic and political affairs and, though this may lead to the continuation of a number of difficulties as far as debt relief, economic assistance and equitable trading rules are concerned, it may also create space for more sober consideration of domestic policies that could help alleviate the dire effects of mass poverty in Africa. Recent experience in global markets should also lead to a useful revision of the neo-liberal triumphalism that followed the end of the Cold War, and this can only be to the good.
Richard Cornwell, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
