A new Rural Safety Strategy

The plight of South Africa’s farming community again made headlines these last few weeks because of what seems to be a new spate of murders on farmers. The remarks by ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema last week, when he repeated the anti-apartheid chant ‘kill the farmer, kill the Boer” also did not help to lift the mood in the farming community. The closing of the rural Commando’s, which played a key role in the rural protection plan, also worsened the situation. Meanwhile the promise of

Published on 19 March 2010 in ISS Today

Henri Boshoff. Head Peace Missions Programme, ISS Pretoria

The plight of South Africa’s farming community again made headlines these last few weeks because of what seems to be a new spate of murders on farmers.

The remarks by ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema last week, when he repeated the anti-apartheid chant ‘kill the farmer, kill the Boer” also did not help to lift the mood in the farming community. The closing of the rural Commando’s, which played a key role in the rural protection plan, also worsened the situation. Meanwhile the promise of replacing the Commondo’s with Sector Policing and a strengthened police presence, in order not to leave a vacuum, did not materialise.

Already in 2006 the Policy Advisory Council announced that Sector Policing has failed to achieve the results envisaged by the police because of a lack of clear policy and resources. This meant that farmers in the rural areas became responsible for their own security.

Agricultural union Agri South Africa on 8 March 2010 hosted a rural safety workshop in Pretoria to find a way out of this crisis in consultation with all the role players. During the meeting the South African Police Service (SAPS) presented its new draft Rural Safety Strategy. It is important to understand that the previous Rural Protection Plan was focused on the farming community, while the new Rural Safety Strategy includes the broad rural community within South Africa and not only farmers.

Rural Areas are defined as “ sparsely populated areas in which people farm or depend on natural resources, including villages and small towns that are dispersed throughout these areas”. It includes “large settlements in former homelands, created by apartheid removals, which depend for their survival on migration labour and remittances”.

The strategy is based on six pillars:

The strategy focuses on the concept of Sector Policing and Reservists. It is unfortunate that the strategy is based on plans that have failed in the past, not because of the strategy but because of the inability of the SAPS to implement it and a lack of resources. This is not unique to the rural areas but is also experienced in urban areas by Community Police Forums. Sector Policing often does not go any further than phase two: the identification of the sectors. The moment phase three is implemented, namely the allocation of resources, personnel and equipment, the strategy ends because of a lack of resources.

Relying on Reservists also raises questions because of inadequate budgets and a lack of funds at station level to call up Reservists. Reservists are often deployed in hotspots instead of being deployed in the areas for which they had been recruited. There is a problem of insufficient training and the prolonged process of joining the Reservists.

The biggest challenge for this new strategy to work is that it lacks two crucial capabilities; house and hearth protection and an area-bound dedicated reaction force. Although the strategy mentions house and heart protection, it does not empower the farmers (or, as per the new strategy, the rural inhabitants) with the means, knowledge and ability to protect themselves. This includes radio communications, weapons for self-defense, first aid and a link to a dedicated reaction force. The strategy also fails to address dedicated area-bound reaction forces in the rural communities.

The restructuring of the crime combating units is perhaps an indication of the shortcomings that have emerged after the Commando’s were phased out. A mere three years after the announcement that the crime combating units would be part of the new system to replace the Commando’s, these units were restructured and their numbers halved.

What are the practical implications on the ground? The tendency in both the rural and urban areas is that the communities have accepted the concept of Sector Policing as well as the fact that the police does not have the capacity to implement, man and resource Sector Policing. Communities are now using their own resources to impliment this by establishing sector operational centers, voluntarily manning it and equipping it with radio communication to mobile patrols and individual farms and houses. Community members are also identified and put on standby rosters to be called upon as a dedicated reaction capability, with the limitation of not having powers to arrest.

Communities overcome this limitation with good coordination between themselves and the local police stations. Evaluations of the crime situation in policing areas where these initiatives are in place clearly show a decline in crime.

In conclusions it is clear that the SAPS probably has to rethink its strategy and possibly consult with the rural communities, including the farming communities, because we are talking about addressing two different target groups with different needs. This is crucial given that the previous Rural Protection Plan was drawn up after extensive consultation in all the provinces.