30 January 2009: A Bridge Too Far: Demobilising the FDLR

The latest developments in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirms that there is a serious effort by the Congolese and Rwandan Governments to pursue the former Hutu soldiers, the Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and at the same time deal with the rebel group, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). On 4 December 2008 representatives of the DRC and Rwanda signed the so-called “Four on Four agreement” that provides for the DRC army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) supported by Rwanda, to forcefully disarm the FDLR. This idea of forcefully disarming the FDLR comes a long way and even formed the basis of the Nairobi agreement signed in 2007. However, previous operations against the FDLR in the past have failed.

Bookmark with:

Facebook

del.icio.us

Digg It!

Against the background of the ongoing Nairobi talks a meeting outside the process was held on 16 January 2009 at the Ihusi hotel in Goma, Eastern DRC between CNDP, PARECO (another local rebel group in the DRC), the Government of DRC and Rwanda. A declaration was signed and the signatures undertook to do the following:

CNDP and PARECO will put their forces under operational command of the FARDC
CNDP will be ready for integration into the FARDC under the supervision of a Joint Commission
A commitment of CNDP to peace in the DRC
The readiness of CNDP to fight FDLR
FARDC to build confidence in Eastern DRC and ensure the return of peace to the region
CNDP will immediately dismantle all roadblocks in the North Kivu
Government of DRC to accelerate the implementation of the Goma Agreement and the implementation of the Amani process.

All the CNDP commanders signed the declaration and gave it their full support.

This came as a surprise and questions the position of CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda – recently apprehended in Rwanda - and how serious the split is between him and his former deputy Jean Bosco Ntaganda. It is seems evident that Rwanda has lost confidence in Nkunda and is concerned about his growing political ambition. This also explains the split in the CNDP. The fact that Bosco was willing to negotiate with the Government of DRC supported by Rwanda have provided the ideal scenario for the Governments of Rwanda and the DRC to deal with the issue of CNDP, PARECO and FDLR.

These developments might sound positive, but there is serious concern about the way forward and the process to be followed. According to the agreement CNDP agrees to go into brassage, (a thorough process of integration into the national army) but also stated that CNDP and PARECO will come under operational command of FARDC to fight against FDLR. Rwanda has undertaken to give logistical and intelligence support to the FARDC/CNDP/PARECO force.

This intention, however, quickly changed when two thousands RDF troops with heavy military weaponry entered into DRC on 20 January 2009 to go after FDLR. This operation looks very much like a repeat of the 2007 mixage process where FARDC and CNDP were integrated without going through the brassage process and was taken up in the FARDC, largely with its structures in tact.

The outcome is now well known: a humanitarian disaster in North Kivu. To make matters worse the UN force in the DRC, MONUC, is not involved in any planning of these operations - again a repeat of 2007. In addition, the position of Jean Bosco and his possible integration into the FARDC, while there is an International Criminal Court warrant out for his arrest, is further cause for concern.

MONUC has in the interim put in place contingency plans to deal with the possible consequences. This includes the following:

Early identification of possible flash points
Likely reaction of FDLR
Impact on civilians
Possible attacks on IDP camps by FDLR
Possible tasks in support of FARDC
Protection of civilians.

It is important to note that the MONUC mandate only provides for MONUC to support FARDC and not rebel groups or the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF). The possible involvement of the RDF in the Eastern DRC has already raised concern in the Kivus. Questions could also be asked about the capability of the combined FARDC/CNDP/Pareco force; even with the support of RDF, to successfully carry out a military operation against the FDLR. Before 2002 RDF had 20 000 soldiers in the Kivus and they could not defeat the FDLR. The possible outcome of such an operation is extremely worrying.

We have seen what the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) did after being attacked by a combined FARDC, Ugandan and South Sudan military: they dispersed into smaller groups and attacked civilians. Up until now, the operation in Ituri against the LRA has not been successful and the rebels continue to attack civilians. The FDLR has in the past used the same tactics with success.

Perhaps the Government of DRC must relook its modus operandi and rather brassage the CNDP, PARECO and other signatories to the Goma Agreement as part of the Amani process. Leave the demobilisation and repatriation to MONUC and the FARDC.

It is unfortunate that the DRC is back to the 2002 situation with both the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force and the RDF back in Eastern DRC. Ugandan and Rwandan armies backed several Congolese rebellions over the last 15 years under the pretext of hunting their rebels in the DRC. In a worst-case scenario, six months down the line the FDLR, CNDP, and LRA could all still be in Eastern DRC, as well as the Rwandans and Ugandans!

Henri Boshoff, Military Analyst, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tswhane (Pretoria)