CHAPTER 7: Public order policing and the 2010 FIFA World Cup

CHAPTER 7

Public Order Policing and the 2010 Fifa World Cup

SAPS` COSTLY RESTRUCTURING
A Review of Public Order Policing Capacity

 

Monograph No 138, October 2007

 

Bilkis Omar

The South African Police Service has a good track record for providing security at major international events. According to the deputy national Commissioner, Andre Pruis, ‘The security blueprint employed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development is being employed at all United Nations events’ (The Star 28 June 2006). The SAPS demonstrated its ability to provide security at the Rugby World Cup in 1995, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, and the Cricket World Cup in 2003. The 2010 FIFA World Cup will be the country’s most important test.

Given the undeniably high levels of violent crime in the country and in particular the recent increases in armed robbery and murder (Burger 2007), the SAPS and government in general face a major challenge in both allaying negative perceptions around the FIFA World Cup, and ensuring the safety of those visiting the country in 2010.

The SAPS will need a comprehensive strategy to cope with the expected increase in crime during the World Cup, while simultaneously attending to already high levels of crime, and the management of other public events. Considering that the World Cup is an opportunity for organisations to gain international publicity for various political purposes, the number of public demonstrations is likely to increase during the event.

In addition to the high crime rate, the police will also have to deal with the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism. According to the Minister of Finance, Jabu Moleketi, ‘The SAPS is working together with the International Police (Interpol) to ensure that hooliganism will not ruin the soccer spectacular. The names of hooligans are recorded on a database and these people will be prevented from entering South Africa’ (Moleketi 2007).

Internationally, the existence of the ‘database’ has become contentious because the process of determining who is a hooligan and who is not may infringe on civil liberties and human rights:

The high turnover of ‘personnel’ in the hooligan firms (groups) hampers work to compile profiles on suspects, some members will only attend a few high-profile games over a number of seasons and others will ‘retire’. At the other end of the scale the [United Kingdom] Home Office expressed concern about a ‘new generation’ of young hooligans that are as yet unknown to them…and there is substantial evidence that innocent fans have consistently fallen foul of mass arrests and deportations, particularly in Euro 2000, where only one of the 965 arrested was even charged with an offence (Stott & Pearson nd:6).

Football hooliganism, whether spontaneous or socially organised, almost invariably culminates in violence. The victims may be players, soccer officials, fans or the police; the location may be stadiums, bars, clubs, shopping centres, or even different countries. According to Spaaij (nd:1) ‘trans-national dissimilarities complicate the conceptualisation of football hooliganism’. The SAPS will require the assistance and advice of a range of foreign agencies experienced in dealing with this complex phenomenon.

In preparation for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, the German police introduced regulations banning hooligans from entering stadiums. Some     7 000 of the world’s 10 000 identified soccer hooligans were ranked as ‘most dangerous’ (Tshehla 2006:5). Those banned from stadiums were informed personally about the restriction and had to present themselves for registration at police stations twice a day for the duration of the World Cup so that their movements could be monitored and they could not leave their home cities (Tshehla 2006:10). Unfortunately, while these regulations could be enforced in Germany, they could not be applied to other European Union (EU) countries (Tshehla 2006:5).

The SAPS will have to explore other dynamics associated with the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism, including police behaviour. Spaaij (nd:2) contends that ‘even if self declared hooligans are committed to the use of violence, their behaviour is more often triggered by more spontaneous elements, for instance aggressive policing or an unfortunate match result’. In addition, ‘the important issue to arise from…different but related bodies of research is that public order police tactics, fan/police interactions and crowd dynamics appear to play a very important role in determining the levels of "disorder" that occur in the context of international football tournaments’ (Stott & Pearson nd). 

This means that the SAPS will have to be especially aware of crowd–police dynamics when dealing with soccer fans. The CCU members are well placed to deal with this, given the training and reorganisation they have undergone since 1994. However, the behaviour of other policing agencies like metro police, private security and SAPS VISPOL has to be refined if they are to address these factors. Stott and Pearson (nd), in addition to other international researchers, have suggested that:

‘low profile’ information-led policing (where officers interact with soccer fans in a friendly manner, on the basis on fans’ actual behaviour rather than their reputation), is the most effective at minimising major incidents of ‘disorder’ among ‘high risk’ fans.

Internationally, there is agreement about the potential success of several measures in curbing soccer hooliganism. According to Spaaij (nd:3) these are: the segregation of ‘home’ and ‘away’ fans, fencing, closed circuit television (CCTV), conversion to all-seater stadiums, identity card schemes, and intelligence gathering. It should be noted that hooliganism is not confined to sports stadiums, so policing of the problem needs to be extended to other venues.

A number of studies deal specifically with crowd management of hooligans. Special training is essential, and it would be valuable if CCU trainers and officers were sent abroad to learn more about dealing with the problem. This would be beneficial considering that Spaaij (nd:1) states that although international structures and concerted responses are required, prevention strategies should ultimately be based on local practices and designed to fit local needs.

Structures governing 2010 security in SA

Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the world body governing international football. The South African Football Association (SAFA) is the governing body of local soccer. The Premier Soccer League (PSL), consisting of the soccer clubs in the country, is affiliated to SAFA which is in turn affiliated to the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF), the body governing African football on the continent, and CAF is affiliated to FIFA.

FIFA safety guidelines prescribe safety measures that match organisers, associations and clubs must take to prevent spectator riots and to ensure safety and order within the confines and vicinity of stadiums for the World Cup (FIFA 2004:5). When South Africa was awarded the hosting of the 2010 event, plans had to be put in place to ensure that all FIFA requirements would be met. Apart from infrastructure development, security was the most pressing issue.

From the SAPS side, the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) Priority Committee was formed to deal with security. The committee falls under the auspices of the National JOINTS Committee, which reports to the Justice Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster and/or the National Security Council Director Generals Committee, which falls under the National Security Council at ministerial level.

The NATJOINTS Priority Committee faces a mammoth task and has to prove to the world that South Africa can manage the World Cup. Standards for safety and security had to be put in place by all those involved: the SAPS, South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD), and Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department (EMPD).

Regarding the JOINTS and LOC Security Directorate’s roles in the operational plan for the World Cup, a clear distinction is made between the national security plan and the event safety plans. JOINTS will take responsibility for the national security plan while the LOC will be responsible for event security (Groenewald 2007).

The National JOINTS Priority Committee was replaced by the NATJOINTS Planning Committee, which, with the backing of a planning support team, was to give operational effect to overall safety and security (Groenewald 2007). The NATJOINTS Planning Committee was to work in close consultation with the Local Organising Committee (LOC) Security Directorate, tasked to deal solely with the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Groenewald 2007). However, according to Phasha (2007), ‘The committee met for three to four months, but once again there was no consistency in the attendance of meetings and no follow up on agreements, and the committee fell away’.

The Local Organising Committee has also been concentrating on the development of the Safety at Sports and Recreation Bill. The Bill was poorly received in many sectors with commentators raising concerns about the seemingly impossible requirements. According to Phasha (2007) ‘The Bill was confusing in terms of the reporting structure and going above the Local Government Act and the SAPS Act. The consultation process of the Bill was flawed, there were no public hearings, the sports ministry was pushing for a response and said that FIFA wanted the Bill. In addition because of the "afro pessimism" in Europe, the Bill was being touted at all corners’. After being returned from the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security and Cabinet for review, a new draft was submitted to Cabinet and approved. At the time of writing it was in the process of being promulgated.

Despite these extensive efforts, there is still cause for concern about the security of the FIFA World Cup given that roleplayers’ commitment to the committees appears to have been minimal.

What will be expected of the SAPS

To be operationally ready for the FIFA World Cup, the SAPS has to comply with FIFA minimum standards, the Host City Agreement, and the Organising Association Agreement or the Bid Document (Groenewald 2007). The SAPS security plan comprises seven phases: the current phase being the Run-Up Phase, which ends in mid-June 2009. The subsequent phases are (Groenewald 2007):

• Confederation Cup (17-24 June 2009)

• Pre-tournament phase (July 2009-June 2010)

• Opening ceremony (June 2010)

• Tournament phase (11 June-11 July 2010)

• Final and closing ceremony (July 2010)

• Post world cup phase (debriefing)

Given the different roles and functions of the various policing agencies in South Africa, more clarity is needed regarding the division of labour for the World Cup. A decision was taken by the JOINTS and LOC (Security Directorate) committees that 80 per cent of the responsibility for policing the main pavilion and the inner perimeter of the stadium will be done by private security companies and the remaining 20 per cent will be undertaken by law enforcement agencies (CCUs). Law enforcement agencies will take 80 per cent responsibility for the outer and city perimeters. SAPS VISPOL members will perform crime prevention duties on roads and areas surrounding the stadium. Metro police have been tasked to conduct traffic control outside stadiums.

Uniformed and plainclothes police members will be stationed at strategic points and locations to police crowds outside stadiums. State-of-the-art mobile command vehicles and helicopters, capable of transmitting live video footage to police commanders on the ground, will be used to police the event.

The allocation of tasks between police and private security companies     has not been well received by CCU members, particularly the decision     that the CCUs will not be fully in charge of spectator areas. This is not surprising given the CCU’s expertise in crowd management and the private security companies’ lack of experience in this area. It is unclear if the decision was based on FIFA rules or those of SAPS management following the practice of the 2006 German Soccer World Cup and current practice in England:

England has a highly trained security staff to deal with low levels of incivility, and for the more serious problems the police step in. In England matches are heavily micro-managed by stewards. Policing has to be…sensible (Williams 2007).

 

There is a general rule in Germany that all private events/activities are a security responsibility of the organisers…the World Cup is a private event. If you send an active police officer, it means that the police would be taking over responsibility (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:10).

During the World Cup in Germany, deployment in the stadiums differed from state to state: some used a heavy police presence in the stadiums, others relied on private security (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:10). The deputy president of the Munich police has stated that he was not in favour of police being stationed outside stadiums because if a problem were to occur inside, quick police action would be needed to prevent it getting out of hand (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:11).
 

‘Fan parks’ – large open areas with big screen televisions – will be erected for spectators who are unable to attend matches at stadiums, and will have to be manned by police as well. Prior to the World Cup in Germany, police expressed great concern about the fan park concept saying the parks would ‘require serious interventions’ due to the large numbers of people using the spaces, the possible attraction of soccer hooligans to the parks, and the resultant disruptions (Tshehla 2006:4). Despite these concerns no major problems were experienced. According to Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, ‘The success of the security operation was "a quality landmark in international police work"’

The role of private security

Private security in South Africa has been granted a key role in 2010 – to provide security within the inner perimeter of stadiums. The concept, used in Germany during the 2006 Soccer World Cup, proved to be successful.

Private security in South Africa is regulated by the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). PSIRA has one million registered members, 300 000 active registered members, and 4 800 registered companies (Badenhorst 2007). When an application is made to register a company, PSIRA verifies the company, registers it, and ensures that the company complies with legislation (Badenhorst 2007). PSIRA also does the vetting of members and the SAPS looks at the applications. The requirements for registration are laid down in the PSIRA Act 56 of 2001.

While some private security companies in South Africa already conduct security at sports events like Premier Soccer League (PSL) soccer matches and international cricket and rugby matches, most are involved in safeguarding the physical security of people and property.

PSL has 400 PSIRA registered security guards and 1 000 unregistered stewards in its own security arm (Majola 2007). PSL stewards are positioned within the crowds, they monitor spectators and tear tickets: ‘PSL’s stewards are trained by the soccer clubs. This is an overseas concept and stewards are also taught to identify potential problems. They have great experience’ (Majola 2007).

The Premier Soccer League’s security arm does management of high-risk events, while each soccer team’s own security provider offers security for low risk events, i.e. events where fewer spectators attend (Majola 2007). The decision on whether to treat an event as a high or low risk event is taken at planning meetings prior to the event. Security guards do body searches and access control, but they do not do crowd management (Majola 2007) and are not trained in special events (Pasha 2007). Of interest is that the security company within PSL is not registered with PSIRA. There is currently debate within PSL management about whether the company should be registered (Majola 2007).

Although the 2010 event may lead to the mushrooming of new security companies, PSIRA believes that this is not likely since the industry has grown by 11-13 per cent in the last ten years, and the growth in the security business is constant (Badenhorst 2007).

A concern is that training for events management in the private security industry is insufficient. The Premier Soccer League (PSL) hosts approximately 200 matches per year, and it is considered too costly for security companies to train members in events management because of the relative infrequency of soccer matches. The SA Football Association (SAFA) cannot undertake the registration of private security officers – this would require the establishment of a security division, with high cost implications. In any case SAFA hosts only 20 to 40 matches per year. As a result, soccer clubs are tasked with the responsibility for security. But, as one roleplayer stated, ‘they don’t care about security; there is no statutory requirement for events’ (Phasha 2007).

Private security companies have been accused of ‘picking untrained, unregistered people off the street on the day of the event, providing them with bibs and money, and expecting them to provide security for soccer matches’. PSIRA National Manager of Law Enforcement said that PSIRA was not aware of such practices, stating that ‘if complaints are received regarding this, then PSIRA investigators will undertake checks. Spot checks are also done on occasion’ (Badenhorst 2007).

A PSIRA training programme for events management does exist and is offered with the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA). PSIRA has 600 trainers and each trainer undergoes a dual programme run by PSIRA and SASSETA. A training standard for monitoring, controlling and directing crowds at special events has been developed and registered by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) (Badenhorst 2007). It is designed to enable relevant personnel to competently assess venue sites, to monitor, observe and control crowd size, and to respond to behaviour and direction of spectators within the venue and its precincts (SAQA:1). Specific skills are developed to enable the following:

• Inspecting and providing security presence at a venue. This means identifying stadium layout, communications between Venue Operational Command (VOC) (fire department, police, emergency medical services, and security of stadium), communication equipment, positions, and regular communication to VOC.
  
  

• Monitoring crowd size, movement, stress, behaviour and safety. This also means understanding maximum stadium capacity, the number of spectators, crowd behaviour, identifying problem spots, stadium access, distress alarm response, identifying potential safety problems, back-up, and the amount of force to be used.
  
  

• Reacting to potential crowd problems and/or breaches of event etiquette. This means identifying people or situations that may cause a breach of safety, identifying potential problems, communicating with people behaving in disruptive manner, and recording information.
  
  

• Directing crowds at special events. This requires directing people to correct locations, in an appropriate manner, with minimum risk of injury (SAQA:1).

A workshop was held in March 2007 to consider developing the PSIRA events management course into a full qualification by the end of 2007. PSIRA will also be reviewing the training of security personnel, aligned with the National Qualification Authority (NQA) (Badenhorst 2007).

A case study: Ellis Park stadium

In 2002 Ellis Park stadium experienced the worst soccer disaster ever seen in South Africa in which 43 supporters died and 158 were injured. A commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the reasons for the tragedy. The following reasons were listed:

• Poor forecast of match attendance
  
  

• Failure to learn from lessons of the past
  
  

• Failure by the role-players to clearly identify and designate areas of responsibility
  
  

• Absence of overall command of the Joint Operation Centre
  
  

• The inappropriate and untimely announcement that tickets were sold out
  
  

• Failure to adhere to SAFA and FIFA guidelines
  
  

• Unbecoming spectator behaviour
  
  

• Sale of tickets at the venue and unreserved seating
  
  

• The use of teargas or a similar substance
  
  

• Corruption on the part of certain members of the security personnel
  
  

• Dereliction of duty on the part of certain officials
  
  

• Failure to use the big screen to show the game to spectators still waiting to enter the stadium
  
  

• Inadequate public address system
  
  

• Failure by the Public Order Policing Unit to react timeously and effectively (Independent Online 2002)

Since the incident much has been done to improve Ellis Park stadium’s structure and its security. The stadium now contracts with private security companies for crowd management during sporting events. The companies are registered and accredited with PSIRA and the responsibility to train the guards rests with the security companies (Meyer 1999). The security guards at Ellis Park serve as safety officers, chief stewards, zone wardens, and supervisors. They are used inside and outside the stadium and in the VIP areas, and a reaction group is always on standby. A Chief Safety Officer is employed by Ellis Park stadium to oversee the security companies. A separate company is contracted to do the 24-hour property security.

Guards are provided with the standard bibs and issue numbers. The stadium is equipped with a fingerprint reader that checks each guard’s PSIRA-issued card against the database, which stores each guard’s identity. However PSIRA is slow to issue cards to guards registered with them, and it is difficult for stadium personnel to check every person (Meyer 1999).

PSL and clubs do not have public liability insurance and rely on private security companies to cover public liability should anything go awry. If spectators lose their lives, the security company is liable. Ellis Park has public liability for its structure and third party insurance, but no cover for security (Meyer 1999).

Ellis Park’s preparation ahead of 2010

In South Africa, standard practice prior to any soccer event is the planning meeting. Issues discussed at the meeting cover overall command, shifts, the number of CCU members, security personnel and VISPOL members working, relevant times, VIPs attending, venue of the Joint Operational Command (JOC) or Venue Operational Command (VOC), number of spectators expected, security plans, requests for venues to sell tickets, and the operational plans of each organisation. The planning meetings determine the threat level which takes into account the category of the event and the mechanisms that will be required to ensure safety.

The Venue Operational Command is the working structure for law enforcement agencies, private security companies and other agencies to coordinate operations on the day of the event. The VOC of the Ellis Park stadium consists of representatives from the SAPS, CCUs, Metro Police, Disaster Management and Johannesburg Emergency Services. Ellis Park personnel include a safety officer, deputy safety officer, main radio controller, and maintenance radio controller. Private security companies have radio operators and a data capturer. PSL and SAFA representatives are also part of the VOC at certain events.

Ellis Park stadium is undergoing a physical restructuring (5 000 seats are being added) for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Organisational changes are also being undertaken to address the following problem areas:

• Role players planning individually without consultation

• Areas of responsibility are blurred

• Competition amongst security providers

• Little control over quality of service delivery/personnel (and high turnover)

• Uncertainty regarding some aspects of public liability cover

• Slow and complicated communications network among VOC

• Out of date processes compared to international standards and proposed legislation

The new structure will aim for:

• A single plan for event safety and security
  
  

• Clearly defined areas of responsibility and authority
  
  

• All service providers share common goals under one plan
  
  

• Full control and consistency (regulations, polices, standards, training, identification, bibs)
  
  

• Collective and defined public liability plan
  
  

• One communication network with quick reaction times
  
  

• International standard complying with local regulations
  
  

• Being a progressive structure

It is unclear if this kind of structure is planned for all the 2010 stadiums or whether each stadium will develop its own plan to ensure the safety and security of spectators and players.

The role of CCUs in the FIFA World Cup

As stated above, the CCUs will police the outer perimeter of the stadium (areas from the entry gates to the entrances to the stands) and they will be summoned to assist private security guards in the inside perimeter when the need arises. Given the inexperience of private security guards and their lack of training in event management, combined with uncertainty regarding accreditation of PSIRA, many members of the CCU said in interviews that they were sceptical about the value of the participation of private security companies in the World Cup.

One member stated, ‘PSL and SAFA are disorganised and don’t know what they are doing in security and crowd management. They pick people off the streets, give them a bib, and pay them R50 a day to police an event. These members are not registered. The responsibility is then left on the police to manage.’ Members of the CCU also said they feared that there would be problems with private security guards managing crowds inside the stadium and with the CCU members being in the outer perimeter. If they were called to deal with a problem, it would take a while before they arrived and thus they might be ineffective.

Despite their scepticism about private security companies, CCU members were very positive that South Africa would be able to manage the security for the World Cup. Most stated that South Africa had previously hosted many big events (CAF, Rugby World Cup, WSSD, Cricket World Cup, Under-23 Olympics) and that the FIFA World Cup would be just as easily managed. One member said that the SAPS management had already started working on a strategic plan for security so, operationally, South Africa will be ready.

CCU members were adamant, however, that the success of the 2010 security was dependent on having more resources. Some of their suggestions were: an increase in human capacity, upgraded equipment, good intelligence, special intensive training for managing hooliganism, assistance from other countries, and the training of station members in crowd management. They said that more attention had to be given to the bad attitude of some of their SAPS colleagues, their lack of discipline and people skills, and the poor level of their policing.

The role of metro police in the FIFA World Cup

Metro police have been designated to perform traffic enforcement in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The role of the Public Order Police Unit of the EMPD during the World Cup is unclear, but it could well be the reason they were trained in crowd management – as first respondents to spontaneous incidents.

Ekurhuleni metro police officers’ views on the country’s management of security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup were positive. Some of their comments were: ‘Metro is now skilled in crowd management so they will manage security at the World Cup’, ‘South Africa previously did security at the rugby World Cup and cricket World Cup but they need more manpower and more training.’ One officer stated that communication and tolerance to work with one another is also important. Furthermore ‘EMPD excels and the POP unit is very successful, they have done many events.’ Only one officer was sceptical. He said that with the current situation – meaning little capacity and too much work – the law enforcement agencies would not manage security for the World Cup: ‘The idea is to increase officers at EMPD to 2 000.’

A meeting between the Provincial Commissioner’s office, the Head of EMPD and Head of CCU East Rand has recently taken place to mend the poor relationship between the EMPD and the CCUs in the East Rand.

Conclusion and recommendations

The SAPS appears confident that the police can cope with security demands for 2010. Considering the challenges facing police, such as the high rates of violent crime, problems in the relationship between SAPS and the LOC, soccer hooliganism, and a likely increase in protest marches during the World Cup, the task should not be under estimated. 

The policing agencies, especially the CCUs, need specialised training in tactical techniques on how to deal with soccer hooligans. The SAPS also need to be cautious regarding the hooliganism issue because of the contentious issues surrounding the ‘database’ of offenders and the definition of a ‘soccer hooligan’.

With regard to the role of private security organisations, the research findings suggest that:

• There is confusion regarding the titles and roles of various types of private security personnel. Those designated to protect property and persons are referred to as ‘guards’ while others are called ‘officers’; there is no clarity regarding those providing functional duties at events, for example, tearing tickets, escorting spectators, etc. The FIFA Safety Guidelines document refers to private security personnel as ‘stewards’. These issues need to be addressed.
  
  

• PSIRA has a vital role to play if the World Cup is to be a success. Private security companies have been tasked with an important role so proper training in crowd management and registration of stewards is essential. PSIRA must also ensure that security officers wear their registration cards.
  
  

• In Germany a security steward has to undergo an examination at a public institution. FIFA requires that at least 50 per cent of security stewards should have passed this examination, and that these stewards are deployed in areas of high sensitivity. ‘All security guards undergo a three-day training…specifically for the policing of the World Cup’ (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:12). SAFA has to ensure that notwithstanding PSIRA and SASSETA training, a similar approach is followed prior to the World Cup.