CHAPTER 4: SAPS restructuring in 2006

CHAPTER 4
SAPS Restructuring in 2006

SAPS` COSTLY RESTRUCTURING
A Review of Public Order Policing Capacity

 

 

Monograph No 138, October 2007

 

Bilkis Omar

Background to the restructuring

 
In mid-2006 the SAPS announced5 a restructuring of the way in which the whole organisation would be managed. The changes were intended to address a duplication of functions, weak command and control, and poor service delivery at police station level. The restructuring meant that the area level of SAPS management – which was viewed as an unnecessary level of authority – was eliminated. This meant that SAPS management would now operate at national, provincial and station level in line with the requirement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996:119). The overall intention of the changes was to improve service delivery to the public.

Specialised units affected were the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS), the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC), and the Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). It was proposed that these specialist units should be decentralised to police stations.

In Gauteng the restructuring was implemented in late September 2006. The Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences units and the Serious and Violent Crimes units were decentralised to stations. The Area Crime Combating Units, after much deliberation, were not fully disbanded but were reduced from seven to three units.

Before this restructuring, when the area level management of the ACCUs was still in existence, the Gauteng ACCU had had 1 383 operational members within its seven units (see Figures 5 and 6). After the restructuring, and the dissolution of the area level management structures, the ACCUs were renamed Crime Combating Units (CCU). The three Gauteng units that remained comprised only 614 crowd management members. The remaining 769 members of the disbanded ACCUs were redeployed to police stations to perform ordinary crime combating activities as station members.

The three new Crime Combating Units that exist currently in Gauteng are located in Johannesburg, East Rand and Pretoria. The Soweto and West Rand ACCUs were incorporated into the Johannesburg CCU (based in Diepkloof, Johannesburg) with 225 operational members. The East Rand CCU (consisting of Vaal Rand and North Rand and based in Nufield) has 197 operational members. The Pretoria CCU (based in Rosslyn) has 202 operational members (Schutte 2006).

The new arrangement means that the three Gauteng CCUs service the same geographical areas previously serviced by seven Area Crime Combating Units – but with far fewer operational members. The Johannesburg unit, which previously serviced a single policing ‘area’ with 197 operational members, is now servicing three such ‘areas’ with approximately 225 operational members. Johannesburg CCU members living in the West Rand area travel from as far as Krugersdorp to the Diepkloof base to report for duty, a distance of 30 km. In the East Rand, the situation is similar: some members travel from Vereeniging to Springs, a 103 km trip. And while the Pretoria CCU does not cover a greater geographical area within Gauteng province, parts of the North West province (Garankuwa, Mabopane, Loate, Dube, and Themba) have been incorporated into the Pretoria unit’s jurisdiction.

Implementation of the restructuring

By September 2006 the restructuring of the Johannesburg CCU was underway. The unit managers were uncertain of the details of the restructuring and could only confirm to members that a restructuring was in progress. The changes were not popular amongst the members, who felt that they had not been adequately consulted or informed about the process, and that it was too drastic. To exacerbate matters, rumours were circulating that units were to be closed down or scaled down, and that members above the age of 35 years were to be redeployed to stations. This resulted in members feeling insecure and uncertain about their futures

Confirmation of the restructuring from SAPS head office came in the form of a list that was distributed to ACCUs in September 2006 giving the names of who was to be transferred. Letters were issued to individual members that confirmed their new posts at particular stations and units. The transfer was referred to as a ‘service arrangement’. In police management terminology, a service arrangement is a temporary movement of a member from a currently held position to another position, for any period of time. It is defined as a temporary measure and can therefore be rescinded at any time.  Correspondence from the SAPS, dated 12 April 2007, to all heads of divisions informed them that they should finalise all interim service arrangements so that the restructuring process could continue.

Rumours had circulated that an evaluation of the restructuring would take place after six months. Some understood this to mean that the restructuring would be re-assessed and a decision about whether the original ACCUs would be re-formed and members reinstated to their former positions would then be made. In our interviews, senior managers of the SAPS refuted this claim. However, at a Safety and Security Sector Bargaining Council (SSSBC) meeting the SAPS management explained that they were ‘evaluating the achievements of strengthening the police station process’ (SSSBC 2007: 8). While it appears that this is a reference to the process that was implemented in September 2006, this is not a certainty. It may be that the six-month evaluation was intended to mollify members because of discontent about the restructuring. Be that as it may, the changes, and the rumours that accompanied them, have resulted in a great deal of uncertainty for members whose daily lives were affected by the transfers.

Impact of the restructuring

The restructuring of the ACCUs to a smaller number of CCUs proved to be damaging for the SAPS. One reason for this was that the planning process lacked transparency, and was not consultative. In addition, the implementation phase was too sudden and was viewed as being imposed on members. Issues such as logistics, resources, financial costs, travel and transport, relocation, teamwork, personal circumstances, and members’ wellbeing appear not to have been taken into account either when the changes were proposed or when they were implemented. These flaws are featuring prominently in the aftermath of the restructuring.

Extensive commuting

As mentioned already, many of the present CCU members must now commute substantial distances on a daily basis. In one example, a member of the Johannesburg CCU who lives in Krugersdorp must report for duty approximately 30 km away at the Johannesburg base, where he attends a parade, is assigned a duty for the day, and books out his firearms. If the duty is a crowd management event in Khutsong, he has to travel back to the West Rand (30 km) to carry out his function. If he is being transported in a Nyala (an armoured police vehicle) the trip takes almost twice as long as for a standard police vehicle – and this is assuming that the Nyala is in working condition (see Chapter 6 on equipment). After the day’s work is complete, this unit member must once again report back to the Johannesburg CCU base to book in his firearms and attend a debriefing and parade. He must then return home to Krugersdorp (30 km). In essence, the member will have travelled approximately 120 km on that particular day and spent approximately three hours travelling (including travelling in peak hour traffic in the morning and evening and collecting three to four other members from the area who travel with him to the base). The problem is just as bad in the East Rand unit with members having to travel 103 km per trip from Vereeniging to Springs.

Logistically the arrangement, as illustrated in the example above, is costly, inefficient, time consuming, and demanding on the individuals involved. While some concessions have been made to alleviate these problems, the consequence has been that some members of the unit do not participate in debriefings with their platoon commanders at the end of each day, and at times they do not check in their firearms, which are meant to be locked in safes at their respective units. These are matters of concern.

Crowd management capacity diminished

Of equal concern is the reduced number of CCU members who remain available for crowd control activities. As noted in the previous chapter, mass gatherings increased by 50 per cent between 2002 and 2005; and the number of mass gatherings at which there are incidents of violence increased by 64 per cent in the same period. These changes in themselves represent an increased demand on the units; yet the three units are now expected to service an increased geographical area with fewer members to do the job. As a result, the management of events has become a major challenge for the CCUs. In-service training is also being neglected due to the manpower shortages and the workload.

Specialist teamwork affected

The restructuring process, in transferring members to other units and stations, has destroyed the spirit of teamwork that is vital for a specialist unit. The expert capacity of the individual members remaining in the units, and of those who were redeployed, is now scattered and there is no central gathering point for members. As one trainer commented: ‘Units are effective because of in-service training and the core spirit of togetherness. Now that the togetherness is gone, the pride and joy is taken away’ (CCU trainer 2007).

One member stated that under the previous structure he had been well accustomed to his work partner, but was now unsure of whom to trust. Under the ACCUs, members with extensive crime combating training and experience had established networks of police informers within their respective areas. This vital component has also been lost with the restructuring. While the training and specialist skills of the ACCU members will enhance capacity at police stations, a member commented: ‘The fear is that the former ACCU members who have been redeployed to stations will have to take over work that should be done by station members who have a propensity to become lazy’, and will as a result, lose their specialist skills.

Impact on well-being, morale and productivity

The effect of the restructuring on the well-being of members is perhaps the greatest concern of all. A few were positive about the move, with comments such as: ‘It had to happen; the situation needed people’, or ‘it’s good because stations are strengthened’. In general, however, almost all of the members are harbouring ill feelings towards the SAPS management. This is mainly because of how the implementation was done.

Questions have been raised about the criteria that were used to select members, the lack of proper consultation and transparency, and the financial implications for members in relation to transport and travelling times. Productivity has dropped, morale has been lowered and family life has been affected. Many members stated that they were considering leaving the SAPS for other jobs. Some members retained at CCUs have said that they would prefer to be transferred to stations closer to their homes. Some members regard the transfers as some sort of punishment by their superiors. The following comments are revealing:

‘Morale among members is very low’

‘Members cried like babies when they realised they were sent away’

‘The uncertainty was difficult to deal with’

‘The process was not thought out’

‘Managers who are making decisions don’t know what operations entails’

‘Those sent away feel that they are bad’

‘Good members were sent away’

‘Experience has been lost’

One manager stated that he looked like a fool to his members because he was not in a position to provide them with information about the restructuring. 

Members of the disbanded ACCUs who were dissatisfied with the new arrangement were told that they had to take up the new posts, and could then follow this up with a grievance letter to the provincial office. Thus far all grievances have met with the same response: a standard letter indicating that the position cannot be reversed.

Despite the negativity surrounding the restructuring, by February 2007, five months after implementation, the members of the restructured CCUs seemed to have settled down and accepted the status quo. As one CCU member stated: ‘I was apprehensive of the new place, but I have settled down now. I like the job, it is challenging’.

While the members of the CCUs are coming to terms with the changes, the fact remains that the restructuring has come at a huge cost to all members – those who were absorbed into station level policing; those who were retained under the new CCUs; and even to SAPS management. It remains to be seen whether the increase in the number of police members at station level and their ability to combat crime will show that the restructuring achieved its purpose.

Operation Trio: another restructuring?

Despite the turmoil created by the 2006 restructuring, more changes were to come. In February 2007, President Mbeki in his State of the Nation address spoke about ‘a sustained drive to improve community safety’, and said that ‘government will ensure that the decisions already taken about strengthening our fight against crime are effectively implemented’.

In response, SAPS management embarked on an intensive crime prevention operation dealing with the most problematic types of crime.

To succeed in this initiative, the SAPS had to rely on the CCUs. During the three-month period designated for the operation, which started in late February 2007, almost all CCU operational members had to report to priority police stations within their areas. Named ‘Operation Trio’, the primary objective was to reduce three categories of serious violent crime: residential robberies, business robberies and vehicle hijackings. A small number of CCU operational staff, also deployed to stations, would be called up as reserves for the purposes of crowd management.

The result was that Gauteng’s three CCUs were left with only their unit commanders and support staff to deal with any crowd management incidents that cropped up while Operation Trio was taking place. Any remaining operational members who had not been deployed to stations were either on detached duties6, sick leave, or rest days. 

In late February 2007, when interviews were conducted with members of the CCU in Pretoria, it was found that members of the unit’s support staff had been deployed to manage crowd management incidents in Shoshanguve. These support staff members did have some previous operational experience, but in recent years they had been involved only in support service and logistics. They therefore had little recent experience in managing crowds and had not received in-service training. They had not been given the danger allowance that operational members are entitled to, and their families would not have been able to access pensions in the event of their death while involved in an operation. They should therefore not have been deployed for crowd control operations, as their lack of experience presented a risk both to themselves and the participants in the gatherings.   

With the number of public service strikes peaking in May/June 2007, the CCUs were re-mobilised to attend to crowd management events. Operation Trio came to an end after this and the CCU members were returned to their respective units. The outcome of the operation, in terms of the successes at the different stations, is not known; suffice to say that the Gauteng MEC for Community Safety noted that ‘Operation Trio assisted the police to significantly improve their ability to target the perpetrators of violent and organised crime. This operation was successful as arrest rates for these crimes increased significantly over the first six months of this year’ (Cachalia 2007).

Whether intentional or not, the latest arrangement of utilising CCU members at station level for crime operations appears to have been the original plan envisioned for the former ACCUs by the architects of the restructuring. Initially, when the decision was made to dissolve the area level offices, the plan was to close down all seven ACCU units and deploy all 1 383 operational members to the 25 accounting stations7 around the province. Under this arrangement, each accounting station would have had 55 ACCU members. Crime prevention support to stations would thus have been increased, the crowd management capacity would have been closer to station level, and there would still have been capacity for borderline operations8 and assisting detectives with dangerous criminals.

Operation Trio displayed all the elements of the initial SAPS plan. According to the MEC of Gauteng Community Safety, Operation Trio has been a success in terms of crime control. Given the success, SAPS management could well be tempted to make the situation permanent. For the CCUs this will be a travesty, because crowd management incidents are at an all time high and rising steadily, and the specialist capacity of the units needs to be maintained. Currently in-service training is being neglected to the extent that across the country, 75 per cent of units are not doing any in-service training (Day 2007a).

Impact of Operation Trio on public order policing

The research findings suggest that CCU members should not be expected to provide additional help to stations for crime combating operations. In addition, the CCUs need to maintain their skills with continuous in-service training. Since the implementation of the restructuring, the units have been performing crowd management operations with minimal capacity in addition to performing crime combating duties. Whereas once entire platoons were used to manage a gathering, the current situation sees subsidiary groups called ‘sections’ being utilised.

It is noteworthy that despite the fact that 719 CCU members, in addition to members from the Serious and Violent Crimes (SVC) units and Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS) unit have been permanently deployed to stations, the need still remains to use additional CCU members for crime combating activities.

A description of the organisational structure of the CCUs will give a more concrete idea of the extent to which the capacity of these units has been stretched (Figure 9).

A Crime Combating Unit is headed by a Unit Commander. Some units have Company Commanders, while others have Operational Commanders. These commanders are in charge of the units’ operational planning. Below them are approximately two to five Platoon Commanders, who are in charge of approximately two to four sections each. Each section consists of approximately eight to ten members. The number of platoons and sections varies according to the different units. 

To give an example, in order to manage a gathering of 2 000 participants, under current circumstances a CCU will deploy one section consisting of around ten operational members. In the past, a whole platoon consisting of 36 members would have been deployed for a gathering of the same size. This gives an indication of the minimal capacity that is now being used by the units to manage marches.

In relation to Operation Trio there were both benefits and shortcomings. The general public would have benefited in terms of the extra capacity devoted to crime control. Visible policing would have been stepped up, stations would have gained extra capacity, crime operations would have been enhanced, and response times would have been better. Overall, the extra capacity would have contributed to improving station statistics and enhancing the credibility of the police force.

The negative impact of Operation Trio is that only some stations and areas would have benefited from the new arrangement. At the same time it is probable that criminal activity would have been displaced9 away from the stations that received extra capacity towards those that did not. The CCU members seconded to Operation Trio would have had to adapt to a new environment; in-service training would have been neglected for the duration that the members were deployed to stations; and mobilising members for any sporadic public order incident would have been difficult because the CCU members were scattered across the province.

The most serious concern, however, is that station commissioners could become dependent on CCU members for crime control. While for some this may appear to be a positive development, especially if the statistics show that crime is decreasing in the station areas, the ongoing dependence on the CCUs could result in stations utilising the units ever more frequently for crime combating operations. This is something the SAPS should guard against. The CCUs should not be called upon whenever it suits the police to provide crime combating assistance to police operations; as it stands the CCUs, since the 2006 restructuring, are already expected to respond to crowd management events with substantially depleted capacity. The primary function of CCUs is still the management of crowds and this must be retained.

Whether SAPS operations such as Operation Trio are sustainable is difficult to predict. The CCU members should not be utilised for another Operation Trio – protests marches are occurring more frequently than ever and the 2010 FIFA World Cup is imminent. While there have been no major incidents at public gatherings thus far, and the CCUs seem to be coping, these units have not been tested to their full capacity. The test will arise when a spontaneous incident of violence occurs in a crowd situation.

In the short term the restructuring of the ACCUs to CCUs is not working. What the long term plans of the SAPS are in relation to the CCUs only time will tell. There is a concern amongst members that these specialist units will eventually be closed down or relocated to stations. The comment of one member that ‘the restructuring is one of the biggest mistakes ever made by the SAPS management’, encapsulates what many members are thinking.

Recommendations

• In future when the SAPS requires extra capacity to undertake crime combating operations along the lines of Operation Trio, an alternative to using the CCUs must be found, for example, the utilisation of the National Intervention Unit.
  
  

• The former Area Crime Combating Units were much better placed to provide crime combating assistance to the police. They functioned within smaller more localised geographical areas with more manpower, which meant they had the capacity and expertise to both manage public gatherings and provide crime combating support to stations. If the ACCUs were to be reinstated along the lines of the pre-2006 arrangement, the issue of the dissolution of the area level command would not be of prime concern, since the reinstated ACCUs could be made accountable to the provincial office as Provincial Public Order Units.
  
  

• It is evident that the restructuring of the ACCUs to the present CCUs was not a good idea from the perspective of crowd control. While one can understand that the intention was to strengthen capacity at police stations in order to bring down the crime levels, it is recommended that an assessment of the SAPS initiative be done to determine whether the outcome has been favourable overall.