A restive Amhara needs the Council’s attention
Continuing conflict in Amhara region threatens stability beyond Ethiopia’s borders should decisive action not be taken.
Since April 2023, Ethiopia’s Amhara region has been the epicentre of political violence and armed confrontations between ethnic militias known as Fano and the federal government. Calls from national and international actors for cessation of hostilities have been to no avail. President Sahle-Work Zewde, in her October 2023 state of the federation address, reiterated the need for dialogue between contending political forces on major issues that divide the political elite and society.
Similarly, in August, African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat called on the two parties to ‘immediately cease the fighting’ ‘ensure the protection of civilians’ and ‘engage in dialogue to reach a peaceful solution’. He also reiterated the AU’s support for an ‘inter-Ethiopian initiative’ to achieve peace and stability in the country. Nevertheless, the region remains in turmoil.
At the core of the crisis
Amhara region was relatively stable before the Tigray crisis. However, its armed forces and ethnic militias joined federal government forces in the two-year war against Tigrayan forces. After the first round of the war, the regional government incorporated contested territories such as Wolkayt, Humera, Tselemt and Raya under Tigray's jurisdiction.
Amhara and Tigray political elites have a decades-long history of competition and mistrust
The conflict ended with the November 2022 signing of the AU-mediated cessation of hostilities agreement (CoHA). Thereafter, the federal government integrated regional special forces into national security institutions – the Ethiopian National Defence Force, federal police and regional regular police forces. This move was vehemently resisted by Amhara political organisations and prompted the defections of regional special forces members into the Fano ethnic militia.
Some Amharas argue that the reintegration plan was untimely, a failure for both the Ethiopian government and the AU to disarm Tigray People’s Liberation Front – a CoHA stipulation. Under Article 11 of the agreement, the AU launched the African Union Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission in December 2022 and deployed the full team to Mekele in January 2023.
In May of this year, the mission said that 85% to 90% of the disarmament of Tigrayan forces was complete. The following month the AU Commission extended the mission’s term by six months. However, Amhara forces do not believe their Tigrayan counterparts are properly disarmed. This is due partly to the decades-old competition and mistrust between the political elites of the two regions. This uneasy relationship was further complicated by the fresh memory and trauma of the war.
The Amhara forces are also alarmed about the status of the contested territories Wolkayt and Raya. They therefore consider the federal government’s recommendation to resolve the issue through a referendum as the beginning of a move to force them out of these territories. They argue that this security dilemma is rooted in prior grievances. They fault the government for not protecting ethnic Amharas across the country from attacks, particularly those in the Oromia region by the Oromo Liberation Army.
Given the conflict’s potential to spread, early involvement of continental actors is recommended
While resistance to the government’s reintegration is the immediate cause of the tension between it and Amhara forces, the conflict was shaped by from various historical and structural factors. Similarly, Amhara elites’ widely held suspicion that the CoHA shifted alliances between Tigrayan forces and the government against the former is the result of deep-seated historic rivalry and mistrust.
A securitised approach
In response to the security-cum-political crisis, the government seems to have opted for a fully fledged security approach. The Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) was ordered to disarm members of the Amhara special forces who didn't heed the government's call for disarmament. Although ENDF's mission went with little armed resistance, leading authorities to believe the reintegration was successful, Amhara defectors joined forces with Fano militias and launched coordinated attacks against local and regional officials.
The fragmented hit-and-run tactic of the militias would later morph into a coordinated attack against local administrative structures during which the group started seizing control of towns. Eventually, Fano and ethnic militia threatened to take control of the regional capital, Bahir Dar, forcing the regional government to request federal government intervention.
The Council of Ministers declared a state of emergency in Amhara on 3 August 2023, the day the regional government sent its request. States of emergency inherently encroach on the civil and political rights of citizens. This is compounded by disruption to livelihoods through securitisation of avenues of life.
Despite the state of emergency and ENDF deployment to enforce peace and security and restore stability, the region remains fragile, with armed confrontation between ENDF and Fano and ethnic militias continuing unabated. To date, the federal government maintains its security approach to contain the volatility.
Why the PSC should step in
Unless resolved timeously, instability in the Amhara region will have implications beyond the borders of Ethiopia. During the 2020 to 2022 war between Amhara and Tigrayan forces, Eritrea’s involvement lent a regional dimension. The more disruption in Amhara lingers, the higher the probability of actors in Eritrea becoming involved. This could be inspired by, among others, the two parties’ mutual disapproval of the CoHA.
Given the conflict’s potential to spread, early involvement of continental actors is recommended
The instability and ongoing war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Force in Sudan could also influence the trajectories of the armed confrontation in Ethiopia. The contested territories across the Ethiopia-Sudan border, the al-Fashaga territory, the rising influx of refugees and the increase in arms smuggling in the area could exacerbate the conflict.
The Amhara situation could also affect the AU, international communities and Somalia campaigns against al-Shabaab. For one, if ENDF is preoccupied with Amhara forces and withdraws from the Ethio-Somalia border, as it did in 2020, Somalia's anti-al Shabaab efforts could be prolonged. The Islamists could use the security vacuum to infiltrate Ethiopia in search of a territorial safe haven. They could also expand their influence into Ethiopia and threaten the stability of yet another Horn of Africa member state.
Entry points for engagement
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) should view the Amhara crisis as more than a local security challenge in one of its member states. Based on its mantra of African solutions to African problems, it should activate early involvement of continental actors since the conflict has the potential for regional implications.
The federal and Amhara regional governments recently indicated receptiveness dialogue. This is an opportunity for the AU Commission – at the PSC’s behest – to explore this entry point and approach the parties to implement a conflict resolution mechanism in the region. This could be through the use of a special envoy under the auspices of Mahamat.
The Panel of the Wise could also inspire the two parties’ political will for a negotiated settlement of differences. A timely approach will go a long way in preventing another major and destabilising crisis in Ethiopia.
Image: © Eduardo Soteras/AFP
