Could African Union presence be a step to peace for Sudan?
Returning to Khartoum offers a narrow, but real, opportunity for the AU to contribute to a cessation of hostilities.
In its 1 330th communiqué, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) reiterated the urgent need to reopen the AU liaison office to Sudan. These offices focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, regional integration and continental advocacy. The key objective is to provide on-the-ground technical support and maintain open communication channels between the host state and the AU Commission to manage peace and security.
The Sudan liaison office was closed in April 2023, when the civil war broke out. The AU, with many international and regional organisations, withdrew its staff and pulled diplomatic missions as heavy fighting erupted in the capital Khartoum. Personnel were relocated to Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the AU, as the organisation initiated virtual shuttle diplomacy with the warring parties to expedite a ceasefire agreement.
Three years into the conflict, the PSC is reinstating its Khartoum office. However, considerations include practical and logistical challenges, evaluation of benefits and possible pitfalls and the office’s contribution to AU peacemaking efforts. Could this move cement AU peacemaking efforts and bring a lasting end to hostilities?
Tracing the history
The AU has a longstanding history of mediating and managing conflicts in Sudan. The liaison office was established to advance the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005. Following South Sudan’s secession and the simultaneous eruption of the Darfur conflict, the office’s mandate was extended following the PSC’s decision to establish the AU High-level Panel on Darfur and later the AU High-level Implementation Panel. The office was crucial in transmitting PSC decisions to local authorities for implementation and for keeping the PSC and AU Commission informed of and engaged in political dynamics.
Three years into the conflict, the PSC is reinstating its Khartoum office
The office managed Sudan’s multiple conflict hotspots and, in particular, the precarious transition following the military coups in 2019 and 2021. It was led by the AU Commission chairperson’s special representative to Sudan, Ambassador Mohamed Belaiche, appointed in March 2019. After the April 2019 military coup, it facilitated meetings of transitional authorities, the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department commissioner and political and civil society groups. These meetings culminated in the power-sharing agreement of August 2019. The office also advised the PSC to suspend Sudan following both military takeovers.
Even after the start of the current war, the office continued to respond to the crisis. The special representative and head of office has been involved in AU processes, including most recently the Quintet Group on Sudan. Reopening the office involved a discussion with the AU Commission chairperson and a subsequent visit by Belaiche to Sudan to meet the head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and army chief. Although the meeting was fruitful, political and pragmatic concerns arose around the feasibility of the process.
Political and practical challenges
Beliache’s visit strengthened the AU’s role as a pivotal continental actor, but concerns about the reopening of the office remain. First, the AU role may be considered partisan if consultations on the reopening are primarily with Sudan’s Sovereign Council. The AU needs to summon political backing from all fronts to ensure that warring parties draw red lines on attacks on the office.
Secondly, the AU is engaged in multiple mediation processes to stabilise Sudan. The AU’s intra-Sudanese dialogue provides a mediation and negotiation platform between the parties’ political wings, being the transitional government and Tasis plus other political and civilian groups. As a member of the Quintet, the AU aims to undertake a broader political process to initiate state-building processes. These mediation forums may be jeopardised if the AU position is perceived as negatively affecting peace processes.
Political backing is needed to ensure that warring parties draw red lines on attacking the office
Thirdly, the office is likely to return to Khartoum. This could indicate a bias towards the de-facto government, raising security concerns given territorial contestations. Several diplomatic missions were targeted during the early days of the fighting, particularly embassies with genuine or perceived allegiance to either side.
Beyond the safety and security of personnel and infrastructure, other practical concerns abound. Following Sudanese Armed Forces’ recapture of Khartoum in April 2025, the transitional government has sought to rebuild the capital, yet there are significant limitations in water, electricity and internet provision. This may add an additional layer of practical challenges for the AU.
Expediency for the AU?
While primacy in diplomacy is important, it is necessary to examine the strategic objectives of reopening the office. In previous contexts, a fundamental objective was to oversee implementation of peace agreements such as the comprehensive peace agreement, the Doha Agreement and the power-sharing arrangement. However, warring parties are yet to reach a ceasefire arrangement. That said, there is room for the liaison office to enhance information exchange, exerting new pressure on the adversaries to commit to dialogue in good faith. It is important that the AU specify the mandate of the office for the time being.
Any liaison office has to create communication lines between the host state and the AU Commission to prevent and manage conflict, monitor the implementation of agreements and ensure information exchange.
The liaison office could exert new pressure on the adversaries to commit to dialogue in good faith
Reestablishment of the office would secure the AU’s role as the primary interlocutor in Sudan’s peace processes and the only Quintet member with presence on the ground. Neither international nor regional organisations currently have a political presence in Sudan, with the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan having closed shop in February 2024. Similarly, most diplomatic missions relocated their Sudan embassies to neighbouring countries, limiting the direct information and exchange their foreign ministries may have had with Sudanese stakeholders.
This would provide the AU with a tangible advantage. It would be prudent for the liaison office to fully maximise on its ground presence and engage the plethora of professional unions, and civil and political formations. A significant failure leading to the current conflict centres on the lack of inclusion and diversity of different political views and ideologies. Renewed prescence should be utilised as an opportunity to meet with and integrate the voice and vision of all Sudanese actors.
It’s also essential to consider the quid pro quo of returning. For the transitional government, continental and international diplomatic recognition is paramount and is part of its strategy to defeat the Rapid Support Forces on all fronts.
There is a clear cost-benefit analysis to reopening the office. It is no longer merely a practical nor technical decision. It may offer pathways for the transitional government to influence AU decisions. As the AU implements the PSC decision, determining the scope and clearly linking the liaison office to its ‘Roadmap for the resolution of the conflict in Sudan’ are key. The upcoming PSC field mission in Sudan in mid-August offers an opportunity to further assess and act on the feasibility and value-add of the liaison office.
Conclusion
The PSC decision to reopen the office is more than a formality. It is a statement of intent signalling that the AU is unwilling to cede ground on Sudan’s crisis to external actors. The office may give it greater political and pragmatic expediency in managing peace processes. Thus, the AU should consult the conflicting parties to ensure the safety of AU personnel and credibility of the office.
Physical presence will translate into impact only if the AU develops clear objectives in line with its roadmap and maintains a neutral mediation posture between the factions. The organisation’s response in Sudan has been tested by years of competing and stalled processes. However, a return to Khartoum offers a narrow, but real, opportunity to reassert its relevance and contribute meaningfully to the cessation of hostilities, provided it avoids the pitfalls of symbolic and partisan diplomacy.
