CHAPTER 5: The private security challenge in Africa: Problems and options for regulation, Andy Bearpark and Sabrina Schulz

PART III: ADDRESSING PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

 

CHAPTER 5
The Private Security Challenge in Africa: Problems and Options for Regulation

 

 

Andy Bearpark and Sabrina Schulz


PRIVATE SECURITY IN AFRICA
Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation

 

 

Monograph No 139, November 2007

 

Edited by Sabelo Gumedze





Introduction


The chapters in this monograph clearly demonstrate that the private security phenomenon in Africa provides great opportunities but also poses severe risks. On the one hand, private security companies (PSCs) have the potential to improve the security situation for people where the state fails to live up to its duties. This is if PSCs deliver their services in a professional and accountable manner. On the other hand, in the absence of professional standards, their activities may aggravate an existing security situation through leaving the underlying causes for insecurity unresolved. Moreover, private security activity may be counter-productive if security comes at a price that only the rich can afford thus excluding a majority of the population from its benefits. Such developments risk undermining long-term development efforts as well as fundamental tenets of the human security paradigm. Any effort to regulate the private security industry must take these dangers into account. 

This chapter addresses some of the challenges arising from private security activity in Africa from a policy-oriented perspective. It also makes suggestions as to how PSCs in Africa could be regulated in an effective and meaningful way. Although a rich body of academic literature on the options for the regulation of the private security industry is currently emerging (for example, Chesterman & Lehnardt 2007; Bryden & Caparini 2006; Kinsey 2006; Percy 2006) there seems to be a real need to add the perspective of a regulatory agency. The British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) is the self-regulatory body of the private security industry in the UK, one of the biggest export markets for private security worldwide. Because of the presence of its members in more than 100 countries, the BAPSC has developed expertise in a wide range of regulatory issues.1 Some of the lessons learnt will be introduced in this article, and it is hoped that they will provide a useful perspective on the regulatory challenges in the African context.

This article will first address some of the definitional problems regarding private security activity in Africa. It will then take a ‘big picture perspective’ and address the broader structural and historical context of the emergence of private security activity in African countries. Subsequently, the article will draw on three empirical cases-the Niger Delta, Sierra Leone and Kenya-to illustrate the complexity and diversity of the African private security landscape. Against this background, a ‘matrix approach’ for the regulation of PSCs in Africa will be introduced. It is based on the private security industry’s experience with different regulatory regimes as well as ongoing exchange with industry representatives who wish to remain anonymous. With the matrix concept this chapter seeks to provide guidelines for the implementation of regulatory frameworks that are both specific to the local context and compatible with international standards-setting initiatives. 

Private security in Africa-definitional challenges 


The value of any policy recommendations for the regulation of PSCs depends, first and foremost, on an appropriate definition of the different activities in the private security sector. Regulation only makes sense if the activities that are to be subject to control are well delineated and understood.

The regulatory debate, be it in the public sphere or at the expert level, sometimes runs the risk of conflating several highly distinct areas of private security activity. It certainly cannot be denied that the transition between different types of private security service is sometimes seamless. According to the laws of the country, private security activity may be armed or unarmed; private security services may be offered on a strictly local basis or exported across national borders; they may be coupled with other specialist services such as risk consultancy; or they may help with kidnap and ransom situations, or provide training for either armed forces or civilians in hostile environments. The nature of the services provided also depends on the client groups of a PSC; these can be governments, international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private businesses or wealthy individuals. Furthermore, a clear distinction has to be made between services mirroring activities of the police and those mirroring activities of the military. Police-like tasks are almost always domestic in nature and include patrolling, riot control and tasks that have been outsourced from a country’s penal services, such as running a private prison. Military-type tasks are usually services that have been outsourced from the armed forces, such as training, the maintenance of military equipment, or military aid to other governments.

Against this background, there are, therefore, at least three distinct categories of company that offer private security services. Firstly, there are PSCs offering both armed and unarmed private security services to the domestic market. The case studies in this chapter largely refer to these companies. As to the regulation of PSCs that operate domestically it is certainly the task of the relevant government to determine the most appropriate regulatory framework. Nevertheless, an international perspective may spur on the debate and the implementation of regulation. The last part of this chapter will show how domestic and international regulatory efforts can complement each other meaningfully.

Secondly, there are international PSCs with headquarters or offices in several countries. They usually offer what the industry refers to as ‘premium’ security services, which include, for example, the static armed guarding of embassies, facilities of international corporations, oil fields and pipelines, mines and critical infrastructure. Moreover, companies in this second group also protect politicians and foreign dignitaries and offer convoy protection services. Usually, their personnel have a distinguished military or law-enforcement background and substantial experience in hostile environments. Their image of professionalism is usually ensured by means of thorough vetting, ongoing training of operators and appropriate liability insurance policies for their operations. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of acts of gross misconduct or the violation of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) by individual operators. The prevention of such incidents has to be at the core of all regulatory and standards-setting initiatives for international PSCs. The last part of this chapter will explore the options for the regulation of international PSCs in more depth. 

The last category of companies offering private security services are private military companies (PMCs). The label usually refers to companies that offer support services to the armed forces of either their own or a foreign country. The distinction between PSCs and PMCs may be largely semantic and reflect cultural preferences and caveats. Whereas the term PMCs may be perfectly acceptable for US companies working directly for the US government, the same is not true for the UK. This is largely because up to 90 per cent of the client base of UK companies consist of private and commercial actors and only a maximum of 10 per cent of all contracts are performed for the government. In the US, this ratio would roughly be the reverse. Another reason why some companies prefer the term PSC is their claim that they would only ever use armed force for defensive purposes. Yet whenever armed force has to be used in an operational environment the distinction between offensive and defensive action may be hard to establish. This means that it is hard to distinguish between PSCs and PMCs with regard to legal, regulatory and standards-setting questions. As a rough guideline it may, however, be safe to say that PSCs would refrain from offering combat services to any client, including their own government.

Structural conditions for private security activity in Africa-the problems of statehood and weak state capacity 


In order to develop useful and relevant policy recommendations for PSCs in Africa it is vital to understand the specific historical and socio-economic context in which PSCs first emerged in African countries. Some of the many reasons that are usually given to explain why private security activity emerged in Africa are the downsizing of the armed forces after the Cold War, global processes of market liberalisation, the proliferation of arms and small weapons and a general situation of insecurity (see, for instance, Gumedze 2007). One of the most important enabling factors for the emergence of private security forces is supposedly weak state capacity and the concomitant security vacuum in large parts of Africa. This means that PSCs can be seen as the product of long-term historical development rather than a phenomenon of relatively recent origin. 

As Clapham argues, weak state capacity is due largely to both indigenous and colonial ‘projects of territorial statehood’ (Clapham 1999:27). The Weberian model of the modern, territorial nation-state with its monopoly over the legitimate use of force has not always proved to be an appropriate way of providing security to the citizens of African states. During colonial rule, ‘traditional’ ways of providing security at a sub-state level were deliberately eliminated. According to Clapham (1999:25F) ‘[i]t was … one of the key projects of colonial rule to ensure that security derived, and was seen to derive explicitly from the central state, and that any mechanism through which African communities might seek to maintain “their own” security was systematically destroyed or strictly subordinated to the colonial authorities’. Although these undertakings did not necessarily prove successful, non-colonial African states emulated the concept of the territorial state, not least in order to defend local independence against potential colonialist endeavours (ibid:27). These processes bear hardly any resemblance to the creation of the nation-state and the concomitant emergence of a sense of national identity among the European colonial powers themselves. As a result, national cohesion and the perceived legitimacy of the state may be somewhat less developed than in many other, especially Western, countries of the world. 

Further reasons for weak state capacity in Africa and its decline from the late 1980s onwards and throughout the 1990s are the failure of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment programmes that were imposed by international donors, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Mkandawire & Soludo 1999; Simon 1995). This is not to say that these actors are directly to blame for Africa’s development problems. Rather, ‘Africa’s own rush towards development … amid an unforgiving capitalist world economy’ (Chan 2007:94) can explain many of the challenges to state capacity in contemporary Africa. This means, however, that the reasons for Africa’s security problems are embedded in the structural framework of a globalised world economy to which African states cannot always respond efficiently and effectively.

These structural factors produced not only the strained economic situation and high degrees of unemployment, but also the proliferation of small arms and light weapons which together form the backdrop to the private security phenomenon in Africa. The combination of these phenomena has led to a sharp increase in violent crime that public security forces are often unable to tackle due to inefficiency, corruption, and insufficient training (Global Coalition for Africa 1999/2000).

When state capacity is lacking and a country’s legitimate security forces are unable to provide security, alternative security structures must be put in place. This may, of course, come at the price of sacrificing the nature of security as a public good (see Kaul et al 1999; Ostrom et al 2002), which, in the absence of appropriate state policies, may reinforce rather than alleviate existing social divisions and tensions. Since private security does not necessarily tackle the causes of insecurity, it cannot replace the state as a provider of security but, if handled wisely, it may complement official policies and measures. 

Empirical insights and the need for regulation


It is also clear, however, that meaningful recommendations for the regulation of PSCs in Africa can only be made on the grounds of sound empirical data. The current dearth of empirical insights into the private security market in Africa is, therefore, more than unfortunate. Research remains sketchy and, up to this day, only one major comparative research project has been conducted, by Abrahamsen and Williams (2005a, 2005b, 2005c). The project has produced fresh data and novel insights into the domestic private security industries in four countries, namely South Africa (not published at the time of writing), Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Kenya. The authors’ research also demonstrates clearly that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the regulatory challenges for the industry in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. 

Common problems in all case studies concern a pervasive sense of insecurity, a low level of trust in public security forces, general poverty and the exploitation of security guards through long working hours and extremely low salaries, thereby making them prone to involvement in criminal activity. Yet there are also distinct features in every country that require tailor-made solutions for the regulation and control of private security activities. Evidence for this claim is provided through the following summaries of case studies on the role of PSCs in the Niger Delta, Sierra Leone and Kenya respectively.

The private security sector in Nigeria is largely shaped by the increasing need for professional security services in the Niger Delta and the presence of international PSCs providing these services to other international or multi-national businesses. The conflict in the Delta has become a medium-scale insurgency that requires a comprehensive political solution. Because the local population does not reap any benefits in terms of either security or prosperity from the presence of international companies in the Delta the security situation is deteriorating steadily. Bunkering (i.e. large-scale oil stealing) is one of the gravest problems in a country that depends on oil for 95 per cent of its export earnings and 80 per cent of total government revenues (Piazza 2007).

As a US Department of Defense official pointed out recently, militant groups in the Delta now appear to be operating with complete impunity (CSIS 2007). The deteriorating security situation has led to a reduction of the overall on-shore oil production by 500 000 barrels per day, which equals a loss in revenue of $1 billion per month and attacks are now also moving off-shore (ibid). As to the effects on individual oil companies, Shell reported 54 attacks on its installations and 11 kidnappings in 2006 alone (ibid). 

The official armed forces in Nigeria are unable to deal with the insurgency because the troops are underpaid, poorly trained and large parts of their equipment are inoperable. The Navy’s readiness rate is down to 12 per cent; this means that it is virtually non-operational (ibid). Consequently, there has to be a comprehensive solution to the situation in the Delta, combining political and military means, to re-establish security. The role of PSCs will have to be addressed in any attempt to resolve the conflict.  

The current security structure in the Niger Delta, of which PSCs are part and parcel, is characterised by a complex and intricate network of actors and the boundaries between them are grey at best. Since the use of firearms by PSCs is prohibited, close relationships have been formed among state security forces, PSCs and oil companies respectively. It is common, for instance, for members of the Mobile Police (MoPol) to be permanently seconded to PSCs to function as an armed component to their operations (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005b:11, 13). MoPol officers are not directly answerable to the PSCs but they are bound to comply with the companies’ codes of conduct and other internal standards (ibid: 13), which does not, of course, guarantee their legitimate and professional behaviour. 

The Nigerian Ministry of Internal Affairs is currently unwilling or unable to regulate the private security industry. Against this background, standards for PSCs and their operations are most likely to impose themselves through increased competition because clients, such as oil companies, wish to work with respectable and reliable companies, not least to protect their own reputation (ibid:16). A standards-setting process may be promoted through industry associations. However, while there are several competing industry associations in Nigeria, every one of them is currently pursuing its own agenda. There seems to be agreement among the companies on the need for regulation through a regulatory authority (ibid:9f). However, at the same time, most local companies fear the competition of foreign PSCs whose ‘high levels of professionalism’ may threaten their own existence (ibid:10). It may, therefore, be an option to rely on foreign PSCs as the drivers of regulation and standard-setting initiatives, but this is probably not an ideal scenario.

Several aspects of the Nigerian situation are also common features of the private security markets in other Sub-Saharan African countries. Security problems related to the extraction of natural resources, for instance, are equally prominent in Sierra Leone. Like elsewhere in Africa, there is little trust in public security forces and, hence, we witness an increasing demand for private security services. At the same time, however, the case of Sierra Leone is very specific because of the consequences of the civil war which lasted from 1991 to 2002. The private security sector is one of the few growth markets in the country and PSCs offer some of the scarce employment opportunities for ex-combatants (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005b:7, 12). 

Furthermore, because of the UN arms embargo that was imposed on Sierra Leone in 1997, non-state actors, including PSCs, are not allowed to buy arms and there is considerable controversy as to whether this should remain the case or not (ibid:16ff). 

These doubts are not least due to the lack of sufficient state capacity to provide effective regulation and oversight. Against this background, international PSCs operating in Sierra Leone could, again, function as the driving forces in a standards-setting process. With international businesses and aid agencies as their main client base it is not inconceivable for them to implement standards that go beyond what is required from them by local law, for instance in the area of employment. It is already the case that state authorities scrutinise foreign companies far more frequently and rigorously than their local competitors (ibid: 13). Moreover, local companies might perceive a standards-setting process driven by foreign companies as a threat to their business advantages, in particular in that their services are cheaper than those of their international competitors. 

Abrahamsen and Williams suggest self-regulation as a possible way of introducing minimum standards in the private security industry in Sierra Leone but they concede that it would not solve all its problems, in particular as far as the enforcement of labour laws is concerned (ibid:18). One of their key demands is therefore that the private security sector be incorporated into ongoing security sector reform (SSR) programmes, not least because PSCs could potentially have a major impact on the improvement of Sierra Leone’s security situation (ibid:19). 

Considerable regulatory challenges also exist in Kenya where the private security industry is one of the fastest growing sectors (Kamenju et al 2004:1). Yet, at the same time, PSCs themselves are frequently perceived as a major source of insecurity (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005a:3, 17; Kamenju et al 2004:107). The introduction of regulation is therefore seen as urgent and the government seems to be planning to establish a Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority mirroring the South African and the British models for the licensing and monitoring of domestic private security services (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005a:9). Concerns have been voiced, however, that the draft bill does not cover some of the most important issues, such as training and wages, and there are also doubts regarding its effective enforcement (ibid).

The ongoing dispute over the enforcement of the minimum wage and other labour laws for the usually unarmed security guards is currently one of the biggest issues for domestic regulation. Other, non-domestic, regulatory challenges facing the Kenyan industry stem from the export of private security services to neighbouring countries. Because of the comparatively highly developed private security market in Kenya and because of the country’s strategic geographical position, Kenya serves as a hub for the export of private security services to the entire Horn of Africa, Sudan and DRC (ibid:8). International agencies as well as the extractive industry are increasingly relying on the services of Kenyan PSCs, which adds weight to the call for regulation. But it also complicates the situation because of the cross-border dimension of the problems involved.

A seminal study on the private security sector in Kenya by Jan Kamenju et al (2004) calls for effective government regulation through licensing and monitoring schemes. In addition, it recommends the formation of professional associations through which security operators could be represented in official committees and voice their legitimate concerns (ibid:106). At the same time, these associations could promote self-regulation and the professionalisation of the sector (ibid).

As these three brief case studies have demonstrated, national private security markets reflect the overall socio-economic circumstances, the political situation and the strategic challenges of a country. It is, therefore, close to impossible to suggest a one-size-fits-all template for the regulation of these diverse national markets. The chapter will, therefore, now introduce an intellectual framework for the coordination of regulatory efforts in different countries, not only in Africa but worldwide. 

A matrix approach to regulation-lessons learnt for Africa? 


In order to tackle the challenges arising from both the domestic and the trans-border trade in security services, this chapter suggests a ‘matrix approach’ to the regulation of PSCs. As the examples above have demonstrated, the private security industry in any given country reflects political and social national idiosyncrasies. Moreover, there are also huge differentiations within the sector in any given country. At the same time, the delivery of private security services transcends borders with considerable ease. This applies both to African companies operating in neighbouring countries and to international, i.e. Western, PSCs who offer their services to mostly other Western businesses in African countries. Therefore, any regulatory framework has to address national characteristics and the trans-national nature of the private security industry simultaneously.

A matrix approach to regulation would, therefore, consist of regulatory schemes at different levels, namely the national, the regional and the international, as well as within the industry. These different regulatory schemes would have to be complementary and, ideally, mutually reinforcing. Rather than covering every single one of these levels it is essential to ensure that different regulatory frameworks are interlocking. For instance, industry self-regulation may be inappropriate in a specific national context and regulation through regional organisations may not always be feasible.

National regulation, most importantly, has to incorporate all applicable international law, including both statutory and customary IHL and international human rights law. States are obliged to implement and enforce these laws within their own jurisdiction, so regulating its national private security industry can be seen as a state’s legal duty. Comprehensive national regulation would also comprise mandatory standards in areas such as health and safety and other employment-related issues such as minimum wage, insurance, vetting and training. Moreover, it may comprise provisions such as criminal record checks in accordance with existing national company law. Further components of national legislation could be licences for individual companies or for specific contracts when private security services are exported to other countries. An essential aspect of national legislation would be effective enforcement mechanisms through means such as regular audits and inspections.

National regulation, if it exists, may be complemented by industry self-regulation. In the absence of national legislation, self-regulation would have to serve as a stop gap and replace legislation at least temporarily. Self-regulation can be highly effective where official, state-run monitoring systems are failing or likely to fail. Moreover, trade associations of the industry usually have a better understanding of the needs for certain standards and may, therefore, considerably improve the overall quality of the services delivered. Companies may also have a substantial incentive to closely monitor their competitors through a self-regulatory scheme, especially if lawful and legitimate behaviour are a requirement for the acquisition of contracts from public authorities and international clients. 

A self-regulatory scheme for the private security industry is currently being developed in the UK by BAPSC. Alongside the US and South Africa, the UK is one of the most important export markets of private security services worldwide. The effective control and regulation of the UK industry could therefore serve as an example and a template for other countries that wish to impose better control on their national industries. 

Although the British government considered options for the regulation of the private security industry in a Green Paper as early as 2002 no action has been taken (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002). With the boom of private security activity in Iraq between 2003 and 2005 and the substantial presence of British PSCs in that country, the regulatory debate has, however, gained new momentum. PSCs themselves realised the need for regulation and, in the absence of government action, formed an association to work towards the introduction of standards and a regulated environment for the delivery of their services. 

More specifically, the BAPSC aims to regulate the export of armed defensive security services. Because the export of these services is extremely difficult to monitor and control, the association’s approach to regulation is twofold. Firstly, it aims to drive up standards in the industry and thereby decrease the likelihood for violations of IHL, international human rights law, and all other legal frameworks that apply to a company’s operation overseas. Compliance with these standards will be monitored, with sanctions-ranging from financial fines used to improve training in a company to the exclusion of the company from the association-being imposed on members that are in breach of the BAPSC Charter and the Code of Conduct.

The Code of Conduct is currently being developed in cooperation with other stakeholders in the regulatory debate, such as the government, NGOs and academic experts. The BAPSC Charter commits the members of the association to transparency, insisting that they have to disclose their corporate structures and their relations with their offshore bases, partners and sub-contractors. Before being admitted as members, companies also have to undergo a thorough vetting process, performed by external reviewers, to ensure their transparency and integrity. Furthermore, members commit themselves to follow all relevant rules of international, humanitarian and human rights law, as well as all standards of good behaviour formulated in the Code of Conduct. They also pledge to avoid any armed exchange in their operations, except in self-defence; to take all reasonable precautions to protect staff in high-risk operations; to decline contracts that may be in conflict with international human rights legislation or potentially involve criminal activity.

Apart from these ‘preventative’ measures the association is currently putting mechanisms in place whereby cases of alleged misconduct or criminal offences can be reported and prosecuted, in particular if they occurred in countries whose legal systems cannot deal with them effectively. In addition to internal processes to ensure the accountability of companies and the punishment of individual offenders, the BAPSC is calling for the nomination of an independent ombudsman within a government department. The ombudsman, as an independent actor, would collect complaints against companies, investigate and process them.

Voluntary self-regulation that is complemented by the institution of an ombudsman can be an effective and credible mechanism to control an industry that transcends national borders with considerable ease. Self-regulation could further function as a stepping stone to comprehensive regulation through legislation to which all companies in a national industry will have to submit. In this case, companies that have actively shaped the standards-setting process in a self-regulatory regime would have a real market advantage in that they would comply with mandatory standards earlier than their competitors.

The biggest hurdles that industries in several African countries would have to overcome when considering self-regulation are the competitive nature of the industry and the risk of competing trade associations vying for privileged access to government. As the case of Kenya demonstrates, self-regulation may not necessarily be a feasible option (Kamenju et al 2004). Yet in other cases, such as Sierra Leone, self-regulation may indeed be the way forward. Because of insufficient public funds and state capacity, the establishment of a national Security Industry Regulatory Authority, which was suggested by the South African risk management company Quemic in 2003, may even be counterproductive. Such a body may be vulnerable to inefficiency and corruption or only solve part of the problems of the private security sector (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005c:18). 

A further level of regulation would be the regional one, comprising the statutory or self-regulatory schemes of several countries. Because of the trans-national nature of the industry an international element certainly needs to complement national regulation. Ideally, it would also enable the cooperation of the law-enforcement and judiciary bodies of several countries in case of an offence under any national regulation or IHL.

An African code of conduct sponsored, for instance, by the African Union (AU) may offer both the intellectual framework for national regulatory regimes and practical recommendations on how to improve and enforce standards in the industry. Such a code could and indeed should be drafted with the support of international actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), industry associations and governments that have successfully introduced regulatory frameworks. Such a process would ensure the transfer of expertise and best practice, some degree of international coherence of rules and standards, as well as a degree of legitimacy through the buy-in of the international community. 

Governments with both strong political, military and economic ties to Africa and a significant private security industry (operating both at the domestic and the  international level) of their own-such as the UK-may be best suited to advise a standards-setting process in Africa. Britain’s interest in African security and stability has repeatedly been emphasised and the 1998 Strategic Defence Review as well as the 2001 New Chapter are evidence of this. The current degree of Britain’s defence and security assistance to African countries, as well as its involvement in SSR in places such as Sierra Leone, exceeds that of most other countries with a meaningful security industry of their own. Therefore, assisting the drafting of a regulatory framework for the private security industry may be a significant element of Britain’s current agenda for Africa. 

Yet, although the buy-in of individual governments would ensure a degree of international legitimacy, an independent international regulatory process is indispensable. It would possibly consist of a code of conduct summarising all relevant stipulations of existing IHL and human rights law as they apply to PSCs in conflict and post-conflict situations. The ongoing joint initiative by the ICRC and the Swiss government to promote respect for IHL and human rights law among PSCs operating in conflict regions would provide the foundation for such an international code of conduct.

Conclusion 


Thus, as this chapter has argued, the introduction of regulation for PSCs in individual African states has to be matched by similar initiatives in other countries in the region. At the same time, any regulatory initiative should ideally be embedded in a broader, international regulatory process. Yet, before starting such a process it is essential to clearly define the commercial entities that are to be subject to regulation and control. Equally, the services the companies are offering have to be well understood and classified. It would further be helpful to address regulation alongside a broader set of issues, such as SSR and strategies for development, when attempting to regulate PSCs.

In a nutshell, the chapter maintains that provided there is sufficient and enforceable regulation, PSCs can contribute to improving the security situation in African societies and thereby also further economic development. This must not, however, come at the price of further damaging social cohesion whereby security becomes a commodity that only the wealthy can afford and whereby the disenfranchised remain the disenfranchised. Without undivided access to security for all members of society development remains close to unattainable. The private security market alone cannot meet these challenges, even if the necessary funds were made available. Governments must not abrogate their obligations to their citizens, in particular when it comes to one of the state’s core functions-that of providing security. Most importantly, governments have to develop and enforce effective regulation for their national private security sector in order for the industry to contribute meaningfully to the creation of a secure and stable environment.

Note

  1. BAPSC members are present in several African countries as well, namely Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia.

Bibliography


Abrahamsen, R and Williams, M C 2005a. The globalisation of private security. Country report: Kenya. Aberystwyth: Department of International Politics, University of Wales at Aberystwyth. Also available at [accessed 20 March 2007].

Abrahamsen, R and Williams, M C 2005b. The globalisation of private security. Country report: Nigeria. Aberystwyth: Department of International Politics, University of Wales at Aberystwyth. Also available at [accessed 20 March 2007].

Abrahamsen, R and Williams, M C 2005c. The globalisation of private security. Country report: Sierra Leone. Aberystwyth: Department of International Politics, University of Wales at Aberystwyth. Also available at [accessed 20 March 2007].

Bryden, A and Caparini, M 2006. Private actors and security governance. Zurich/Munster: Lit Verlag.

Chan, S 2007. Grasping Africa. A tale of tragedy and achievement. London, New York: Tauris.

Chesterman, S and Lehnardt, C 2007. From mercenaries to market. The Rise and regulation of private military companies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clapham, C 1999. African security systems: Privatisation and the scope for mercenary activity. In G Mills and J Stremlau (eds), The privatisation of security in Africa. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2007. The Niger Delta: Prospects for elections and the future reform agenda [online]. Available at [accessed 20 March 2007].

Global Coalition for Africa 1999/2000 Annual Report. African social and economic trends. Washington: Global Coalition for Africa.

Gumedze, S 2007. The private security sector in Africa. The 21st Century’s major cause for concern? ISS Paper 133. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Kamenju, J et al 2004. Private security in Kenya. Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre.

Kaul, I et al 1999. Global public goods. International cooperation in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kinsey, C 2006. Corporate soldiers and international security. The rise of private military companies. London, New York: Routledge.

Mkandawire, P T and Soludo, C C1999. Our continent, our future: African perspectives on structural adjustment. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Ostrom, E et al 2002. The drama of the commons. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Percy, S 2006. Regulating the private security industry. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Piazza, J., 2007. U.S. Partners with Nigeria on Security for Oil-Rich Delta Region. NewsBlaze 14 Mar, available at [accessed 20 March 2007].

Simon, D 1995. Structurally adjusted Africa. Poverty, debt and basic needs. London, Boulder: Pluto Press.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002. Private military companies: Options for regulation, 12 February. London: The Stationary Office.

feature-5icon-printerlogo-chlogo-frPSC REPORT