31 Oct 2007: ISS Today: Opportunities and Challenges for MINURCAT

31 October 2007: Opportunities and Challenges for MINURCAT

 

On 25 September 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1778 to establish a multidimensional presence in eastern Chad and northeast Central Africa Republic which shall include a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).

 

MINURCAT is a response to a humanitarian disaster that is unfolding along the common border of Chad, Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan as a result of a conflict system that has acquired regional dimensions. Resolution 1778 seeks to establish, in partnership with the European Union, a multidimensional presence for a period of twelve months in eastern Chad and north-east CAR. It has the mandate to create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and durable return of refugees and displaced persons. The Resolution also outlines a strategy to protect civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favorable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of this region.

 

Can MINURCAT effectively bring peace to the region? What opportunities and challenges face MINURCAT? MINURCAT is, first and foremost, a response to the regional character of the conflict that is afflicting central Africa. However, the emphasis on the regional origins or character of these conflicts should not obscure the skewed democratic and socio-economic conditions that triggered the conflicts in the first place. This is not a critique of MINURCAT because the mission does not pretend to provide a political solution to the crisis in these countries. Neither is it mandated to do so. However, it is important to point out that even though MINURCAT is a response to the humanitarian crisis, and does not aim to promote constructive and inclusive internal political dialogue in CAR and Chad, it can in the short- to medium-term change the political configuration and trajectory of these countries.

 

The fact that the political leadership of both Chad and CAR have consented to the deployment of EU forces, coupled with internal efforts to promote political inclusivity and dialogue, suggests that MINURCAT may have a moderate chance to achieve its goals. The worst scenario for a humanitarian mission is when the political leadership objects to its presence or activities. In this regard, the personal effort and endeavors of French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner have given MINURCAT a fighting chance. Kouchner’s humanitarian background (he is a co-founder and former head of Médecins Sans Frontières) has clearly motivated him to do all he can to see a humanitarian disaster averted in this instance.

 

International support for MINURCAT - notably from France, USA and China - can, from one perspective, bee seen as contributing to the chances of MINURCAT succeeding. However these foreign interests also present MINURCAT with its most daunting challenge: the imperative to be perceived as being neutral. This is made all the more difficult given the fact that almost half of the EU forces will originate from France and that the day to day operational command of the force will be French.

 

Against this backdrop, it is possible that MINURCAT will go beyond being simply a humanitarian mission. The danger is that the mission will also turn out to be a diplomatic and political effort to consolidate the power of CAR President François Bozizé and his Chadian counterpart Idriss Déby, thereby also serving the regional interests of France, the US and China. Can this explain why Déby, after initially refusing to allow international forces along Chad’s common border with Sudan, changed his position and gave his blessing to MINURCAT?

 

There is no doubt that the EU force in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR will strengthen the regimes of presidents Déby and Bozizé by acting as a bulwark against attacks from rebels using Sudan as their sanctuary. For France MINURCAT should help avert a potential violent confrontation between Chad and Sudan - something that would have put France in a precarious situation given its economic interests in Sudan (primarily in the form of the Total-Elf oil company) and its geostrategic interest in Chad. But most importantly for the French, the survival of Déby will prevent the “Somalianization” of Chad and any subsequent ripple effect on CAR.

 

As for the US, Déby represents their best ally for the purposes continuing their war on terror. This strategy also ensures that they have access to mining oil in the region.

 

Instability in central Africa has definitely presented China with a diplomatic and economic opportunity to enhance its position in the global political economy. Déby has not only severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but China now acquires a significant portion of Chadian oil.

 

Another daunting challenge facing MINURCAT will be its exit strategy. For the time being there seems no substantial discussion about what will happen when the EU force leaves. Though it looks unrealistic that they will leave after twelve months, it is probable that force levels and resources will be reduced. As such, it is imperative to work out some sort of a framework for interfacing between the AU, UN and EU in order to ensure coordination cooperation and a sustainable exit for EU forces.  

 

MINURCAT is a welcome initiative but its benefits will only be sustainable if it is accompanied by constructive and inclusive attempts at addressing the roots of the crisis in central Africa. The epicenter of tension in this region is the absence of strong democratic institutions able to negotiate elite interests and manage ethnic animosity. This democratic deficit has been compounded by the lack of genuine economic development, thus making state power the only means of wealth accumulation in a region endowed with an abundance of natural resources. These issues must be addressed if a lasting solution to the troubles of the region is to be achieved.

 

Chrysantus Ayangafac, Senior Researcher: Direct Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa