26 Jun 2006: ISS Today: Sudan Suspends all UN Mission Work in Darfur

26 June: Sudan suspends all U.N. mission work in Darfur
Opheera McDoom, Reuters.

Sudan has suspended the work of a U.N. mission in its violent Darfur region after accusing the world body of transporting a rebel leader who opposes a recent peace deal, a Sudanese official said on Sunday. "The suspension applies for all of Darfur and this will continue until we get an explanation," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Jamal Ibrahim. He said the ban was imposed because a U.N. helicopter had moved rebel leader Suleiman Adam Jamous, who rejects a peace deal signed on May 5. It excludes two bodies affiliated to the U.N. mission, the World Food Programme and the U.N. children`s agency (UNICEF), Ibrahim said. U.N. spokeswoman Radhia Achouri said the mission had not received any formal communication from the government.

 

Commentary

For seasoned Sudan watchers, the past week is certain to confirm a widely held view about politics there -- that it remains unconducive to long term predictability. If we consider some of the key events that have taken place over the past month in Sudan, it is clear that there remains no ‘politics of cohesion’ on issues relating to either of the two main peace agreements signed – the  Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The mixed signals emanating from all belligerents, the new government of national unity and the Darfur rebels included, highlight the key obstacle to moving beyond ‘peace talk’ into action, a fundamental lack of visionary leadership. The fracturing of both the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has revealed the divisive nature of the DPA. Indeed, the legitimacy of the deal is widely disputed, particularly by the most vulnerable of Darfur’s war affected population -- the internally displaced. In the view of one analyst, the IDPs have nothing left to lose and their opposition to the agreement reflects a last effort to be heard by the central government.

 

The past three weeks have seen a flurry of diplomatic activity in Khartoum that locals have likened to the seasonal haboob (sand storm) in its intensity and impact.  This included high-level talks between the UN’s Special Envoy in Sudan, Jan Pronk, and retired senior diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, a meeting that resulted in the dispatch of a joint AU-UN Technical Assessment Team to Darfur, a visit by AU Head Alpha Konare, the release of the report by Chief ICC Prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo on investigations into human rights abuses in Darfur, and a one-day meeting between President Omer El Bashir and his South African counterpart President Thabo Mbeki. In addition talks between the Eastern rebel group, the Beja Congress, and the NCP are continuing under the mediation of Eritrea. On the sidelines to the central issues facing the Khartoum government, the latter also played host to talks between the warring factions in Somalia in its capacity as the head of the Arab League.

 

This list excludes developments in Southern Sudan and the key two-day meeting held at the end of May between the SPLM and the NCP on the implementation of the CPA. Sudan has thus been the subject of significant international attention. It is within this multi-faceted framework that we may consider the most recent action against the United Nations Mission in Darfur. It must also be remembered that the UN is essentially in Sudan under a peace monitoring mandate that is wholly confined to the CPA. Thus, any infringements of the DPA or attenuating actions are at present the preserve of the African Union.

 

Khartoum’s position vis-à-vis the UN agencies is both a reaction to the continuing pressure to re-hat the under-resourced African Union Mission as a UN peacekeeping force (a move which also carries with it the shadow of possible International Criminal Court prosecutions), and an emboldened sense of support emanating from Chinese and Russian interests in Sudan. Recent reports suggest that the Darfur conflict is being fuelled by the easy availability of Chinese manufactured small-arms. While this does not mean that the Chinese state has a direct role to play in the conflict, there are certainly economic incentives to block any resolution of the much protracted conflict. China is also a major player in the exploitation for Sudanese oil.

 

Despite AMIS’s significant successes in Darfur (relative to its observer mandate) the AU has openly acknowledged the need for a re-hatting of its mission as a UN force. It was assumed that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting of the 15 March had been decisive in ending the speculation regarding the future of AMIS. However, the latest ban on the UN (aside from UNICEF and WFP) adds a significant caveat to the planning for any UN takeover, a move which can only be guaranteed through Khartoum’s consent. Who is likely to strengthen the AU mission to the end of its 30 September mandate? How will the outstanding rebel factions be dealt with in the coming days beyond the threat of travel sanctions that do not impact upon ground militia? How realistic is it to continue to use Minnawi’s signature as representative of sentiments of the people of Darfur? How will China and Russia position themselves on resolution on a UN mission to the region? How much longer can Minni Minnawi remain within the fold of the pro-Abuja camp without compromising his own long-term legitimacy?  How will US interests in its global war on terror be used to frame its perspective on domestic Sudanese politics? These are some the complex questions that will likely remain unresolved in the near future.

 

Mariam Bibi Jooma