23 Nov 2007: ISS Today: Darfur and the Art of Sexy Politics

23 November 2007: Darfur and the Art of Sexy Politics

 

On 8 November Newsweek launched an online forum on the Darfur conflict, juxtaposing the views of two well respected experts about how best to ‘help’ Sudan. The debate between Alex de Waal, director of think-tank Justice Africa, and John Prendergast, the co-chair of the Save Darfur Coalition, provided substantial food for thought. Among the issues it raised is that of the unintended consequences of an issue-based activism removed from its national context -- as reflected by the “Save Darfur” campaign that took to understanding Darfur as a particular problem rather than as a symptom of a much wider crisis of accountable governance in Sudan that affects southern, western and indeed Eastern and Northern Sudan.  The Newsweek debate also introduced a much-needed critique of the use of the term ‘genocide’ in Darfur. These two central points are increasingly relevant to African and international policymakers and activists who are calling for greater action in Sudan.

 

Much has been said about the failure to protect civilians, and the abrogation of that responsibility by the government of Sudan. That the violence inflicted upon Sudanese in Darfur has been on a mass scale, which essentially has given the lie to the Sudanese government’s rhetoric of trying to solve the conflict between farmers and pastoralists, is not in dispute. However, it is particularly important to assess whether international activism has in fact assisted in creating political space for positive engagement. De Waal argues that the humanitarian principle of ‘first do no harm’ should be applicable to activist groups as well, maintaining that some of the pressure from the lobby groups led the Bush administration to adopt more hardline rhetoric towards Khartoum that has increased the latter’s recalcitrance and  reduced the chances of finding a solution. This assertion is significant when we consider that, despite the “Save Darfur” campaign gaining mass support on a scale perhaps rivalled only by the former anti-apartheid movement, very little progress has actually been achieved on either the political or military fronts in Darfur.

 

The ISS has argued consistently that the conflict in Darfur is the result of a combination of factors: the clash of elites within the National Congress Party and their much needed desire for regime security; the contestation for relevance by Northern Opposition parties for whom the Comprehensive Peace Agreement delivered little; and the crisis of cohesion in a environmentally challenged area where tribal authority and local governance have been emasculated by central government. Added to this battle for Khartoum was the expectation on the part of smaller groups of the dividends to be gained from using arms to ‘shoot their way to the negotiating table’, threatening to play the ‘spoiler’ role should their demands not be met. But what are those demands, and how are they to be realised in the context of a clear limitation on power and wealth sharing, at least during the interim period of six years dictated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?  It is this national context that has been under-appreciated by media and activists and largely ignored by popular foreign policy announcements such as those made by Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown and George Bush. How has the CPA process been factored into Darfur? Has there been enough emphasis on popularising the CPA so that the benchmarks set for the democratic transformation of Sudan within that agreement can be fully implemented (the most important of these is re-aligning state constitutions and assemblies to reflect the changes set in the Interim National Constitution)? How are the demands for land regulation, tenure and access being addressed, considering the establishment of the Land Commission framework stipulated in the CPA? With the two main signatories to the CPA seeking to maintain the gains made in Naivasha how realistic is it to entertain such high expectations of a power-sharing and wealth-sharing deal with the rebel movements/groups? As the conflict continues to rage, how are popular expectations of the effects of the UNAMID mission being managed, something that is certain to be a key in the post-deployment environment in Darfur? How will the process of addressing the injustices in Darfur be interpreted by other areas, such as Eastern Sudan which has the highest rates of malnutrition in the country?

 

As the stalemate between the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) continues there are more worrying signs of a lack of confidence and trust between troops of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) who are meant to make up the new Joint Integrated Units to be deployed in some of the most contested areas in Sudan – the oil rich border regions between North and South. This speaks to a growing sense of insecurity and a lack of faith that the promises made upon signing the CPA in 2005 will be implemented.  President Bashir visited South Africa recently to solidify bilateral links between the two countries and also to broach the question of South African support for mediation in the Darfur talks. At the same time Vice President Salva Kiir embarked on a two week trip to the  United States where he met with key policymakers and raised the SPLM’s concerns about the non-implementation of the CPA. It seems that for both sides the desire to use external leverage to effect power shifts remains the default mode of oppositional politics in Sudan, once more highlighting the ‘hollowing out of the state’. In the absence of a social contract between the Sudanese state and its disaffected citizens, peace is likely to be a dream deferred.

 

Mariam Bibi Jooma, Researcher: African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)