23 Nov 2006: ISS Today: Darfur - Breakthrough or Breakdown?

23 November 2006: Darfur - Breakthrough or Breakdown?

If there were any expectations that last week’s high level consultation on Darfur held in Addis Ababa heralded a breakthrough for the peace process, certainly these have been tempered by the meeting’s outcomes. The meeting of the UN Secretary General, the Security Council’s permanent members, the AU Chairperson and a handful of African countries was centred on finding a way forward for Darfur, particularly in relation to the African Union’s peacekeeping operation (AMIS) currently under strain there. This time the discussion centred on the proposal of what has been called a ‘hybrid force’, which would see dual ownership of the process by the UN and the African Union. Predictably Sudan’s dominant National Congress Party maintained its opposition to any deployment of international troops (despite the presence of UNMIS in the South) and reiterated its support for the status quo -- an African Union led force with UN technical and logistical support.

In essence, the Sudanese authorities have their consent to a ‘hybrid operation’ rather than a ‘hybrid force’. Nevertheless, the meeting was inappropriately hailed by some elements of the international community and media as a ‘historic’ moment, following statements by UN humanitarian chief Jan Engeland. This optimism would seem to be misplaced if we consider that very little of substance was agreed upon in Addis Ababa. Indeed, even the size and mandate of the force is yet to be ratified, and it is expected that these issues will be raised once again on 29 November at the next Peace and Security Council meeting. Interestingly, the situation also raises the question of the effectiveness and utility of the non-permanent African seat on the UN Security Council since none of these countries were represented at the discussions in Addis Ababa. This might moderate some of the expectations around South Africa’s election onto the Security Council for 2007 and 2008.

But leaving aside Khartoum’s clear position on international deployment, we are still confronted with the practical issues relating to such a proposed hybrid force. Who would lead the command and control side of such an operation? Would the United Nations be willing or able to play a subordinate political role to the AU and would this be a viable option given the urgency of the matters? Is it realistic to expect an easy and effective institutional fit between two vastly different organisations such as the AU and UN? Is the de-linking of the military and political processes through institutional areas of responsibility not going to add to the gap between the climate on the ground level and those in the meeting halls of negotiations? These are some of the questions that come to mind when considering a joint operation. More importantly, is the question of AMIS credibility to lead on the Darfur issue, considering the local climate of hostility towards the regional organisation seen as partial to the Sudanese government’s position. This is particularly important if we consider the growing and threatening opposition within and between rebel groups and the internally displaced towards the Darfur Peace Agreement, the very document whose implementation is meant to be overseen by the AU. Indeed the perception that AMIS is bias towards the Minni Minnawi faction of the SLM and the Khartoum authorities has proven dangerous, and even fatal, for AMIS troops operating in rebel held areas. Moreover, the expansion of tensions not only across the borders into the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad but to the centre of Khartoum through protests and police crackdowns point to an increasingly insecure Sudanese political landscape.

But Sudan’s problems are not confined to the question of Darfur, and it is now clear that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed last year between North and South is at risk of being derailed as a result of the deteriorating relationship between the SPLM and the NCP on key issues relating to the Abyei boundary, wealth sharing, continued suspicion of the NCP’s support for the LRA in Southern Sudan and increasingly on the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in Darfur. It is no coincidence that Vice President, Salva Kiir is spending a large part of his time in international capitals reiterating the need for international support for implementation of the CPA. The SPLM is showing a renewed urgency around securing the gains of the Naivasha talks as the primacy of the CPA is being challenged by the multiple peace processes in the rest of the country. It is this bilateral rather than multilateral approach to Sudan’s conflicts that is now paralysing the CPA and will surely continue to plague the Darfur process if the current deadline-based diplomacy prevails.

Mariam Bibi Jooma, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)