23 Feb 2007: ISS Today: Darfur Rebels Say Not Concerned By Tripoli Tripartite Meeting

23 February 2007: Darfur Rebels Say Not Concerned By Tripoli Tripartite Meeting

 

Darfur rebel groups denied participation in a mini-summit held in Tripoli in a bid to find a common ground allowing them to join the Darfur Peace Agreement signed last May between Sudanese government and one rebel faction. While Abdelwahid al-Nur, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) told Sudan Tribune that they were not contacted by the talk’s sponsors, the spokesperson of the National Redemption Front (NRF), Ahmed Hussein Adam, said they received an invitation from the Eritrean mediator but they declined it. In Tripoli, the Libyan leader affirmed they expect the arrival of the rebel leaders to take part in the meeting.

 

Commentary

 

“There’s no business like show business”, as the saying goes, and this adage perhaps best describes the current state of diplomacy on Darfur. While the situation of thousands of civilians affected by the current conflict in Darfur is deteriorating at an alarming rate, the only news of Darfurian “high politics” is continued intransigence from both the state authorities and the rebel groups, further inflected by regional interests.

 

The current meetings under way in Tripoli illustrate the continuing political theatre that has characterised the attempts at peacemaking in the region: diplo-speak without substantive movement on the actual implementation of the ceasefire accords or the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006.  It has been suggested that the aim of the latest meeting between Sudan, Chad and Libyan authorities is to bring the recalcitrant rebel factions into the DPA process. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the 2003 uprising by the SLA under Abdel Wahid Nour in El-Fasher no longer reflects the political grievances of three years ago. Thus the initial opposition to the agreement -- concerns around the compensation, power sharing and guarantors for the disarmament of the janjaweed -- have also been inflamed by questions of regional interest and leverage that have become a trademark of protracted peace negotiations.

 

For one, the rebel formations are increasingly based on what was previously less relevant to the Darfur context: ethnicity. Where media reports have tended to portray the conflict as rooted in Arab-African tension, in the past this has offered too simple an explanation for what essentially is a crisis of governance within the centre of Sudan’s ruling party. However, since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement there has been a fracturing between the military and political wing of the SLM around ethnicity, particularly against the Zaghawa people who are seen to be partial to the authorities through the figure of Minni Minnawi.  Although it is also pertinent to remember that such formations are not cut-and-dried in the sense of constituting homogenous identities, but are as fluid as the political environment, what is important is the fact that such appeals to tribal allegiance do little for the overall political relationship of Darfur to centre of power in Sudan, and instead reduce the “fight against marginalisation” to a scramble for the spoils of ethnic representation.

 

In addition, the historical use of militias now widely known as the janjaweed was partly to avoid disaffection in a national army in which Darfurians were heavily represented. This led to a situation where the economics of war have accentuated the cleavages between nomadic and sedentary people of Darfur.

 

The evolution of the SLA into five broad factions, the proliferation of the smaller Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the formation of the formidable National Redemption Front (NRF) with links to Chad and Eritrea, suggests that the war economy continues to thrive and is unlikely to be disrupted by an appeal to join the DPA. 

 

It can be argued that actions of the leadership of both the National Congress Party and the rebel factions reflect less concern with the outcomes of the peace processes than with the illusion of engagement itself. It is clear that the basic conditions for security in Darfur are not being addressed and, indeed, that the African Union’s hybrid operation with the United Nations is unlikely to reach the third and most critical phase agreed to in Addis Ababa last November, that of joint AU-UN troop deployment.

 

Curiously the Tripoli mini-summit also comes at the same time as suggestions by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon that a UN deployment into Chad and the Central African Republic may be an option for stemming civilian insecurity in the border region.  His predecessor Kofi Annan’s report to the Security Council last December raised concerns that there are “so far no signs of a credible and inclusive political process in Darfur” and that “the decision to deploy such a robust United Nations monitoring and protection mission should be contingent upon a cessation of hostilities and an agreement by all parties to allow the induction of force, facilitate its operations and fully comply with its mandate.” While the idea of deploying into Chad may be viewed as a creative bypassing of the Khartoum authorities it is also likely to legitimate Pres Idriss Deby’s regime, which has itself been under strain since the 2005 constitutional amendment which allowed him to run for the 2006 Presidential election.

 

If this week’s meeting is meant to facilitate some kind of agreement on the cessation of hostilities then the representation of parties falls short. Moreover the role of China in the Security Council as a key recipient of both Sudanese and Chadian oil is also likely to influence the possibility of a deployment. And with all the pressures on the UN peacekeeping establishment and talk of a new deployment to Somalia, it is also likely that although the grand gestures of political resolutions and meetings are full of sound and fury they may signify nothing.

 

Mariam Bibi Jooma, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)