17 Oct 2007: ISS Today: South African Army Restructuring a Critical Step

17 October 2007: South African Army Restructuring a Critical Step

 

According to a recent report in Janes Defense Weekly the South African Army will shortly begin a process of restructuring that is a critical step in meeting the challenges the army is likely to face in the future.

 

In many respects the restructuring is an attempt to undo the effects of a force design that came into effect in 2001. That force structure was implemented in accordance with the recommendations of auditing firm Deloitte and Touche, who were contracted to draw up a plan to make the SA Army more economically efficient. The Deloitte and Touche plan had the army separate its combat forces into ‘silo’ style structures, including an armour formation, an infantry formation, an artillery formation and an engineer formation.

 

As a result of the implementation of this structure, the combined-arms forces necessary to actually conduct operations had to be assembled on an ad-hoc basis, drawing sub-units together from the various formations. At the time of the restructuring this was not considered by those in authority to be a significant problem as there was a widespread perception that, following the 1994 transition to democracy, the ‘peace dividend’ meant that there would be little need for the state to make use of its military forces. It was also expected that the structure would generate considerable cost savings, and important consideration at a time when the priority for the new government was meeting the considerable domestic needs of South Africa’s citizens, rather than pursuing muscular foreign policy agendas.

 

Another significant effect of the Deloitte and Touche plan was that there were no standing units of the army of greater than battalion strength, and none of those battalions had combined-arms capability. Given the unspoken but palpable mistrust by the political masters of an army still at the time dominated (particularly at the ‘middle-management’ level) by former members of the apartheid-era South African Defence Force (SADF), it cannot have escaped attention that the silo structure mitigated against the chances of a rogue army unit having the capability to conduct a successful coup d’etat.

 

As the SA Army has in recent years been increasingly drawn into the previously unforseen role of African peacekeeping force, it has become increasingly clear that the silo structure makes little operational sense. While it is hard to calculate its value in financial terms, unit cohesion is critical for optimum performance in the field. It is a testimony to the soldiers and officers of the SA Army that they have done as well as they have in the face of this structural obstacle. The new restructuring will allow the army to return to a more traditional, time-tested force structure.

 

Between 2008 and 2011 the SA Army will restructure itself around two divisions (one Mechanised and one Motorised) and a Contingency Brigade. The latter will have responsibility for crisis response and early entry operations, and will consist of a parachute battalion group, a sea-landed battalion group and an air-landed battalion group. The Mechanised Division will be the main deterrent element of the SA Army - the army’s ‘iron fist’ - and will be made up of an armoured brigade, a mechanised brigade and a motorised brigade. The Motorised Division will be the lead force for homeland security operations and will also be the primary provider of units for deployment on peacekeeping operations. The division will consist of six motorised brigades.

 

Another important development that will emerge from the restructuring is the establishment of a new Works Regiment, which will fall under the Army’s Engineer Corps. Since the inauguration of the South African National Defence Force (which integrated members of the old SADF, combatants from the armed wings of the liberation movements, members of the armed forces of the former ‘homelands’, and members of self-defence units) has struggled to cope with a large number of ageing soldiers, many of whom are unfit for operational duty. The Works Regiment provides a positive means of dealing with these soldiers, who will be reskilled as artisans and put to work maintaining army and other Defence Force facilities. This will both equip the soldiers concerned with the skills necessary to pursue a career outside the army (should they so choose), and enable the army to get its fighting units up to combat-ready status.

 

For all the operational advantages that will flow from this restructuring, and they are many, what must not be overlooked is its broader significance. The fact that these planned changes have been approved by those in authority reflects a changing perception of the SA Army, from potential threat to valuable contributor to state security and national policy objectives. It is also significant that this plan has emerged from within the structures of the Army rather than being imposed by outside consultants, and that it has been developed by a leadership team composed of former enemies. The SA Army is coming of age. What is needed now is for the government to give it the resources it needs to become the invaluable servant of our nation that it now shows the potential of becoming.

 

Deane-Peter Baker, Editor: African Security Review, ISS