13 Sep 2006: ISS Today: An Interim Agreement Gives Islamists an Edge in Somalia
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“... the second round of reconciliation talk... concluded on September 4 with the signing of an ‘interim agreement’ that registered little, if any advance in the process of resolving Somalia’s severe domestic conflicts.”
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Commentary
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When Somalia’s shaky 14 May 2006 ceasefire collapsed after a couple of weeks, the situation steadily deteriorated into another phase of conflict, initially between the secular alliance of warlords and the Islamic Court militias. Following the defeat of the warlords, however, the frontline of conflict shifted to one between the Baidoa-based Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Mogadishu-based Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC) (previously Islamic Courts Union, ICU).
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The deterioration in security levels highlights the long-held belief that there can be no durable ceasefire in the absence of serious commitment. This has been notably lacking on the part of Somalia’s protagonists and raises questions of the prospects of even short-term peace in this war-torn country. This lack of commitment to peace-building stems from the greater commitment of the TFG and the ICU/ICC each to their own entrenched political ideologies. Thus, while the TFG is committed to the ideology of a political process largely instigated by the neighbouring states in collaboration with key stakeholders within the international community, the Islamic Courts remain steadfast in their pursuit of a populist religious ideology that seeks to establish an Islamic state in the country.
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Given this political standoff, the logical course of action for both sides was to consolidate their respective positions. As a result, the Islamic Courts sought to shift the balance of power in their favour through the establishment of more Sharia Courts and, when necessary, to induce the surrender of armed elements. Two cases in point were the resumption of hostilities - in Mogadishu on 9 July, and the advance of the Islamic militia to Buur Hakaba (35 kms from Baidoa) on 19 July that resulted in the surrender of some 150 TFG troops - and the consolidation of the presidential palace of Mogadishu, following negotiations with Husayn Aydid’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) on 27 July.
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Even though the Courts Alliance might not have intended these actions to be provocative, it was predictable that the TFG, which increasingly finds itself in a precarious position - was bound to respond, and respond it did by way of an “open” invitation to Ethiopia to deploy a protection force in Baidoa. The increasingly divided TFG has experienced cabinet resignations.
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In addition to the delivery of arms, in violation of the 1992 UN Security arms embargo, both sides are guilty of serious pre-emptive and retaliatory violations of the14 May ceasefire. The cumulative consequence of these actions is now evidenced in the political polarisation that caused the second round of the Khartoum talks scheduled for mid-July to be delayed. The subsequent deterioration in the situation in Somalia was thus only a symptom of the deep mistrust between the protagonists, who profess dialogue, but are disposed to the use of force to achieve their political ends.
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At the second round of talk (hosted by Arab League) which eventually took place in Libya on 9-10 September, the parties reaffirmed the provisions of the first round of the Khartoum talks on 22 June - mutual recognition, end to military operations and commitment to negotiation of power-sharing. Both sides are now seeking to assure the other of the integrity of their political ends; but it is questionable whether the reaffirmation of commitment to these ground principles, and which, nevertheless, continue to be violated by all sides, has laid the desired foundation for the new commitments made: the unification of the security forces, regular or irregular, and to refrain from accepting foreign military aid.
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The road ahead for the implementation of a peace deal in Somalia can only be described as appearing to be deceptively calm, bordering on a “situation normal absolutely unpredictable”, or snafu. The real deception stems from the apparent successes of the Islamic Courts, and this may result in their taking an uncompromising stance that would bring them into a head-on collision with a wounded TFG and its Ethiopian ally, which is bent on using Somalia to fight a proxy war against its own ‘liberation-terrorist’ movements. The apparent peace that the SICC have established in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia should not be regarded as a substitute for the TFG and the Transitional Federal Institutions. After all, there has been stability in Somaliland and Puntland, long before the Islamists arrived on the scene, and these entities have a stake in the outcome of the dialogue between the TFG and the Islamic Courts.
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If both parties are committed to peace, as they claim to be, the next step now should be the establishment of a mechanism that ensures inclusion of all stakeholders in the political process, the so-called power-sharing arrangements. The mandate of such a mechanism will be to resolve all other outstanding issues now coalesced around such key issues as the: 1) unification of forces, 2) withdrawal of foreign forces, and the 3) deployment of a regional peace support mission.
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But this cannot be left to the national stakeholders. As emphasised already, IGAD, the AU, the League of Arab States, the UN and the International Partners cannot but remain engaged with the Somali debacle to lever the parties towards the critical mass of political compromise and accommodation in the establishment of a government of national unity. Indeed, their immediate challenge should be for the parties to discuss the more substantive issue of power-sharing during the third round of the Khartoum talks scheduled for 30 October 2006. Gaining “the edge” in the Somali peace process should not be the primary agenda of any of the parties, as this will only run counter to the restoration of peace in this war-ravaged country.
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Festus Aboagye, Training for Peace Programme, ISS Pretoria
