13 Jul 2007: ISS Today: South Africa: Intrepid Guardians of the State?

13 July 2007: South Africa: Intrepid Guardians of the State?

 

Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across the world, intelligence is an essential weapon, perhaps the most important. But it is, being secret, the most dangerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be devised, revised and rigidly applied. But, as in all enterprises, the character and wisdom of those to whom it is entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of that guardianship lies the hope of the free people to endure and prevail. - Sir William Stephenson, A Man Called Intrepid, p xvi The Globe Pequot Press (2000)

 

The guardianship of the coercive tools of statecraft, among which military strength and covert intelligence operations are essential, is central to the exercise of democratic control of the state security apparatus. The Billy Masetlha case, involving the abuse misuse of position and power within the South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) in 2006, highlighted important gaps in the mechanisms and processes that safeguard against the subversion of the state’s civilian intelligence apparatus in personal or group interest. The secret nature of intelligence operations is often used as a justification for limited transparency. But consenting to excessive secrecy creates room for abuse and provides opportunity for the furthering of political and economic interests that do not necessarily add value to the security of the state or its people.

 

In South Africa, as with any other state, the intelligence community is shaped by the evolution of the state security apparatus and the strategic political environment in which the state functions. The challenges of intelligence governance in South Africa, therefore, emanate from the challenges of deepening a democratic culture, opening space for political engagement and overcoming the excessively centralised and biased culture of the apartheid state security structures. The post-1994 transformation of the intelligence services was comprehensive and fundamental, involving the establishment of a sound legislative framework and vast organisational restructuring. A defining characteristic of this was the establishment of mechanisms of oversight such as the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) and the Inspector General for Intelligence. Intelligence reform was, therefore, a direct consequence of the changed political environment.

 

That said, intelligence operations and priorities are determined primarily by the political context of the state. In recent times, the political stability of South Africa has been linked to the succession battle within the ANC and, given the legal mandate of the domestic intelligence agency NIA to engage in domestic political intelligence operations, the civilian intelligence body is legally empowered to conduct operations involving inter- and intra-party disputes. The problem with the current mandate of the domestic civilian intelligence body is that it is too broad to prevent the subversion of national intelligence priorities to personal or group political interest. If one is to truly interrogate the mandate of NIA, one should begin by questioning the role that state intelligence needs to play in the provision of security for the South African state and people. Is it still relevant for the security needs of South Africa, that the intelligence services are concerned with domestic political behaviour and, if so, what kind of domestic political behaviour should catch the eye of the intelligence agencies?

 

It seems that there is a small wind of change beginning to stir within the South African intelligence community, with the Minister of Intelligence Services, Ronnie Kasrils, saying that he will remove the term political intelligence from the lexicon of NIA. In this regard the Minister established the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence, which includes in its investigations mechanisms of control of the civilian intelligence agencies, including control over intrusive methods of investigation and the issue of political intelligence. The Commission has engaged in public consultation and accepted submissions from civil society.

 

Overcoming the apartheid hangover of intelligence engagement in domestic political affairs beyond a legitimate mandate must be a priority if South Africa is truly to develop the intelligence architecture capable of achieving even a modicum of non-partisanship. Through mechanisms such as the Ministerial Commission, the opportunity is open for civil society to have an input into the security policy process. Sadly, there is a distinct lack of civil society engagement on issues of intelligence governance, partly because of the nature of intelligence and partly the historical role of intelligence in South Africa.

 

The basis for continually evaluating and refining the role of the intelligence services needs to be a realistic evaluation of the political-strategic environment in which the state finds itself. Hopefully, the process currently under way in South Africa will result in a redefined mandate for NIA. At a minimum, refining the mandate of NIA to conduct domestic political intelligence operations to counter activities seeking to alter the political environment through violence or unconstitutional means. On the positive side, for now at least, the South African intelligence services seem to be under the leadership of a notable guardian who is utilising the negative behaviour of certain elements within the intelligence services to advance reform and embed a democratic culture within the intelligence community. The only concerns are the degree to which the leadership can remain immune from the pressures of politics, especially the current politics within the ANC ranks, and overcome the tendency of the executive guardians of intelligence to hide behind plausible deniability as an indispensable defence. This means that, apart from refining the mandate of NIA to conduct domestic political operations, the Minister also should consider the level of control and authorisation needed to conduct such operations.

 

What is evident in the post-apartheid intelligence community is that the role of guardianship is taken seriously, with the JSCI taking the lead in holding the Minister and the intelligence agencies to account. During the Intelligence Budget debate in May 2007, committee members used the public engagement to highlight issues of success and flag areas of concern. One such area was the notion of political intelligence and the exact mandate of NIA. Furthermore, the JSCI has initiated investigations into irregular expenditure within NIA and into reports of intimidation by NIA of trades union members prior to labour action. 

However, as Sir William Stephenson so fluently articulated, the character and wisdom of those to whom the management of intelligence is entrusted will be decisive. Although much can be done at executive and parliamentary level, the actual success of any mechanisms of control will depend on the people to whom we entrust the conduct of intelligence, especially covert activities. It has become common cause that there are rogue elements within the South African intelligence community misusing their positions to further alternative agendas. The dual challenge is further to improve and refine the mechanisms of control of the intelligence services through legislation and regulation, but also to embed a culture of professionalism, accountability, cooperation and non-partisanship within the services and to build the understanding of those involved of their role in the policy chain.

 

Lauren Hutton, Researcher, Defence Sector Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)