13 Aug 2007: ISS Today: Burundi in Turmoil

13 August 2007: Burundi in Turmoil

 

Dark clouds are looming over Burundi’s peace process. In dark contrast to the domestic and international hopes that accompanied the democratic general elections of 2005, recent political events have shaken the functioning of State institutions and have aggravated the climate of tension that characterises this post-conflict society. Among the key elements in Burundi’s rapidly deteriorating political situation are: a governance crisis has led to institutional paralysis; alleged cases of corruption within the government; the stagnation of the country’s economy; and the recent suspension of the ceasefire agreement by the only remaining dissident armed group.

 

Background

 

After more than ten years of devastating civil war, the 2000 signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement between several warring parties began a transition period that officially ended in 2005 with the overwhelming victory of the former rebel movement Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) in the legislative elections. The parliament then elected Pierre Nkurunziza as President of the Republic. With South Africa leading the way, the international community’s commitment to the Burundi peace process was hailed as resulting in the elimination of the last barrier to a broader peace when, in September 2006, the last holdout armed group, the Parti pour la Liberation du people Hutu, Forces Nationales de Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL) signed a ceasefire agreement with the government. However, although the ceasefire agreement formally ended hostilities, its implementation has continued to face tremendous challenges. This can be attributed to several factors including: the increasingly authoritarian style of the political leadership; loopholes in the ceasefire agreement; and the failure of the political leadership to deal with the governance challenges of the country.

 

Democratically elected but not ruling democratically

 

Since his election in August 2005 President Pierre Nkurunziza and his party, the CNDD-FDD, have concentrated on a crackdown on their enemies, whether real or perceived. This confrontational approach by the ruling party and elite, both in government and in the two chambers of the parliament, has been mainly directed at senior opposition leaders - including the former transition president, Domitien Ndayizeye, his vice-president and four others who have been arbitrarily arrested and detained for over five months while also being prosecuted on charges of alleged coup-plotting. Civil society and the media have also been targeted for expressing opinions deemed to be ‘anti-government’.

 

More recently this authoritarian approach has also been directed at the president’s own political party members and former allies. In recent months increasing divisions within the ruling party have led to the removal (in February 2007) and imprisonment of the party leader, Hussein Radjabu. Radjabu, a Muslim and a very influential member of the CNDD, was the mastermind of the present peace deal. He was also said to have been the architect of the government’s persecution of political opponents, which triggered discomfort among moderate leaders about the president’s leadership style. President Nkurunziza’s audacious move in arresting Radjabu and subsequent purging of his supporters from the government has greatly affected the party’s cohesion. About 20 pro- Radjabu CNDD-FNN MPs have stood up to the government, leading to Nkurunziza losing majority support in the parliament. This has literally paralyzed the country’s institutions, by making it impossible for any bill to pass through the legislative process.

 

Though it is certainly the case that President Nkurunziza’s current inability to effectively govern is due to his failure to resort to accountable, inclusive and democratic governance, opposition parties must also take some of the blame. Due to their own internal divisions and lack of positive alternative visions, their contribution to a national political agenda has been negligent, since their political maneuvers have tended to further radicalize the president’s positions.

 

The ceasefire in danger

 

In addition to institutional bottlenecks and the lack of cohesion within the ruling party, the government is also confronted with rebel defections from the ceasefire monitoring team. The monitoring team was set up in the aftermath of the ceasefire deal of September 7, 2006 under the mediation of South African Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula. It comprised government members, FNL negotiators and South African mediators.  However, the implementation of the agreement has always faced enormous obstacles on all sides. Irrespective of all considerations about power sharing agreements and rebels’ security concerns, the failure to reach a comprehensive political and military settlement with the rebel Hutu militia is partly due to the final composition of the country’s new national army, the Forces de Defense Nationale (FDN). Referring to the Hutu’s share of population, the Palipehutu-FNL is demanding greater representation for Hutus in the army. The CNDD-FDD categorically rejects this on the grounds that it would undermine the current power-sharing agreement on which the tenuous peace of the country lies. This agreement provides for a 50/50 share of army positions between Tutsi and Hutu. However, due to the country’s colonial history, members of the minority Tutsi group traditionally occupy most of the army’s senior positions, making the power base of the army clearly inequitable. That said, a fundamental reform of this arrangement would certainly shake the fragile social contract that emerged from the Arusha agreement.

 

Apparently irreconcilable differences between the government and Palipehutu-FNL negotiation teams are mostly due to a profound lack of mutual trust, which originates in part from their history as competing rebel movements. Boosted by their democratic legitimacy, President Nkurunziza and the CNDD-FNL have resorted to “winner-takes-all” behaviour that has aggravated the FNL’s reluctance to engage in a full peace-process. Moreover, the repeated human rights violations of the government, and the President’s increasingly authoritarian ruling style, have reinforced their skepticism about his sincerity with regards to their security. On the other side, the FNL has never shown a great deal commitment to the agreement. The FNL’s move to sign the ceasefire agreement, which came as a surprise to many observers, was almost certainly due to massive pressure from the international community and to specific threats of severe regional and international sanctions by the peace facilitators. Because of inescapable financial and logistical considerations, the international community sometimes resorts to ‘deadline diplomacy’, which can in the long run set in place conditions which undermine the peace process it facilitated in the first place.

 

Prospects

 

Despite increasing fears stirred by a new round of armed clashes, the current political crisis might nonetheless present a unique chance for Burundi’s political elite to pave the way for durable peace in the country. The current crisis doesn’t benefit most of the political actors, including the president and his allies as well as the opposition parties and the CNDD dissidents in the parliament. Nor does it benefit an exhausted population that wishes nothing more than peace and economic recovery. The only possible beneficiary might be the FNL, which could profit from the current weakness of the ruling party by renegotiating specific issues in the ceasefire agreement that the government has previously been reluctant to address.

 

This governance and political crisis in Burundi is in a way representative of all post-conflict societies. It carries the potential risk of dangerous deterioration but also offers great opportunities that the political leadership should be able to identify. The huge governance challenges that the country faces, which have thus far been inadequately addressed by Nkurunziza and his government, can only be handled as part of a common effort of inter-party dialogue. Full peace negotiations, including not only the government, but also all parties represented in the parliament, as well as the Palipehutu FNL rebel group, would ensure broader ownership of the peace agreement. African states and international role players have recently expressed their deep concerns about the political maneuvering that is endangering the country’s fragile social peace. They should further use their leverage to enforce direct talks between the political leaders who bear such a huge responsibility for the country’s peace. Whatever the loopholes of Arusha and the ceasefire agreement of September 2006, are they not better that a return to war?

 

Dr Paul-Simon Handy, Visiting Senior Research Fellow: African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)