10 May 2007: ISS Today: Renegade DRC General Threatens to Withdraw Troops from Army

10 May 2007: Renegade DRC General Threatens to Withdraw Troops from Army
AFP, 9 May 2007

 

The party of a renegade Congolese general Wednesday threatened to withdraw its troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo`s armed forces, sparking fears of renewed violence. Laurent Nkunda`s fighters, who clashed with government soldiers in the volatile Nord-Kivu region in the country`s east late last year, had started integrating into the army in January following an accord with Kinshasa.

 

"The mixing has failed on a logistical and an organisational level," said Patient Mwendanga, who heads up Nkunda`s National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) party. "The government is not taking responsibility for our troops. We have been forced to supply them with food and fuel," Mwendanga added in a telephone interview.

 

"If the government is unable to live up to its responsibilities, that should be made clear. Otherwise CNDP will take back its troops and use them differently," he said. When asked if this meant a new rebellion in the region, he answered: "When the time comes we will tell you."

 

An advisor to President Joseph Kabila lamented the "orchestrated failure of the mixing," telling AFP that Nkunda`s men had never intended to integrate into the army and that the former general continued to "exploit" ethnic issues.

 

The threat, along with nearly daily violence against civilians in eastern DRC prompted observers on Wednesday to predict new violence in the region.

 

Commentary

 

There is an ever increasing possibility that mixage will lead to a new war between Hutus and Tutsis in North Kivu. The mixing process of two of dissident General Laurent Nkunda’s loyalist brigades with three FARDC brigades has been under way since the start of 2007, in a bid to address the serious security problems posed by Nkunda’s forces in the troubled Kivu provinces since 2004.  

 

From the very beginning, this process was criticised by MONUC, the European Military Section (EUSEC) and the international community. MONUC was never consulted in the process and therefore did not support the mixage process either in terms of logistics or the execution of operations against the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). It is still unsure how this process came about; it is known that General Numbi, Chief of the Air Force, brokered the deal with Nkunda for his forces to come into the mixage process, with the blessing of Kinshasa and Kigali.

 

The position of President Kabila on all this is difficult to ascertain. An advisor to the President lamented the "orchestrated failure of the mixing," telling AFP that Nkunda`s men had never intended to integrate into the army and that the former general continued to "exploit" ethnic issues. Questions raised about how Kabila could have supported the process after winning the political majority remained unanswered. It now seems that he always entertained reservations about the mixage process and that he does not intend to lift Nkiunda’s indemnity against prosecution for gross human rights violations. This raises the question of the role of General Numbi, who seems to be in charge of the process and is overruling all other military command structures such as the 8th military region commander in decisions on logistics and operations in North Kivu.

 

International organisations and MONUC’s human rights arm have warned that the process could lead to increasing instability in the Eastern DRC, specifically with regard to child soldiers and human right violations. This has now happened, largely because of a lack of command and control and the absence of the direct support of MONUC. More than 300 children have been identified among the Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and Delta Brigades during initial phases of mixage. After calls from MONUC, orders for separation of all children was issued by FARDC Chief of Staff, the Land Forces Commander, Air Force Commander and 8th Military Region commander. Following these orders and continuing advocacy, 52 children were eventually separated from the Echo Brigade. To reach remaining children, a special operation was conducted, but only 37 children were released as a result.   Resumption of mixage for Foxtrot Brigade has so far led to separation of 17 children. In total 106 children were separated from mixed brigades.

 

The February, a human rights assessment report by MONUC said operations by the FARDC and mixed brigades against the FDLR had led to increasing allegations of human rights violations against civilians. The population in North Kivu lives in fear of what will happen to them and how the operations of the mixed brigades against FDLR will affect them. Cases of arbitrary executions, forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, and lootings are being reported to MONUC and other humanitarian organisations. The population is directly targeted by the FDLR, FARDC and the mixed brigades in reprisals for alleged collaboration with one or the other party to the conflict. A good example is the Buramba massacre of 9 March 2007 in which 15 people were executed.

 

What is of major concern is that Nkunda basically has now taken control of six mixed brigades, although he has not been given a position in the FARDC. The FARDC is planning to establish an Eastern Military Command similar to MONUC’s Eastern Division. It is foreseen that this Eastern Command will take on the FDLR. Apparently Nkunda already is going around saying that he will command the Eastern Command. Nkunda apparently even sent people to Bukavu to propose that the mixage be extended also to South Kivu, replacing brassage. This resulted in a protest by the population in Bukavu against any involvement of Nkunda, because of his role in the 1994 Bukavu crisis. This did not stop Nkunda, however, and pro-Mutubutsi officers was transported by an FARDC helicopter for further negotiations about mixage with combatants not yet integrated. The danger also exists that the Mai Mai and other militia groups in North and South Kivu will reorganise and reopen hostilities with the mixed brigades.

 

It is unfortunate that the non-completion of the official integration process, brassage has resulted in a resort to a mixage process, for all the wrong reasons. If the brassage process could have been completed, the issue of the FDLR could have been addressed by the politicians rather than the soldiers. 

 

Henri Boshoff, Military Analyst, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Pretoria