07 Sep 2007: ISS Today: Rethinking DDR in Africa

7 September 2007: Rethinking DDR in Africa

The UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) sums up the central goal of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and those associated with armed groups when it states that “…DDR is often a vital prerequisite for post-conflict stability and recovery, especially within the African context. DDR lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens, while building national capacity for long-term peace, security and development.”

This statement underscores the need for effective intervention in post-conflict environments.  Realising the need to establish a sense of normality to post-conflict societies, the UN has been involved in a series of DDR processes since the early 1990s, with the largest concentration of DDR processes being in Africa. In fact, of the twenty-four DDR interventions by the UN since 1992, all but six have occurred in Africa.

Besides the UN, there are other agencies and organisations involved in DDR processes either directly or indirectly. Some of those involved include the United Nations Children`s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), Action Aid, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Currently the largest demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) programme in Africa is the one funded by the Multi-country Programme for Demobilisation and Reintegration (MDRP), an initiative that involves the World Bank and forty other Western and African governments, NGOs, and regional organizations. MDRP, which funds only demobilisation and reintegration programmes, covers six countries of the Great Lakes region: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo (RoC) and Uganda. RoC is the last country to benefit, having embarked on the implementation phase in July 2007. Evaluation of the MDRP-funded D&R programme in CAR reveals important lessons, outlined below, that can help in shaping future DDR processes in Africa. It is also underscores the need for regular assessment of DDE processes with the view to making them more effective.

The CAR case study highlights a series of concerns that continue to affect DDR processes in Africa, namely:

1. Unfavourable timing: Timeliness in DDR processes is of the essence. Often the quicker the mitigation the better the results which in turn reduces the likelihood of the society relapsing into conflict. In CAR the most intense period of the conflict was between 1996 - 2003. Although there were several disarmament initiatives, lack of sustainable funding weighed heavily against the process, subjecting ex-combatants to self-demobilisation (auto-démolisation). As a result, when MDRP funding was initiated in 2002, most of the ex-combatants had ‘reintegrated’ into the community. That the D&R programme of MDRP came some time later meant that there was the need to re-identify ex-combatants to participate in the programme. To many people in the society this was equated to ‘rewarding’ perpetrators of the conflict. This raised the ire of many, especially those who had been immediate victims of the conflict.
2. Unexpected ‘windfall’: The fact that the D&R process involved financial benefits, with each registered ex-combatant getting an equivalent of 700 United States dollars in either cash, training or in form of reinsertion kit (cement, iron sheets, fishing kits, livestock, building tools, school fees, etc), there arose numerous cases of double-dipping whereby same ex-combatants registered in several centres using different names. In some cases persons not meeting the criteria of ex-combatant, but who were affiliated to DDR officials, were irregularly absorbed into the process. Monetarisation of the process therefore led to predatory behaviour. Furthermore, at the closure of the programme in February 2007, when an assessment of the 7,553 beneficiaries was conducted, it was revealed that over 95% of the 3,577 individuals (representing 48% of the 7,553) who had chosen retail trade (petit commerce) and had been given cash, had failed in their businesses. This high failure rate was in strong contrast to the outcome for those who had chosen small-scale farming and who had been issued with livestock and not cash.
3. Individual versus community projects: Most post-conflict environments are characterised by a lack of basic facilities such as clean water, roads, medical facilities, schools, bridges, etc. It could certainly be of benefit to such communities if funds meant for D&R or any other post-conflict reconstruction processes were invested in improving community facilities, especially in education and training. This approach would be particularly pertinent in situations where intervention comes several years after the war, when self-demobilisation has taken place.

When the three year MDRP funded programme closed in February 2007, it was realised that development, judicial and small arms issues still required urgent intervention. This led the implementing agencies to put into place three transitional projects, namely Security for Development Project, Judicial Security Support Project and Project against Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which required additional funding from donors. These transitional projects are in their preparatory stages.

Conclusion

DDR remains an important intervention measure in post-conflict environments and should be upheld. However, in order to achieve effective outcome, each DDR programme should be based on a clear understanding of the dynamics underpinning the particular post-conflict environment. The approach should therefore be founded on primary research and requires analysis of the community in order to lessen uncertainties. In Africa, further debate is required on DDR in which stakeholders continuously develop more efficient and effective approaches which take into consideration the immediate needs of the communities. Particular effort must be made to prevent creating a ‘DDR syndrome,’ in which locals associated DDR with money.

Nelson Alusala, Senior Researcher, Arms Management Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)