04 Sep 2007: ISS Today: Darfur Reveals SANDF Need for a Reserve Capability

4 September 2007: Darfur Reveals SANDF Need For a Reserve Capability

 

The United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the first ever hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force, is gathering momentum. Created on the 31st of July by UN Security Council Resolution 1769, UNAMID is set to become the largest peacekeeping force in the world and is expected to consist of around 20,000 military personnel and 6,000 police officers, backed by close to 5,000 civilian staff. Forces will be supplied mainly by African nations, supplemented by troops and police drawn primarily from Asian countries. Some Western nations have also indicated an interest in participating in UNAMID.

 

According to a recent report by Jane’s Defence Weekly, South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad has stated that South Africa is seriously considering adding to the 600 SANDF troops that are already in Sudan under AMIS command. Given the political importance of UNAMID, and given South Africa’s desire to play a leading role in African affairs, it is only natural that the South African government should want a significant stake in the Darfur deployment.

 

Unfortunately, as the Jane’s report points out, there is a problem. The SANDF, and the SA Army in particular, is currently at overstretch. On top of the 600 troops already in Dafur, the Army has a battalion deployed in Burundi, another battalion group in the Democratic Republic of Congo, plus smaller deployments in a number of other countries including the Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique and Nepal – a total of somewhere around 3,000 troops altogether.

 

The numbers alone do not indicate a problem. By comparison it’s worth considering the case of the British Army, which is similar in size to the South African Army, and currently has around 30,000 troops on deployment around the world. The problem for the South African Army is that it is still wrestling with the aftermath of the political compromise that followed the 1994 transition to democracy in South Africa. At that time the apartheid-era South African Defence Force was merged with the armed wings of the liberation movements and other paramilitary groups, as well as the military forces of the former ‘homelands’. Since the merger, political imperatives have kept the ranks of the SA Army bloated by soldiers who would otherwise be considered militarily unsuitable. The impact of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and a range of other health problems among a largely over-aged troop complement has left the SA Army well below its nominal operating strength. Indeed, it is incapable of deploying any one of its eleven infantry battalions – the deployed battalions are all composite units made up, piecemeal, of whichever soldiers pass the necessary health and fitness tests.

 

The light at the end of the tunnel is the Military Skills Development (MSD) programme. This two year short service programme is pumping fresh blood into the SANDF. Many of the troops on deployment are MSD soldiers, and the most promising recruits are being retained for in the SANDF on longer duration contracts. There are also encouraging reports that civilian employers are snapping up MSD ‘graduates’, thereby increasing the future popularity of the programme and, hopefully, the quality of each intake. It will take time, but in the long run there are positive signs that the MSD programme and other initiatives (such as project Hoefyster, which will equip the infantry with a new-generation Infantry Fighting Vehicle) are beginning to lift the South African Army out of the doldrums.

 

None of that, however, helps with the current need for extra troops. The reality is that no matter how much the SANDF improves it will never have all the troops it needs to meet every demand for forces at the drop of a hat. There will frequently be a need to bring extra troops into play for a limited duration in order to allow for a realignment of existing commitments as circumstances and priorities shift.

 

The tried and tested means of providing a short or medium-term force surge is by turning to the reserve component, the military home of the much derided ‘weekend warrior’. While reservists are often under-appreciated by policymakers, military commanders and the general populace, the reality is that when properly trained, equipped and utilised reserve forces are a cost-effective and indispensable means of coping with short and medium-term crises. The British Army, for example, is currently leaning heavily on its reserve arm, the Territorial Army (TA), as it transitions its main operational focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. In the longer term British troops will be withdrawn from Iraq, allowing for regular force rotations to be directed primarily at Afghanistan. But in the meantime it is the TA that is providing the extra forces necessary to ensure that Her Majesty’s Government does not renege on any of its commitments.

 

South Africa’s reserve units have a proud history but have been largely neglected since the transition to democracy, while the powers-that-be struggled to address the challenges inherent in the regular structures of the newly-formed SANDF. Recently, however, there have been encouraging signs that the reserves are beginning to get the attention that is so necessary if South Africa is to equip itself with a real capability to surge forces when needed. In March of this year the SANDF hosted its first ever Reserve Force Symposium, which generated a considerable amount of energy aimed at regenerating the reserves. To this was added the good news that an entire intake of the MSD programme will be dedicated to soldiers destined for reserve units. These are welcome and important steps. There is however much more that needs to be done in order to get the reserves up to operational standard, and it is essential that this new momentum not be lost. This is essential if the South African Government is to avoid the sort of embarrassment and frustration that has undoubtedly resulted from its inability to become a leading participant in the effort to put an end to suffering of the people of Darfur.

 

Dr Deane-Peter Baker, Editor: African Security Review, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)