04 Oct 2006: ISS Today: African Union Extends Darfur Troops Mandate to 31 December 2006

04 October 2006: African Union Extends Darfur Troops Mandate to 31 December 2006 (1)

 

The African Union (AU) has decided to extend the mandate of its Peacekeeping forces in the Sudanese region of Darfur until the end of the Year, AU Peace & Security Council (PSC) Chair, Burkina Faso President, Blaise Campaore announced in New York at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters.

 

The extension of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) by 3 months comes after much haggling, posturing and demands for “effective peacekeeping” by Amnesty International, diplomatic cajoling by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and the threat of sanctions by the United States against the Sudanese Government if they did not acquiesce and allow the peacekeeping deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The Sudanese Foreign Minister, while welcoming the extension, would have preferred a 6 month extension.

 

This commentary contends, however, that the AU PSC has rushed in where angels fear to tread by yet again agreeing to another very temporary extension of AMIS, in very similar circumstances to those prevailing in October 2004. The question that they should be asking is what has changed or is likely to, before 31 December 2006, to ensure AMIS’ exit strategy? The deployment of AMIS was under the clear understanding that this was an interim measure, a bridge to allow for negotiations to be completed that would result in the insertion of a larger force – 20 000 with a more robust mandate, capability and experience (2). AMIS has always been conceived of as an interim force with only a ‘Chapter 6 mandate’ that allows for “protection of civilians in their immediate vicinity” and a relatively small force level of just over 7 000. However, the fact that UNMIS has not since been “invited to deploy” by the Sudanese Government, two years later, should be sufficient reason to ring warning bells for the AU.

 

Given the tensions and different perspectives of interpretation that have surrounded the stalled transition of AMIS into UNMIS, perhaps the time has come to take stock and pose some hard questions on precisely what is or has been the purpose, impact and exit strategy of AMIS in Darfur? Secondly, now that AMIS has yet again been given a new and temporary lease of life, is this going to make a difference to the plight of civilians whose situation has been acknowledged as dire and bordering on constituting a threat to international security? If not, then what is the justification for maintaining AMIS in place?

 

Before examining some of the questions raised above, we need to briefly acknowledge some of the key factors on the ground. The first is that widespread human displacement; fatalities and serious human rights violations are still prevalent in Darfur. The evidence is that both sides perpetrate these, with AMIS unable to do anything about it. In fact, AMIS has since been publicly threatened, its patrols deliberately targeted and restrictions placed on its freedom of movement or ability to mount operations; its patrols have also been attacked, personnel kidnapped and killed. Furthermore, AMIS’ operational capability and capacity has always been dependent on outside support. However, in a single illustrative case, when Canada provided the force with 105 armoured vehicles, the Sudanese Government took 5 months (from July to December 2005) to allow these into the country. Conclusively, AMIS’ monitoring role and operational capability are both seriously inadequate to make a meaningful impact on the crisis in Darfur. Secondly, there is still not a full peace agreement in place. Only the Sudanese Government and the Minni Minnawi faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) have signed the Abuja Peace Agreement while the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the other SLM faction have so far refused. This is important as the signing of the peace agreement by all parties in the Darfur conflict was supposed to have triggered the deployment of UNMIS. Thirdly, the Sudanese Government has interpreted the deployment of UNMIS as part of the balkanization of the country and President Omar al-Beshir has vowed not to allow this to happen. Part of this reading from Khartoum is found in the ‘even balanced’ Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 that in effect divided the country into South and North. With sentiments of ‘defeat’ flowing from the CPA, this has informed and created the current conundrum: a continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur with an ineffective AMIS in place and a larger and more robust UNMIS authorized, but which logistically can only be effective 3 months after the “invitation” is made in line with existing international security guidelines. In trying to come up with an effective strategy for the Darfur crisis in a short commentary such as this, posing more questions than answers may perhaps jog the international community towards finding a workable solution. To this end, this commentary asks, what is the purpose of leaving in place a clearly ineffective AMIS? Is there credence in finding some way for the international community responding to ‘threats to international security’ without seeking the ‘invitation’ or acquiescence of the parties to a conflict?

 

Martin Rupiya, Defense Sector Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria) Office.

1. BBC News report, 21 September 2006

2. See UN Security Council Resolutions 1564 (2004) and 1706 (2006)