16 May 2007: ISS Today: Politics, Snipers and Dry Cleaners: A Tale of Power and Attempted Murder

16 May 2007: Politics, Snipers and Dry Cleaners: A Tale of Power and Attempted Murder

 

Many people are suckers for a good spy story: cloak and dagger and behind the scenes thrills where it is easy to tell the good guys from the bad guys and the good guys always win. But out here in the world of non-fiction, the rumblings from within the South African intelligence world sometimes seem more like a B-grade Hong Kong kick-flick than a slick and professional James Bond movie.

 

The latest in what has been nearly sixty years of politically inspired domestic intelligence charades is what I like to call the “Zuma Dallas Day” probe. Jacob Zuma and intelligence seem to go together like a horse and carriage, the only question is who leads whom? In exile, Zuma ran much of the ANC intelligence apparatus. Nowadays, he seems to be leading his own intelligence branch, with the South African taxpayer picking up the tab for his own mini-private security service.

 

The Zuma Dallas Day movie would open with a scene of a sniper waiting patiently on a rooftop overlooking a political rally in Durban in 2004. His intended target, Zuma, fails to arrive at the function, however, and the sniper is forced to pack up and go home mission unaccomplished. The sniper is left out in the cold, so to speak, and begins to fear for his own safety as his handler fails to contact him and he fears he is being followed. The next events are a little uncertain but what is known is that, Zuma’s lifelong friend Elias Khumalo has a private meeting with the sniper after the aborted operation. The purpose of the meeting is not clear, but Khumalo is very defensive when the fact that a meeting took place is made public. He claims that this information was deliberately leaked and should only have been made known to the relevant security operatives.

 

The grim reaper chasing Zuma, however, is a pretty determined fellow and cannot be put off easily. The story line would then split between the Zuma camp beefing up their security systems and the unknown X-force conspiring to have him permanently removed from the South African political scene. But the X-force underestimates the power and influence of ‘the Zuma’, and in 2006 the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) get wind of a foreign intelligence operation to poison the former deputy president. This is shortly after the same intelligence agency uncovers a plot to remove Zuma from power, which is later determined to be a fabricated political conspiracy, known as the e-mail hoax. The NIA, possibly still reeling after the e-mail hoax scandal, tips off Zuma’s personal security units as to the possibility of him being targeted by a foreign intelligence operation.

 

The attempted poisoning of Zuma, although not as Hollywood as a sniper attack in broad daylight, reads like apartheid style political assassination. Clothes being poisoned at dry cleaners, glasses laced with foreign substances at gala dinners and 24-hour bodyguards to cater for all his dietary requirements. When he travels abroad, it is on commercial airlines, fearing that private airplanes are too easy to target. His security personnel usually fly ahead to secure the accommodation and precincts surrounding the hotel. Furthermore, he does not interact with the South African embassy staff overseas for fear that his movements will be filtered back to the ANC.

 

Does this really seem like the normal political processes of a democracy, or has South Africa’s past done such irreparable damage to the political and security landscape that fear and distrust have become archetypal features of the South African political scene? There are several disturbing aspects of the Zuma Dallas Day drama that, regardless of the authenticity of any of the attempted assassinations, require closer attention, greater public awareness and vigilance. These include:

• The name of the alleged sniper involved in the aborted assassination is known by those close to Zuma and has been leaked to the South African press. There is no indication that he has as yet been apprehended for questioning by the legitimate authorities.
• The alleged sniper met with people within the Zuma camp after the aborted assassination. Would it, therefore, be incorrect to assume that they had foreknowledge of the plot? Why were Zuma loyalists meeting with the alleged assassin and not handing him over to the police? This would indicate that the former deputy president has his own security services conducting intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in South Africa.
• There is a lack of trust in the national intelligence apparatus and indications of divisions within the intelligence community that hamper the ability of the intelligence agencies to provide accurate intelligence and achieve a high level of integrity in analysis.
• There seem to be powerful people, foreign and domestic, who do not want Zuma to become the next president of South Africa.
• Zuma has a six-vehicle cavalcade and at least 20 bodyguards all paid for by the state.

 

As yet, the Zuma Dallas Day story has no clean and neat ending. According to media reports, crime intelligence has been investigating claims that there is a R1 million price on Zuma’s head. Since the latter is a man who seems to be making some very powerful enemies, it is impossible to establish who ‘ordered the hit’ on Zuma.  The former deputy president believes, in fact, that there are several assassination plots afoot. Cynical as it may seem, one is forced to ask if this is just another ploy to attract public attention by a media-struck politician or is there any concrete evidence to support his claims?

 

There are apparently two crime intelligence units investigating the allegations. Some think that this is evidence of the division of the intelligence community along Zuma-Mbeki lines, with one team wanting to capture the alleged sniper and his handler and the other determined to compromise the investigation. The leaking of information to the press could, therefore, be interpreted as the work of the second element trying to sabotage the investigations, force the alleged assassin into hiding and halt the probe. There would have to be high-level involvement in such a plan, or a great deal of power and influence to be able to mobilise an operation for the purposes of sabotaging an investigation in order to cover what must be a critical information trail to the person/s who want Zuma gone.

 

All that can be said for certain is that South Africa continues to suffer from an apartheid domestic political-security hangover of epidemic proportions. The ANC succession battle has now taken on a new dimension: it has been internationalised and further sensationalised. The cloak and dagger claims have highlighted the climate of fear and distrust that infects the South African political scene. Thirteen years into democracy and there are still whispers of politically motivated assassination. It seems that within the ANC the struggle continues: fought with the same weapons as in the past, though this time the enemies are within, the lines are blurred and alliances are strained.

 

This piece relied on an article published in the Mail & Guardian on 11 May 2007 entitled Zuma: A sniper was sent to kill me, by Zukile Majova for much of the factual information. 

 

Lauren Hutton: Defence Sector Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)