13 Jan 2009: ISS Today: A New Balance of Power in Somalia

13 January 2009: A New Balance of Power in Somalia

 

Somalia’s multifaceted crisis is currently more finely balanced than at any time in the past several months. A number of interrelated events account for this situation. First the Ethiopian security forces have reduced their footprint in Somalia, even if they continue to intervene in local politics and provide support to allies and surrogates in various guises, as they do in the Gedo-region.

 

The nature of the security vacuum they have left is open to dispute, and there are many observers who hope that Ethiopia’s withdrawal will deprive the militant liberationists of much of their nationalist appeal. In this regard much will depend on how the security needs of Mogadishu, in particular, are met. There are signs that elements of the rump of the transitional federal government (TFG), clan militias and the accommodationist Djibouti wing of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS-D) are trying to assume control of certain law and order functions. The future role of the African Union mission (Amisom) remains opaque. The AU Peace and Security Committee has urged its reinforcement and for the United Nations (UN) to provide urgently needed financial and logistical support. Whether the UN Security Council will be able to shed its institutional lethargy quickly enough to do this remains to be seen, though the US and other interested parties are also urging rapid action to make the best use of what they see as a rare opportunity to influence matters positively.

 

Of course, the militant liberationists have always tried to depict Amisom as an Ethiopian tool for assisting the TFG. In addition the UN has forfeited some of its claims to political neutrality by financing a TFG police force that was scarcely distinguishable from a warlord militia. The argument can therefore still be made that a low profile is what is required on the part of would-be peacekeepers, so that even if a measure of inter-militia violence ensues, this is seen to be a domestic issue rather than another surrogate operation with foreign agendas in mind.

 

The resignation last month of Somalian President Abdullahi Yusuf and the subsequent decampment of his Darod militiamen to Puntland has also changed the balance of power in south-central Somalia. However, it also provides the new president of Puntland, Abdirahman Mohamed “Farole” with greater muscle to engage in his feud with Somaliland, should the dispute over Sool and Sanaag again move beyond negotiation.

 

Farole’s election by Puntland’s parliament last week marked the end of the controversial rule of President Mohamed Musa Adde, who had long been at odds with the legislators of this autonomous region of Somalia and had occasionally clashed with the TFG, especially over the granting of potentially lucrative oil exploration contracts on land and at sea. President Musa Adde’s administration had also failed to deal with the pirate menace, which is based largely in Puntland and apparently flourished with the connivance of certain of his colleagues. President Farole has promised to end the pirate scourge, which would certainly earn him the plaudits of an international community facing the expense of extensive naval operations. He has also urged other areas of Somalia to embrace the constitutional path attempted by Puntland since 1998: the formation of responsible local administrations ultimately subordinate to the transitional federal government.

 

At present the TFG is headed by an interim president, Sheikh Adan “Madobe” Mohamed, but parliament is due to meet on 26 January to elect a new head of state. Madobe has insisted that arrangements for the formation of a new unity government, which would see the size of parliament doubled to 550 members, will have to wait, though this has been contested by an official statement following a ministerial meeting attended by representatives from Somalia, Uganda and Burundi (the troop contributing countries to Amisom), the UN, AU and ARS-D. According to the press release from this meeting, a unity government will be formed before the presidential vote in Djibouti on the 26th, which will be both a political and logistical challenge.

 

It might be argued that strict adherence to the procedures dictating a presidential election within thirty days of the previous incumbent’s resignation might by waived in the interests of a more promising and more soundly based administration, though it might be argued that a new president, especially one commanding popularity in Mogadishu, would give much needed fillip to the project of refurbishing the threadbare TFG.

 

Since its inception in 2004 the TFG has been regarded by many, if not most, Somalis as a political solution imposed by outsiders. If a government is to be fashioned in Somalia that can somehow break the mould of the past, it will probably take more time and patient support than the international community is willing to concede, especially as any good that is to be done from outside will have to be extremely low in profile. This is often advice that is difficult to heed, especially when foreign politicians and diplomats are eager to be seen to be doing something.

 

Richard Cornwell, Senior Research Fellow, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

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