08 Jan 2007: ISS Today: Somalia: What Now?
08 January 2007: Somalia: What Now?
Ethiopia’s government now claims that its forces, together with those of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), have routed those of the Union of Islamic Courts and that it is preparing to withdraw its troops from Somalia in a matter of weeks. This begs the question of how a reversion to the status quo ante bellum is to be avoided. The answer being touted is that the Ethiopians will be replaced by an international force, possibly under the auspices of the African Union, to provide essential support to the TFG. Later this week, the AU’s Peace and Security Council will meet to consider this issue.
Commentary
The deployment of an African force into Somalia to assist the TFG in building up its own security structures has been the subject of discussion for some time now, though events must have overtaken such planning as had already been done. In any event it had been decided that it was inappropriate for neighbouring states to become involved in such an operation, but this was before Ethiopia took unilateral action. As matters stand, Uganda has expressed a willingness to provide 1 000 troops for such a mission, though this commitment is hedged around by a number of caveats, not least of which is the need to obtain parliamentary approval. Continuing instability in the Somali capital Mogadishu, and attacks upon Ethiopian occupation forces there, will do little to reassure the Ugandans that the proposed enterprise will be an easy one.
As things stand, the Union of Islamic Courts’ forces have been dispersed rather than wiped out, and many of the casualties appear to have been suffered by scarcely trained newcomers to their ranks. Defeat may have widened the already considerable differences within the ranks of the UIC, but the continued presence of Ethiopian invaders and the support provided to Addis Ababa by the USA will still act as an incitement for the hardliners to continue war by other means, inside Somalia and in other parts of the region.
Whether the TFG will now feel that it is in a position where it needs to engage more moderate elements of the UIC in discussions that could lead to the formation of a new broad-based government with some claim to internal legitimacy remains to be seen. Indeed, it is far from clear that the TFG will be able to rein in those of its Mogadishu warlord allies who seem determined to recoup the material losses suffered when they were evicted from their fiefdoms by the UIC earlier in 2006.
No clear political outcome suggests itself that could act as a prospective base upon which foreign peacekeepers might be deployed. This is problematic, for as we have seen in other theatres of military operations, the application of military force needs to be calibrated carefully in time and intensity, with desired political outcomes. At present, in the case of Somalia, there seems to be a massive gap opening between the end of the military campaign and the construction of some sort of post-conflict order. Certainly it would be a matter of some surprise were the AU to be able to mount a sizeable or effective operation in Somalia within the next few months.
In some respects, and to some of the principal players in the drama, this may be of less concern than to the Somali population at large. Though the more extreme elements of the UIC drew much international media attention during its period of rule over much of south and central Somalia, its presence was welcomed by many as bringing a semblance of order in which commercial and social life could flourish. A Taliban-style state was never realistically in prospect, but by resuscitating the calls for a Greater Somalia and by giving assistance Oromo and Ogadeni rebels and receiving military aid from Eritrea, the hardliners of the UIC invited retribution from Ethiopia. Jihadist rhetoric and the recruitment of foreign fighters aggravated matters further, lending credence to the dubious claims that Somalia was about to become a major staging post for international terrorist attacks.
In this atmosphere it was almost impossible for those on either side of the Somali political divide advocating a negotiated political settlement to make their voices heard. How they will fare in future weeks is unclear, though the European Union in particular has made its assistance to the TFG conditional upon some broadening of its political base. The US commitment to talks is less emphatic, and one is bound to wonder whether the formation of an effective and legitimate state in Somalia features high on the agendas of either Washington or Addis. Do either the Ethiopian or US governments consider the rebuilding of the Somali state as something that can be left safely in the hands of the Somalis themselves? Or would they settle for a relatively weak and dependent government recognise internationally if not internally, with the means to police its territory against those considered a threat principally by outsiders?
Richard Cornwell, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
