South Africa: divisions in ANC lobbying ahead of Mangaung
As lobbying intensifies on the
road to Mangaung, divisions within the African National Congress (ANC) are
becoming more evident. Growing dissatisfaction with President Jacob Zuma’s ability
to lead the organisation has divided the ANC into two camps, broadly termed the
‘national coalition’ and the ‘pro-change coalition’.
The ‘pro-change coalition’ is
advocating for the removal of President Zuma as ANC president at the party’s
electoral conference in December. According to this faction, he has failed to
provide adequate leadership, as evidenced by his lack of will to fight
corruption, the failure by the Department of Education to deliver textbooks,
among other crises, and more recently, the killing of mineworkers by the police
at Marikana.
It was widely reported in national
newspapers over the weekend that senior ANC provincial leaders from eight of
the nine provinces and a number of National Executive Committee (NEC) members
who support the pro-change coalition held an informal meeting in Sandton last
week, at which all agreed to back Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe for the
post of ANC president, with ANC stalwart Tokyo Sexwale as the party’s deputy
president. This was an important step for the pro-change coalition because
until then Sexwale had also been campaigning for the presidency. Had this not
been agreed to, the pro-change coalition would have been split, which would
have been to President Zuma’s advantage. Motlanthe has yet to announce if he
will indeed run against President Zuma, as the NEC has agreed that nominations
and leadership discussions will only formally start at the beginning of
October. This, however, has not prevented intense lobbying on both sides and
open displays of preference by various top ANC officials. Although Motlanthe
has previously stated that he would only run for the position if President Zuma
decided to step down after one term as president (a position from which
President Zuma appears to have backtracked), Motlanthe has not disassociated
himself from those lobbying on his behalf, which suggests that he may very well
announce his candidacy in October. Nevertheless, he has played his cards close
to his chest and is unlikely to accept the nomination if he does not think that
he has a strong chance of beating President Zuma.
The pro-Zuma faction, or ‘national
coalition’, has a simple campaign message focussing on organisational unity
rather than attempting the far more difficult task of highlighting President
Zuma’s strengths and achievements. They have stated that the status quo should
remain intact, with President Zuma as ANC president and Motlanthe as his
deputy. They make the argument that this will prevent destabilising the
organisation, as had happened during the battle between President Zuma and
former President Thabo Mbeki in the run-up to the ANC 2007 national conference
in Polokwane. While pro-Zuma supporters are confident that they still have the
upper hand, they do appear to be increasingly concerned by the ongoing and
increasing statements made by a number of senior members about the lack of
leadership in and poor performance of the ANC. It was reported that members of
the national coalition also met over the weekend to strategise in the face of
increasing criticism aimed at President Zuma and to contemplate reports that
possible fractures are emerging in KwaZulu-Natal, President Zuma’s main support
base and the province with the largest number of voting delegates at the
national conference. Former National Police Commissioner Bheki Cele, who has a
significant powerbase in KwaZulu-Natal, attended meetings held by the
“pro-change coalition”. Cele is said to be deeply upset by his dismissal as
police chief by President Zuma. The Sunday
Tribune newspaper reported that, in an effort to maintain support for
President Zuma in the provinces, ‘lucrative state tenders, worth hundreds of
millions, have emerged as a massive electoral carrot and intimidation tool’.
The article claimed that members contemplating voting against President Zuma
were reminded that they would lose access to these tenders. Reportedly, senior
ANC official John Block was told that if he supported President Zuma the
corruption charges he is facing would be dropped, as was the case recently with
two senior KwaZulu-Natal politicians who are vocally pro-Zuma. It is uncertain
if these reports are true given that both sides are likely to misuse the media
for their own ends, as had been the case in the previous leadership battle.
The battle for power within the
ANC will only intensify over the next three months, with the antics of expelled
ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema upping the ante. Malema has seized upon
the lack of leadership in the growing mineworker revolt triggered by the Marikana
tragedy to call for a mining revolution in support of nationalisation. He has
addressed the striking Lonmin workers at least four times in the past week or
so and has caused alarm by stating that he will be meeting with disgruntled
soldiers of the South African National Defence Force to listen to their
concerns. Most of these soldiers are likely to be those who were suspended from
the military and are facing disciplinary action following their participation
in an unruly protest at the Union Buildings in 2009. Although the Minister of
Defence appeared to panic and play into Malema’s hands by placing military
bases on high alert, it is unlikely that serving soldiers would be willing to
risk their careers by disregarding the instruction not to attend this meeting.
Malema appears to be trying to provoke President Zuma into taking some kind of
action so that Malema can paint himself as a victim and President Zuma as being
willing to abuse his power to persecute a challenger. This strategy worked well
for President Zuma in his battle against Mbeki, as his supporters believed that
the corruption charges that President Zuma faced were part of a conspiracy.
This was despite the fact that President Zuma’s financial advisor had been
found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in jail for corruption allegedly
involving President Zuma. It is likely that he will continue to ignore Malema
for the time being to avoid giving the impression that Malema still has
influence. Malema, however, will continue to be a thorn in the side of
President Zuma as he sends out a message that it is preferable to have him
(Malema) inside rather than outside the ANC.
Compiled by the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division