Monograph 84: Policing the Ports. Reducing Illicit Trafficking in South Africa, Anthony Minnaar

In assessing the current security measures at air and sea ports of entry in South Africa, there was an obvious need to review the systems in their entirety in order to understand processes, procedures and requirements. This would lead to an evaluation of any shortcomings. In particular it would reveal any loopholes that could be exploited by traffickers in firearms.

Case studies of Johannesburg International Airport (JIA), Durban Harbour and the City Deep Container Terminal (an internal port) were used to examine these systems. In addition, complementary visits were made to other sites (Lanseria Airport, Durban Airport and Richards Bay Harbour) to see whether similar procedures were being applied. The assessment was also contextualised within both the international regulatory framework for aviation and maritime safety and South Africaís firearms control legislation.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 on targets in New York and Washington have raised awareness among the global community of the need to monitor the cross-border movement of people and goods more strictly. Although South African officials had taken note of this trend, the tightening of border controls and other security measures at international ports of entry both air and sea had begun long before 2001.

The Firearms Control Act and the newly launched National Firearms Programme of the South African Police Service (SAPS) have led to the implementation of additional measures for the inspection of imported and exported firearms. Overlying these control processes are the general security and screening mechanisms for firearms used by the different role-players at airports and harbours. This overlay is important in terms of the overall security systems, since they concern not only goods handling but also the screening of baggage; the movement of foodstuffs onto aeroplanes; the supervision of maintenance and cleaning staff; the securing of restricted areas; and the limitation of access to certain areas. However, because these systems often provide opportunities for the safety processes designed for the handling of the export or import of firearms to be circumvented, these systems are also scrutinised to see whether they might in any way assist trafficking in firearms.

Among the conclusions and recommendations arising from this study are suggestions for improvement in a number of systems. These range from information sharing to profiling risk analysis to cargo inspections. In terms of information systems, tip-offs and crime intelligence play a crucial role within the whole inspection process in the deterrence and detection of smuggled goods. It is essential that the application of the crime intelligence resulting from information analysis be used within a more integrated and co-operative framework. Other shortcomings included lack of equipment, staffing shortages and inadequate levels of professionalism and training. Consequently, some of the recommendations touch on the human factor, particularly the need for integrity testing and corruption-prevention training for security personnel.