Monograph 33: Constructive Disengagement. Western Efforts to Develop African Peacekeeping, Eric G Berman and Katie E Sams
In
response to recent humanitarian tragedies in Africa, countries such as
France, the United Kingdom and the United States have started to offer
peacekeeping-related training, instruction and equipment to African
states. In May 1997, they announced the ‘P-3 Initiative’, a common
capacity-building programme designed to strengthen and co-ordinate their
respective policies and provide a forum for other interested countries
to participate. Despite the apparently non-controversial nature of these
undertakings, the three countries have nevertheless felt compelled to
defend their actions.
In
an effort to portray the P-3 Initiative in a favourable light, Western
officials have endeavoured to display a unified front and downplay
African scepticism. When Nigeria’s Foreign Minister denounced Western
capacity-building initiatives at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
Council of Ministers meeting in March 1998, Western countries quickly
discounted his criticism as sour grapes. US law precludes Nigeria from
receiving American assistance, and France and the UK have also withheld
support. Libyan and Sudanese support for Nigeria’s stand has been
interpreted as proof of Nigeria’s isolation. The US, in particular,
dismissed reports that Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe had also joined
Nigeria in voicing their disquiet.
Nevertheless,
African fears of further marginalisation and Western disengagement are
widely held. While a number of African countries have participated in
Western-sponsored bilateral and subregional training programmes, no
African regional or subregional organisation has formally approved of
Western capacity-building initiatives. In light of this undercurrent of
wariness and hostility, United Nations officials hosting the 5 December
1997 Meeting on Enhancing African Capacity for Peacekeeping feared that
the conference would be a diplomatic fiasco and were greatly relieved
that it even took place.
African
countries view these initiatives as a manifestation of the West’s
desire to avoid being drawn directly into conflicts, either financially
or militarily. The Security Council’s growing reluctance to commit UN
Blue Helmets — in sizeable numbers if at all — has altered the
international peace and security landscape substantially. This trend has
affected Africa more severely than other regions because of the huge
demand for peacekeeping on the continent and the difficulty African
actors have in responding effectively on their own. While the mere
interposition of peacekeepers (be they UN or others) is not necessarily
beneficial, the failure to deploy can also have grave consequences.
At
the same time, African states are aware of their own limitations. As a
general rule, individual African countries possess inadequate military
infrastructures to mount sustained operations beyond their borders.
Scant economic resources also restrict their abilities. While a number
of African states have considerable UN peacekeeping experience, they
have benefited from Western and UN largesse in carrying out their
responsibilities. In fact, logistical and financial constraints often
preclude African states from participating in peace operations that
receive Security Council authorisation as multinational forces, but do
not receive UN equipment or financing.
African
states are thus attempting to become more self-sufficient in responding
militarily to various crises by developing collective responses. To
this end, a number of political and economic alliances on the African
continent have been expanded to include military dimensions. The OAU and
various African subregional organisations are attempting to create new
mechanisms and develop new capabilities. African states are also
increasingly willing to form ad hoc coalitions to respond to conflicts.
While
it is important that African actors have recognised the need to take
primary responsibility for responding to crises, even their collective
abilities to undertake credible and effective peacekeeping operations
remain limited. Their political will far surpasses their peacekeeping
capabilities. For the recently established UN peacekeeping operation in
the Central African Republic (CAR), for example, France transported all
of the African contingents to the mission area.
This
monograph assesses current efforts to develop African peacekeeping and
peace enforcement capabilities. As a starting point, it identifies the
shortcomings of African regional, subregional and ad hoc attempts
to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent. It then describes
various Western capacity-building initiatives, highlighting larger
individual programmes such as those of Denmark, France, the UK and the
US. In order to chart an appropriate future course, the monograph
examines the true motives underlying Western initiatives, identifies the
positive aspects of these programmes and suggests how they can be made
more effective.