Zimbabwe: A wait-and-see agreement
blurb:isstoday:160908zimbabwe
16 September 2008: Zimbabwe: A wait-and-see agreement
The morning of 15 September saw the ceremonial signing of the political agreement paving the way for a government of national unity in Zimbabwe. The details had been eagerly awaited since the conclusion of a power-sharing deal was announced on 11 September by South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, who had acted as facilitator on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
That a deal was reached at all was to be credited to Mbeki’s persistence and personal involvement, though these would probably have availed little but for the background of dire economic crisis against which the political and diplomatic manoeuvres took place.
In terms of the accord, which is reproduced in full elsewhere on this site, Robert Mugabe remains President, and chairs a Cabinet of 31 ministers, 15 of whom are to be drawn from his ZANU-PF party, 13 from Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC-T and 3 from Arthur Mutambara’s MDC-M. Morgan Tsvangirai becomes Prime Minister, and heads a Council of Ministers, which is made up of the entire Cabinet. Though the relative powers of these two bodies are spelled out in the agreement, their interaction will remain unclear until they are actually functioning, especially on issues on which deep policy divisions have existed between the constituent parties.
Also of importance for the medium to long-term are the provisions for a new constitution, to be drafted with popular participation and approved by referendum within the next 18 months. This would indicate that the current agreement is seen very much as an interim measure, pending a more satisfactory redefinition of the democratic space.
The resuscitation of an economy that has been almost fatally damaged by the misguided and self-centred policies of the Mugabe administration will be a protracted and uncertain task, the success of which will depend on the reversal of many initiatives announced with great fanfare over the past few years. Whether ZANU-PF and its leadership are willing to admit to the magnitude of these failures remains to be seen. Indeed, the agreement itself places considerable emphasis on the role played by international financial sanctions in worsening Zimbabwe’s plight. President Mugabe’s rather rambling speech at the signing ceremony also showed no sign of contrition or acknowledgement of blame for the country’s current situation. Instead he seemed adamant that most of Zimbabwe’s problems could be laid at the door of foreigners who persisted, under provocation from London and Washington, in interfering in Zimbabwe’s sovereign affairs.
Article 6 of the agreement deals specifically with the controversial land issue. It binds the signatories to accept as irrevocable the land acquisitions and redistribution carried out since 2000, and places the principal responsibility for compensating dispossessed commercial farmers on the shoulders of the British government. Although provision is made for a land audit and the exclusion of multiple ownerships, and emphasis is placed upon the productive use of agricultural land, this article does not augur well for the prospects of reviving commercial agriculture, an issue of deep political and emotional relevance. If Zimbabwe’s economy is to recover, a thorough overhaul of the land settlement would seem essential. Indeed, economic recovery as a whole inevitably will be predicated upon challenging the financial interests of many prominent figures in ZANU-PF who have used their decades in power to systematically loot the state and its institutions.
The agreement includes other sections condemning foreign interference, so it will be interesting to see how Mugabe goes about the matter of political cohabitation with Tsvangirai, whom he has continuously reviled as the catspaw of his tormentors in the UK and USA. It evidently dawned on Mugabe at some stage in the talks that a political dispensation that excluded Tsvangirai would be unable to engage donors, investors or international financial institutions in ways that would allow for economic survival and eventual recovery. How much the terms of the agreement or their execution will impede the new prime minister in his quest for external financial assistance remains to be seen.
As it is, for all the enthusiastic endorsement of this agreement as a triumph of home-grown diplomacy, the mere conclusion of an accord will not be sufficient to do guarantee broader international support of a material kind. It is only to be expected that the international community outside of Africa will wait to see how the arrangement works in practice, and whether those largely responsible for the catastrophic policies that have led to Zimbabwe’s ruin are kept away from the controls of government. Mugabe’s speech at the ceremony will have done little to allay fears that he sees himself as still central to Zimbabwe’s future. His tone also explains why Zimbabwean popular reaction to the deal has been so muted.
Although the donors will now hope for more space in which to deploy humanitarian assistance on a non-partisan basis, it is highly unlikely that international financiers are going to be convinced simply to bankroll the continued existence of a political and economic mafia in Zimbabwe.
Richard Cornwell, Senior Research Fellow, Africa Security Analysis Programme, ISS Pretoria
