Zambia: Are Fears Of A Repeat of the Kenya Syndrome Justified?
blurb:isstoday:01112008zambia
1 November 2008: Zambia: Are Fears Of A Repeat of the Kenya Syndrome Justified?
On Thursday 30 October, Zambians went to the polls to elect a new president. Election results are expected within the next few days. In accordance with the Zambian Constitution, the election was organized within 90 days of the death of former president Levy Mwanawasa in August 2008. Four candidates were contesting the presidential elections. Acting President Rupiah Banda ran for the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), while Michael Sata was the candidate for the leading opposition party, the Patriotic Front (PF). Haikande Hichilema from the United Party for National Development and Godfrey Miyanda from the Heritage Party are also presidential hopefuls.
Unlike many of its neighbours, Zambia has been relatively stable since it gained independence in 1964. There have been no serious attempts to overthrow the government by the military and conflicts have generally been resolved through non-violent means, mostly through the courts, whose decisions are generally accepted.
The contenders have fought a brief yet highly charged battle for the presidency, and in the wake of the recent experiences of electoral violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe, observers are paying keen attention to how the situation develops. Moreover, Sata’s aggressive rhetoric is giving credence to arguments around the likelihood of violent post-electoral disputes. But before professing that Zambia will go the way of its forerunners merely because it happens to be an African country, or downplaying warnings of impending violence as Cassandra-like prophecies, a structured and focussed comparison could perhaps provide an answer to that burning question: Will Zambia become yet another example of elections that serve to destabilise an entire country, or will it continue on its bumpy road to consolidate its emerging democracy?
The following outlines the likelihood of either a non-violent or violent outcome of the elections by comparing the current situation in Zambia to that prior to the elections in both Kenya and Zimbabwe by means of two criteria: 1) the context, and 2) the mobilisation strategies of key actors. It will become apparent that while many of the ingredients required for the potent recipe are present, several factors indicate that Zambia may not follow the path of its neighbours.
Outcome 1: Recognition of Results (non-violent)
Kenya has long witnessed a disparity between various identity groups in terms of their political, economic, social and cultural opportunities. Thus, while important identity groups within Kenya did not enjoy an equal standard of living, the socio-economic inequity that is witnessed in Zambia is not confined to a particular ethnic, religious or other group. There is marked socio-economic inequity, but it is between the “Haves” and Have-Nots”, with the majority of the population being denied access to goods and services (food, housing, employment, health and education).
Both Zimbabwe and Kenya have witnessed widespread electoral violence in previous elections, whereas Zambia has not. The two multi-party elections held in Kenya in the 1990s were marred by violence and fraud as accusations abounded that ruling party supporters were stirring ethnic hatred in the Rift Valley, Nyanga and Western provinces. Likewise, Zimbabwe’s elections in 2002 and 2005 were marred by gross manipulation and suppression of opposition.
While political violence is indeed a feature of election campaigns in Zambia –violence flared briefly in October 2006 in Lusaka and the Copperbelt when Mwanawasa won the elections – the political leaders have not manipulated this willingness to resort to violence to further their political interests to the extent that it has been done in Kenya and Zimbabwe.
Mwanawasa’s 2006 electoral victory triggered some riots in the opposition strongholds in the capital Lusaka as well as parts of the Copperbelt region, where Sata supporters claimed the vote had been rigged. Riots spread for two days following the announcement of the election results, with disgruntled voters taking to the streets, looting shops and burning car tyres. The military was called in to assist the police, but the riots only ended after Sata called on his supporters for an end to the violence. In 2006, some opinion polls also identified Sata as the favourite to win. Yet Sata, despite losing, did not exploit the readiness of some of his supporters to resort to violence.
Outcome 2: Contestation of Results Through Violent Protests
Despite the warning signals from the 2006 Africa Peer Review Mechanism report and Kenya’s poor performance on the state failure rankings, few anticipated the violence that eventually erupted following the elections in Kenya. Zambia may surprise observers once more, with the losing candidates possibly having “learnt” from the experiences of their neighbours and resorting to violence to force their inclusion into an externally brokered power-sharing arrangement.
Michael Sata is known for his tendency to fuel ethnic and racial tensions. For example, during the height of the election campaigns in 2006, Sata repeatedly argued that the ruling party was deliberately out to suppress the Bemba speaking ethnic group. Such sentiments when aired by influential public figures have the potential to lead to ethnic tensions. Already, Sata is claiming electoral victory based on results from an opinion poll. This claim to victory serves to heighten the expectations of supporters, and the blow from an electoral defeat would be felt even harder.
One might expect a different, less conciliatory reaction to an electoral loss and ensuing violent outbreaks from Sata as compared to 2006, seeing as these elections may be the last chance for the presidential hopeful to secure the top position.
The above reveals that as much speaks for a repeat of what some have called the Kenya-Syndrome as does against Zambia becoming yet another example of failed elections. Political parties, in their role as channels for political and social mobilization, play a critical role in shaping the governance of the country. Sata, a familiar face in Zambia’s political landscape, may expect that his turn has finally come to take the reigns. Should he lose, he certainly has the ability to mobilise his supporters to take to the streets in protest. In a nutshell, political stability will rest not only on which candidate emerges victorious, but on whether the result will be accepted by the losers of the race.
Judy Smith-Höhn, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
