The Heart of the Matter in the Worsening Relations between the Sudans
The hydra-headed nature of the crisis between Sudan and South Sudan are capable of pushing the two countries beyond the tipping point into full-blown war.
Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis Division, ISS Pretoria
As Antonovs
from bases in Sudan continue to miss their targets amidst the ear-splitting
sounds of AK47s in parts of the disputed border areas between Sudan and South
Sudan, it is perhaps only the careful choice of words that prevents this from
being called a new war between the two Sudans.
And as the
clashes between the two sides continue, Sudan is on the one hand profusely
blaming its southern neighbour for having started this latest confrontation
over the oil-rich Heglig, while South Sudan
insists that it is a case of
self-defense and the defense of the territorial integrity of the new state. South
Sudan also argues strongly that it could not be occupying Sudanese territory
since the history of the disputed areas, as per the 1956 border, places Heglig
and its surrounding areas in South Sudan.
The
situation has clearly faulted international early response and preventive
diplomacy mechanisms and has once again put the structures at the continental
and global levels to the test. Meanwhile, the arguments put forward by both
sides are not enough to explain why a military confrontation broke out now, despite
the on-going political process in Addis Ababa – a process that
has, admittedly, been perceived as unsuccessful. There is indeed the tendency
to blame the current worsening of relations on the lack of progress at these
on-going negotiations. However, whilst that is partly the case, there are three
important issues that inform the
positions and actions of the two countries. These are the issues at the heart
of the matter and are capable of pushing them beyond the tipping point into
full-blown war.
First is the continued existence of a post-war and
post-split bitterness that has lead to an atmosphere of intense mutual suspicion
between the two capitals. The incessant exchange of accusations about the
arming of rebels in one another’s
territories and threats of economic sabotage are evidence of this –
a situation that has persisted since the independence of South Sudan last year.
Whilst this might be a natural consequence of the more than two decades of war
between the North and South, this is be worsening by the day. This is due to
strained relations between the two leaders in Khartoum and Juba, who are
constantly attacking one another in the media, and the renewal of the
activities of armed groups on both sides. Some of these groups have an historical
affiliation with people of the other country.
The
preoccupation with access to the oil wealth is the second issue. Importantly,
in the Sudans, deposits straddle the
border between the two countries. Heglig, for example is an important oil-producing
site for Sudan and loss of its revenue
has dire implications for its economic stability. About half of Sudan’s
remaining 115 000 barrels per day of oil production is produced from this
region and explains why Khartoum will go to any length to maintain control over
it.
Finally
these two issues inform the emergence of the third factor which has to do with
the lack of appreciation by the political leadership in the two countries of
the extent to which the economic, security and cultural destinies of the two
countries are inextricably linked. This is, by extension in a security sense, a
case of a mutually assured destabilisation (MAD) whereby the destabilisation of
any of the two countries is an assurance that the other will be destabilised as
well. Apart from proximity, the two countries have over the years borrowed
heavily from one another’s
culture and learned a great deal from one other’s choices. They
can’t
wish one another away. They have effectively become like separated Siamese
twins whose identities cannot be defined without reference to one other and
their history of once been joined together. Yet, despite the reality of their
shared destiny, which has been acknowledged by the leaders of both countries,
it is yet to reflect in mutual cooperation.
The
interplay of choices based on these three factors and the projection of the
right of self-defense and preservation of territorial integrity are, in turn,
informing unilateral and knee-jerk reactions in both capitals and souring
relations between them. Despite signing a memorandum of non-aggression and two
important framework agreements on borders and nationality, the resort to
unilateral decisions and the flexing of military muscle around the border has
effectively derailed progress at the negotiations and made the work of the
African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) more difficult. Post-‘divorce’
rivalry and mutual suspicion over the possibility of destabilisation are the
most deadly and damaging obstacles to progress at the negotiating table and a
key determinant of the possibility of peace and the practice of good
neighbourliness between the two Sudans.
If
the two countries do not temper their actions and resort to war it was be
disastrous for people living on both sides. War is effectively a fast-forward
button towards destruction and a reverse
gear in the advance of countries towards development. A war will cause the two
countries to concentrate their energies and resources on buying bullets and
bombs instead of building bridges and infrastructure. Against the background of
the sharp drop of revenue for both countries - in Khartoum after the split and
Juba after shutting down oil production - a resumption of war would mean that
both sides would empty their national kitties in waging an unjustified and
unnecessary war. For Juba, the little progress that has been made towards development
since the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) will be reversed
quickly and a mass exodus of southerners into other countries in the region
will be inevitable. At the moment, there is no assurance that the enthusiastic
southern returnees are ready to be displaced again.
There
is a need for the international community to unequivocally condemn the use of
force and seek to advance negotiations on the outstanding issues. As soon as
possible the African Union and the United Nations should deploy an observer
mission and prepare for the deployment of a possible force of peacekeepers,
should the tensions and war rhetoric persist. The cost of renewed war will be
far more difficult to handle than a preventive deployment at this stage. Progress
at the negotiation table is also crucial. The AUHIP should build a strong
leverage that is capable of forcing parties to respect the outcomes of
deliberations. This can be achieved through the express support of the
international community for the process, and the elimination of regional
positioning and geopolitics that undermine commitments to the terms of the
Addis Ababa negotiations.
Lastly
the two partners need to be made aware, once again, of their “mutually
assured destabilisation”.
This realization could, on the long run, lead to the resolution of the issues
around borders and oil and also provide a framework for both parties to
cautiously manage emerging issues and mutually support each other in the search
for stability after the split.
