Tension Over DRC-Elections a Failure of Early Warning
There is serious concern over the political and security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with strong indications that the outcome of the 28 November elections will be contested. This article looks at the context that created conditions for a perfect storm.
Nyambura Githaiga, Researcher, African Conflict Prevention Program, ISS Nairobi Office
Following presidential and parliamentary elections in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on 28 November, tension is mounting as results
trickle in against a backdrop of electoral violence, allegations of electoral
fraud and misconduct, and calls for the vote to be annulled. There is increasing fear of an outbreak of
serious political conflict. And when this storm breaks, it will lend credence
to early warnings of the elections being a tipping point for further
instability in the DRC. It will also call into question the capacity of all
stakeholders to translate early warning into early response to prevent violent
conflict.
After the fact, key political players in the DRC will
be blamed for their intransigent positions and statements at various points of
this electoral process that may inadvertently have fuelled reactions of their
supporters. At the same time, their
supporters will be blamed for taking the law into their own hands and opting
for a brute force variety of democracy.
Opposition parties will be blamed for failing to provide a united front
and thereby splitting the vote. The
security sector will be blamed for a heavy-handed response to demonstrators in
meeting force with force. International
observers will be blamed for stoking the flames of unrest with condemning
reports of fraud or congratulatory reports of due electoral process. It will be blamed for doing too little, too
late. Within the international
community, the Great Lakes regional bodies and countries will come under fire
for either taking sides or being indifferent. As apportioning blame preoccupies
the post electoral discourse, the storm will rage and further compound the
suffering of millions in the DRC.
Preliminary results indicate a likely Kabila win and
the opposition is calling for an annulment of the vote. Already clashes have been reported in areas
like the capital Kinshasa with demonstrations as far-flung as in South Africa
and in Brussels. With the existing
tension, it is highly probable that at least in some parts of the country the
announcement of the results will spark more public demonstrations. The fear is that security actors in the DRC
and political opponents will meet these demonstrations with force creating a
post-electoral crisis. How long the unrest will last and how severe it will be,
remains dependant on the actions of Congolese leaders and their
supporters. It is not too late for
regional actors, via the auspices of the African Union and the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region, to engage in conciliatory efforts to
prevent a standoff. Through the Independent
Electoral Commission (CENI) and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in
Congo (MONUSCO), the National Mediation Commission of the Electoral Process (CNMPE)
was also established in November in order for external efforts to complement
this existing process.
Granted the electoral process left much to be desired
and the outcome is likely to be unsatisfactory enough to be contested
significantly. However, these elections
took place in a context that created conditions for a perfect storm.
Politically, since the DRC emerged from the war in 2003, it has been under the
leadership of the incumbent, Joseph Kabila.
He took over in 2001 after the assassination of his father, President
Laurent Kabila, and was elected president with a 58% majority in 2006. Upon assuming office he launched his
political strategy, ‘les cinq chantiers’ which referred to five key projects for socio-economic development and
he also made an election promise to bring security to Eastern DRC. With negligible gains and unpopular
alliances, his popularity seemed to dip in favour of opposition candidates like
long time opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi of the Union for Democracy and
Social Progress (UDPS). Tshisekedi boycotted the 2006 elections and so his
popularity is best gauged on his track record of mobilising supporters in
public demonstrations, as was the case in the run-up to the elections.
Kabila has been at the helm with a majority in
parliament through the support of an alliance of political parties formed in
2006. In that sense, his political
advantage of incumbency, which comes with control of relevant state institutions,
created a political context of uneven power in the country.
Security dynamics in the DRC are closely linked to the
political. A post-war legacy of a high
proliferation of illegal arms and the presence of illegally armed groups has
continued to be a threat to stability in the DRC. Admittedly, efforts of the DRC government, MONUSCO
and governments in the region have reduced the size of illegal groups and the
circulation of illegal arms. Yet these
groups continue to pose a threat to populations living in the affected
areas. Some of the illegally armed
groups are of Rwandese, Ugandan and Burundian origin. Despite their external agenda against their
countries of origin, their association with local illegal armed groups and their
involvement in illegal activities for survival has been to the detriment of the
local population. The integration of
local illegal armed groups into the Congolese army can at best be described as
an incomplete security sector reform process with reports of rogue elements in
the integrated army engaging in illegal activities. The presence of MONUSCO forces has only
partially allayed security concerns with mass rapes and violent attacks on
civilians taking place regardless of their presence. Those from the affected areas, who also
strongly supported Kabila’s 2006 bid, are disillusioned with
the persistent insecurity hampering their local economy and infringing upon
their rights to residence and mobility.
The socio-economic dynamic permeates nationwide. Whilst the political dynamic differs from
region to region just as the security concerns weigh more heavily on the
Eastern parts, the socio economic dynamic is indiscriminate. Kabila’s ‘cinq chantiers’ have not translated into substantive development in the sectors of
infrastructure, health and education, water and electricity, housing and
jobs. From Kinshasa to Bukavu, there are
significant challenges in the state of the roads, the supply of regular
electricity and running water, affordable healthcare, quality education and
housing. According to World Bank
statistics, 71% of Congolese live below the national poverty line. With an estimated population of 70 million,
that means 50 million people are living below the poverty line. The irony lies in the fact that the DRC has
abundant wealth in its reserves of diamonds, copper, cobalt, gold, coltan, tin
and zinc. These reserves have not
benefited majority of the population due, in part, to the war that prevented gainful
exploitation and the now largely informal and unregulated mining industry that
is prey to illegal or self-seeking exploiters. For the majority of the Congolese, their
daily struggles likely influenced their voting patterns to favour the candidate
they felt would improve their socio-economic prospects. This link between
politics and economy is also well illustrated by the legislative polls, where 18
500 candidates competed for 500 national assembly seats. For some, being a candidate was about access
to money and power to advance their individual economic situation by any means
possible.
These dynamics of politics, security and
socio-economics were mutually reinforcing in creating the conditions we see
today. The electoral process in itself also
contributed to rising tension. In
January 2011, the constitution was amended to introduce a single plurality vote
instead of the former two-round voting system for presidential elections. This set the stakes higher with the winner of
the presidential bid requiring only to defeat his opponents without the
recourse of a run-off that may have created alliances to upset the final
outcome. Another highlight of the electoral process that has turned up the heat
is electoral conduct. Tshisekedi’s
penchant for provocative statements, like declaring himself already president
in an interview on 6 November 2011 and proclamations that he will not accept
any other outcome other than his win, have received criticism as being
inflammatory and likely to incite his supporters to protest the outcome with
the potential for post electoral violence.
His supporting party, UDPS, the only party not to sign the electoral
code of conduct, has been active in public demonstrations that have on occasion
turned violent. A final issue was the extreme logistical challenges leading up
to the elections and the resolve of the Independent National Electoral
Commission (CENI) that the elections take place as scheduled, against the
odds. Logistics were complex given the
limited transport infrastructure across this country of 2.3 million square
kilometres, pockets of insecurity, and delays.
Delays plagued voter registration, publishing location of polling
stations and the acquisition and disbursement of election materials.
As the DRC awaits results, it is clear that beyond the
post-electoral storm, the conditions that created it will persist as obstacles
between the resource wealth of the DRC and the well being of its citizens.
