SA policing - Moving from defensive to offensive policing in South Africa
President Jacob Zuma, when announcing his new cabinet on 10 May 2009, surprised many people when he changed the name of the Department of Safety and Security to the Department of Police. While it is obvious that there is a deeper significance to this name change, it remains unclear precisely what that is.
President Jacob Zuma, when announcing his new cabinet on 10 May
2009, surprised many people when he changed the name of the Department
of Safety and Security to the Department of Police. While it is obvious
that there is a deeper significance to this name change, it remains
unclear precisely what that is.
In a Sowetan article of 25 May 2009, newly appointed Deputy
Minister of Police Fikile Mbalule, when asked about the reasons for
the name change, said that ‘the police’s posture must be such that they
are not going to tolerate any criminal activity’. This implies that, in
his view, ‘safety and security’ sent ‘too soft’ a message to
criminals. In the same report, Mbalula is also quoted as saying that
government will be ‘taking the war to the criminals’ and that the
police service will show ‘no mercy’ to criminals.
Depicting the fight against crime as a ‘war’ is nothing new. In June
1999, the late Minister Steve Tshwete, already made it clear that it
was the criminals that declared war against the South African public.
It would appear that strong talk had become increasingly necessary to
counter perceptions and accusations that the introduction of community
policing and changing the police from a ‘force’ to a ‘service’ within a
newly established human rights environment, had created a policing
approach that was ‘soft’ on crime.
However, the sharp rise in especially organised and violent crime
since 1994/95 suggests that more than strong talk and military-styled
crime fighting police operations is necessary, if the ‘war’ against
crime is to be won. It is equally important to identify and address
possible external factors that may inhibit government’s effectiveness
in this regard. These include, among others, the apparent exploitation
by criminals of the perceived space created by our new-found democracy
and the concommitant limiting of space for policing. This situation is
aggravated by perceptions, also amongst police officials, that community
policing and service oriented policing, has relegated law enforcement
to a secondary function and subsequently weakened the authority of the
police. It is likely that this perceived weakness can partly explain
the increasing willingness of criminals to attack and aggressively
confront the police.
What we currently see in South Africa is reminiscent of what the
United Kingdom experienced during the eighties and nineties. It is
ironic that in 1994, when the South African Police Service, with the
assistance of British and other police advisors, began with the
implementation of community policing, some police practitioners in
Britain already described the concept as a failure. During a police and
law enforcement conference held in London from 18 - 20 October 1994,
the (then) Deputy Chief Constable of Kent County Constabulary, D.
O’Connor, argued that community policing ‘has been dented by being
over-sold and by difficulties of implementation’. He attempted to find
clarity regarding the police’s role amidst the confusion and
uncertainty which resulted from the widespread disorder and escalating
crime in the United Kingdom during the early 1980`s, by distinguishing
between - what he termed the strategic offensive and strategic defensive postures to policing.
After the publication of the Scarman Report - following the
1981 riots in Brixton and elsewhere in England - and especially in
view of its emphasis on the primacy of public order over law
enforcement, the British police moved from the strategic offensive (law
enforcement) to the strategic defensive (community policing). However,
by the end of the 1980`s, and contrary to expectations, community
policing ‘tactics’ had failed to make any impact on crime and indeed
crime still dominated the public agenda. The only real benefit
derived from the community policing effort, seems to have been the
improved legitimacy of the police.
According to O’Connor, the early 1990`s in Britain saw a move back
to the strategic offensive in an attempt to ‘regain’ the initiative.
This shift was further supported by the resonance of the ‘crime
fighting’ aspects of policing in the 1993 White Paper on Police Reform and the report by the Audit Commission: Helping with Inquiries,
published soon afterwards. In essence, this meant a strategic shift
in focus away from the ‘community orientated approach’ and community
policing, in favour of what is termed ‘crime focused policing’.
All indications are that South Africa now finds itself in a similar
situation where critical strategic shifts need to be made. According to
recent statements in the media as well as from the ANC’s 2009 election
manifesto, the new South African Government wants to intensify the
fight (or ‘war’) against crime. This will include a reorganisation of
the criminal justice system and a ‘tougher’ approach to crime and
criminals. In addition, and this is implicit in the name change from
Safety and Security to Police, there appears to be a subtle shift in
favour of ‘crime focused policing’ and law enforcement.
At this point it seems appropriate to consider what O’Connor
identified as a need to find some sort of balance between the two
strategic extremes in terms of policing. Realising the new ascendancy
of the crime focused approach in the early nineties in Britain he
proposed that the apparent contradictions between the need to make an
impact on crime and the need to retain a sound relationship with
communities, should be reconciled. Perhaps we should heed this call.
Johan Burger, senior researcher in the Crime, Justice and Politics Programme, Pretoria Office, Institute for Security Studies
