Piracy Challenging Arms Control
Altogether 1 490 attacks on commercial and recreational vessels by pirates have been reported from January 2006 to September 2010, according to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau. This continuous threat has prompted owners to consider arming the crews or at the very least placing armed guards on the ships when they traverse dangerous waters.
Ben
Coetzee, Senior Researcher, Arms Management Programme, ISS Pretoria
Altogether
1 490 attacks on commercial and recreational vessels by pirates have been
reported from January 2006 to September 2010, according to the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau. This continuous threat
has prompted owners to consider arming the crews or at the very least placing
armed guards on the ships when they traverse dangerous waters.
Although
arming of crewmembers and carrying of firearms for personal protection on
seafaring vessels is not a new practice, it has not been necessary for up to a
half a century. Should seafarers again feel the need to protect themselves
against piracy and robbery, control over the movement of firearms can be
seriously compromised.
Firearms
carried on board seafaring vessels should be reported to customs officials after
the vessel has docked. Customs officials then have the option to either seal
the weapons on the vessel, if a suitable strongbox is available, or they can order
the master of the vessel to surrender the weapons for safekeeping until
departure.
This
has been the accepted practice in many harbours around the world. In some
instances, emergency-signal projectors or flare-guns are also required to be
sealed or surrendered, depending on the national legislation of the country
visited by the vessel. These control measures and procedures are in place and
seafarers abide by the rules. The effectiveness and suitability of the current
control mechanisms is however subjected to increasing pressure with the resurgence
of piracy.
Crews
are realising that they have to protect themselves and increasingly firearms are
carried on vessels. The predicament of arms control departments worldwide comes
as a result of armed security guards travelling with vessels that are at risk.
In
these instances security guards are contracted by the ship owner or the master
of the vessel and join the cruise at a pre-arranged point on its voyage. They
participate in the voyage only for the period that the vessel might be at risk
of an attack because their services are extremely expensive.
This
leads to several arms control challenges for the country where said guards
disembark. After going to shore they should declare their firearms, and apply
for a permit to transit the firearms through the country or for a permit to
temporarily import and export the weapons used during their sea voyage.
For
instance travellers through South African borders and ports have numerous
requirements to fulfil according to its Firearms Control Act (FCA). Section 73
of the FCA, stipulates that there is a prohibition on the import, export or
carriage in-transit of firearms and ammunition without a permit issued in
accordance with the FCA. Section 74 of the FCA stipulates the requirements that
have to be complied with if a firearm is to be transited through South Africa.
The first requirement is that an import, export or in-transit permit may only
be issued to a person that is fit and proper to hold such a permit. This is a
very important requirement because a permit is considered a licence in terms of
section 77 of the FCA. The second requirement is that the firearms must have
the prescribed, (according to South African legislation), identification marks stamped
on the barrel, frame or receiver of the firearm. The prescribed marks are
defined as the manufacturer’s serial number or any other mark that could be
used to uniquely identify the firearm.
The
question is who determines if the security guard is a fit and proper person and
based on what evidence is that determination made? If it is a South African
citizen it might be possible to speak to the family and neighbours of the
person in question, but how much resources can we afford to spend to determine
the ‘appropriateness’ of a person using a passport from another sovereign
State? And is it appropriate to ask an already overburdened police service to
spend time on such a burdensome process?
Furthermore,
will the Registrar consider each application for exemption if it doesn’t comply
with South African legislation? A firearm may be legally registered in another
country, the United States for instance, without the markings required by South
African legislation. In such an instance a permit can only be issued if the
Registrar issues a directive in writing exempting the carrier from the legal
requirement.
Should
this vetting process become lengthy and cumbersome, the next question is, would
there not be an increase in the number of untraceable or undeclared firearms
making their way to port? Firearms could simply be hidden in compartments
onboard the vessel and deployed when in international waters or when they are
needed. This might lead to a situation where ships’ crews actively pursue the
acquisition of unlicenced or stolen firearms to protect themselves during the voyage,
whilst they are in port. They would also, at the journey’s end, need to offload
or sell the firearm to any willing buyer.
Inadvertently
regulation and legislation might lead to proliferation should these unlicenced
weapons find their way to shore.
