One Year On: Progress Made to Secure Nuclear Material
One year ago, the first Nuclear Security Summit was held to address the threat posed by terrorists or criminals gaining access to nuclear material. An expert report released exactly one year after the Summit has found that significant progress has been made while warning that nuclear security is a long-term challenge that requires sustained funding and an ongoing global commitment.
Nöel Stott, Senior Research Fellow, Arms Management Programme, ISS Pretoria Office
One year ago, on 12 April 2010, US President Barack Obama, hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit to address an unprecedented threat—the threat posed by terrorists or criminals gaining access to nuclear material.
In an expert report [see: http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110318_3525.php], released exactly one year after the Summit, the Arms Control Association and the Partnership for Global Security has found that a number of nations have made significant progress but also warns that nuclear material security is a long-term challenge that will require sustained funding and an ongoing global commitment.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has categorised four potential nuclear security risks: theft of a nuclear weapon; the acquisition of nuclear materials for the construction of nuclear explosive devices; the malicious use of radioactive sources, including in so-called "dirty bombs"; and, the radiological hazards caused by an attack on, or sabotage of, a facility or a transport vehicle.
The April 2010 Summit was of significance for a number of reasons. Not since 1945 has a U.S. President hosted a gathering of so many Heads of State and Government, including those from Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. The 47 participating nations present made commitments to take concrete measures towards ensuring that nuclear materials under their control are not stolen or diverted. They pledged to continue to evaluate the threat and improve security as changing conditions may require, and to exchange best practices and practical solutions for doing so.
The Summit communiqué reinforced the principle that all states are responsible for ensuring the best security of their materials, for seeking assistance if necessary, and providing assistance if asked. The Summit Work Plan laid out the specific steps that will need to be taken to bring the vision of the communiqué into reality, including national actions that advance global security by improving the security of nuclear-weapon grade materials worldwide and by reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.
In 2012, leaders will gather again—this time in the Republic of Korea—to take stock of the post-Washington work and set new goals for nuclear security.
“The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit: A Status Update”, authored by Robert Golan-Vilella, Michelle Marchesano, and Sarah Williams, documents progress made, including Chile`s handing over to the United States` its entire stockpile of weapon-grade uranium, the safeguarding of Kazakhstan’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium that could fuel more than 770 warheads and the cessation in Russia of plutonium production. The US and China have agreed to collaborate on the establishment of a nuclear security training facility in China. Since the Summit, Armenia, Georgia and the United Kingdom have ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Countries such as Canada have pledged financial support for the removal of HEU from Mexico and Vietnam.
Africa has also played its part in this progress. From 1 – 2 February 2011, the Institute for Security Studies hosted an experts’ workshop on ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’. Participants included officials from various South African government departments, African national nuclear regulators, power plants, atomic energy commissions and radiation protection authorities, the Africa Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA); the African Union (AU), and the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA). The result was an Action Plan setting out implementable actions on nuclear security issues that African states could take at the international, regional/sub-regional, and national levels. Participants importantly agreed that given the developmental benefits of nuclear and other radioactive materials for Africa, there is a need to commit to the safety and security of such materials and sources while ensuring the continued delivery of the benefits that nuclear materials and related applications provide, for example, radionuclides intended for use in life-saving medical applications.
Importantly, South Africa, the only non-nuclear weapon state that produced its own stockpile of HEU, is leading the transition to produce radioisotope with Lightly-Enriched Uranium (LEU) – which poses less of a security threat - rather than HEU. In December 2010, the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (NECSA) delivered the first large-scale shipment of the radioisotope Molybdenum 99 (Mo-99) to the United States made from LEU fuel. Molybdenum-99 enables the early diagnosis of a range of diseases.
The Arms Control Association and the Partnership for Global Security report concludes that approximately 60 percent of the national commitments made last year have been completed, and notable progress has been achieved on another 30 percent. The report, however also correctly states that while a core achievement of the 2010 Summit is the consensus that nuclear terrorism is among the top global security challenges today and that strong nuclear security measures are the most effective way to prevent it, the objective for the next meeting in 2012 should be to gain international agreement that the current regime needs to be further harmonised and that international efforts to protect sensitive materials must continually improve and evolve to prevent new nuclear terrorism threats.
