Niger`s Controversial Referendum a Democratic Setback

Six million citizens in Niger are said to have cast their vote in a highly controversial referendum that now paves the way for President Mamadou Tandja’s life presidency. The trajectory that led to the referendum is marred with repetitive violations of the country’s laws, institutions and of the democratic consensus reached after the assassination of President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara in 1999.

Dr David Zounmenou, Researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)

 

“As the party (government) and the people cannot agree, we have no choice but to dissolve the people”

- Berthold Brecht (German poet)

 

Six million citizens in Niger are said to have cast their vote in a highly controversial referendum that now paves the way for President Mamadou Tandja’s life presidency. The trajectory that led to the referendum is marred with repetitive violations of the country’s laws, institutions and of the democratic consensus reached after the assassination of President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara in 1999. To date, the electoral commission, without its representatives from opposition parties, civil society organisations and trade unions, appears as the only remaining major institution of the 1999 constitution after Tandja’s crusade against any form of challenge to his bid to hang on to power.

 

With the dissolution of all major state institutions and the extraordinary powers Tandja accorded to himself, even public protests and media reports are to be severely repressed. What can one make of a referendum that takes place in such an environment? Moreover, many questions are being raised about the options available to regional and continental organisations whose provisions have been blatantly undermined by Tandja and his supporters.

 

Media reports of the referendum pointed to a lower voter turnout than officially announced, while the opposition pointed at many irregularities ranging from inadequate voter registration and voters’ list to the location of voting stations and the supervision of the referendum. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) all refused to send observers. But does the absence of international observers and a lower voter turnout have any significance for a regime that has resorted to violence and intimidation to impose the idea of a referendum considered illegal by major state’s institutions in the name of the people?

 

It clearly emerges that the process was set up to give the regime an undeserved and controversial legitimacy. Though Tandja claims to be responding to “the call of the people”, this is seen to apply only to those who agree with him. The playing field was uneven and the outcome predetermined. The opposition coalition continues to see this referendum as an institutional hold-up and its outcome is illegal in terms of the laws of the country and of the region. In that case, what are the options available to deal with this initiative that nullifies the progress in the democratisation process in Niger?

 

It is expected that consolidated opposition both in Niger and outside (ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU) will continue to push Tandja into further political isolation even in the aftermath of the referendum. Surprisingly, France’s position on the issue has also been officially clarified and is pro-democracy. Fingered in the political crisis because of its economic and strategic interests in Niger, France through the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, Romain Nadal stated “France’s position [on recent political developments in Niger] is clear and was made public on many occasions. According to him, the referendum falls outside the constitutional framework and threatens to weaken Niger`s institutions in a lasting fashion. He emphasised the fact that the referendum undermines the principles of the ACP/EU Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000, which ties EU development assistance to democratic and good governance principles (article 96). With that, the EU, currently under the Swedish presidency, will be justified in imposing sanctions on Niger.

 

Meanwhile, what the future holds for Niger is unclear given the silence of the army and the apparent control of the regime on some high-ranking military officers. (A law granting amnesty to the authors of the 1999 assassination is included in the new constitution and can be sued as a bargaining tool by Tandja). A major concern however, is how sustainable is Tandja’s strategy for his survival and for peace in Niger? Recent experiences in Guinea-Conakry and Guinea Bissau point out that coups, assassinations or military interventions might not necessary emanate from high ranking military officers. And with the Tuareg insurgency (dormant but still alive) in the North, the likelihood of political violence escalation cannot be ignored.

 

Political opposition and social forces in Niger have vowed to use all means available to “kill” the illegal constitution and to protect the democratic gains of Niger against what they term “an institutional coup d’état”. The response by Tandja’s government could be anticipated to be repressive. Sporadic violent incidents have been reported in many regions of the country and security forces are proceeding to arrest a number of people.

 

In the meantime, ECOWAS and the AU have some basic options available to handle the situation:

 

  • Declare the referendum unconstitutional or consider it as an unconstitutional change of regime (article 2 of the ECOWAS Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance A/SP1/12/01 and July 2000 Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of regimes). Though the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted in 2007 is yet to be ratified, ECOWAS and the AU have sufficient ground to take the lead.

  • Given the fact that Tandja has ignored early attempts from ECOWAS, regional organisations could decide on the suspension of Niger from AU/ECOWAS institutions displaying the same position towards constitutional manipulations as towards coups d’état.

  • There is enough to motivate an economic blockade or sanctions as threatened by both regional actors and development partners. The immediate consequence of this referendum is the cancelation of legislative and presidential elections normally slated for December 2009. Niger would not hold any election before 2012 when Tandja is expected to remain in power indefinitely. Or if it does, it is likely the results will not be the genuine reflection of the “will of the people”.

  • The International community (EU, US) also has a room for manoeuvre in this crisis. The EU could set a precedent by excluding Niger from the Cotonou Agreement based on political conditionalities. EU political conditionalities have been received with scepticism. While the US has been critical about the political developments in Niger, it should also seize this opportunity to act. This could provide some substance to the US new administration’s reengagement in the democratic debate in Africa and give meaning to President Barrack Obama’s speech in Accra in July.

 

While there is no guarantee that these initiatives will immediately bear fruit, they might contribute to a political dialogue that offers Tandja “an honourable exit from power” and the restoration of a consensual democratic order and the consolidation of state institutions. It is clear that, beyond the economic incentives expected from the uranium deals and oil discoveries, the old-fashioned bigmanship syndrome and leader’s megalomania could help making sense of Tandja’s assaults on the constitution and the institutions that made significant contribution to the political stability and signs of socio-economic improvements in Niger over the past decade. It should be made clear to him that there is still time for him to amend his political legacy.