Niger`s Controversial Referendum a Democratic Setback
Six million citizens in Niger are said to have cast their vote in a highly controversial referendum that now paves the way for President Mamadou Tandja’s life presidency. The trajectory that led to the referendum is marred with repetitive violations of the country’s laws, institutions and of the democratic consensus reached after the assassination of President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara in 1999.
Dr David Zounmenou, Researcher, African Security Analysis Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)
“As the party (government) and the people cannot agree, we have no choice but to dissolve the people”
- Berthold Brecht (German poet)
Six million citizens in Niger are said to have cast their vote in a highly controversial referendum that now paves the way for President Mamadou Tandja’s
life presidency. The trajectory that led to the referendum is marred
with repetitive violations of the country’s laws, institutions and of
the democratic consensus reached after the assassination of President
Ibrahim Bare Mainassara in 1999. To date, the electoral commission,
without its representatives from opposition parties, civil society
organisations and trade unions, appears as the only remaining major
institution of the 1999 constitution after Tandja’s crusade against any
form of challenge to his bid to hang on to power.
With the dissolution of all major state institutions and the
extraordinary powers Tandja accorded to himself, even public protests
and media reports are to be severely repressed. What can one make of a
referendum that takes place in such an environment? Moreover, many
questions are being raised about the options available to regional and
continental organisations whose provisions have been blatantly
undermined by Tandja and his supporters.
Media reports of the referendum pointed to a lower voter turnout than
officially announced, while the opposition pointed at many
irregularities ranging from inadequate voter registration and voters’
list to the location of voting stations and the supervision of the
referendum. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) all refused to send
observers. But does the absence of international observers and a lower
voter turnout have any significance for a regime that has resorted to
violence and intimidation to impose the idea of a referendum considered
illegal by major state’s institutions in the name of the people?
It clearly emerges that the process was set up to give the regime an
undeserved and controversial legitimacy. Though Tandja claims to be
responding to “the call of the people”, this is seen to apply only to
those who agree with him. The playing field was uneven and the outcome
predetermined. The opposition coalition continues to see this referendum
as an institutional hold-up and its outcome is illegal in terms of the
laws of the country and of the region. In that case, what are the
options available to deal with this initiative that nullifies the
progress in the democratisation process in Niger?
It is expected that consolidated opposition both in Niger and outside
(ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU) will continue to push Tandja into further
political isolation even in the aftermath of the referendum.
Surprisingly, France’s position on the issue has also been officially
clarified and is pro-democracy. Fingered in the political crisis because
of its economic and strategic interests in Niger, France through the
spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry, Romain Nadal stated “France’s
position [on recent political developments in Niger] is clear and was
made public on many occasions. According to him, the referendum falls
outside the constitutional framework and threatens to weaken Niger`s
institutions in a lasting fashion. He emphasised the fact that the
referendum undermines the principles of the ACP/EU Cotonou Agreement
signed in 2000, which ties EU development assistance to democratic and
good governance principles (article 96). With that, the EU, currently
under the Swedish presidency, will be justified in imposing sanctions on
Niger.
Meanwhile, what the future holds for Niger is unclear given the
silence of the army and the apparent control of the regime on some
high-ranking military officers. (A law granting amnesty to the authors
of the 1999 assassination is included in the new constitution and can be
sued as a bargaining tool by Tandja). A major concern however, is how
sustainable is Tandja’s strategy for his survival and for peace in
Niger? Recent experiences in Guinea-Conakry and Guinea Bissau point out
that coups, assassinations or military interventions might not necessary
emanate from high ranking military officers. And with the Tuareg
insurgency (dormant but still alive) in the North, the likelihood of
political violence escalation cannot be ignored.
Political opposition and social forces in Niger have vowed to use all
means available to “kill” the illegal constitution and to protect the
democratic gains of Niger against what they term “an institutional coup
d’état”. The response by Tandja’s government could be anticipated to be
repressive. Sporadic violent incidents have been reported in many
regions of the country and security forces are proceeding to arrest a
number of people.
In the meantime, ECOWAS and the AU have some basic options available to handle the situation:
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Declare the referendum unconstitutional or consider it as an
unconstitutional change of regime (article 2 of the ECOWAS Additional
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance A/SP1/12/01 and July 2000 Lomé
Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of regimes). Though the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted in 2007 is yet to
be ratified, ECOWAS and the AU have sufficient ground to take the lead.
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Given the fact that Tandja has ignored early attempts from
ECOWAS, regional organisations could decide on the suspension of Niger
from AU/ECOWAS institutions displaying the same position towards
constitutional manipulations as towards coups d’état.
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There is enough to motivate an economic blockade or sanctions as
threatened by both regional actors and development partners. The
immediate consequence of this referendum is the cancelation of
legislative and presidential elections normally slated for December
2009. Niger would not hold any election before 2012 when Tandja is
expected to remain in power indefinitely. Or if it does, it is likely
the results will not be the genuine reflection of the “will of the
people”.
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The International community (EU, US) also has a room for
manoeuvre in this crisis. The EU could set a precedent by excluding
Niger from the Cotonou Agreement based on political conditionalities. EU
political conditionalities have been received with scepticism. While
the US has been critical about the political developments in Niger, it
should also seize this opportunity to act. This could provide some
substance to the US new administration’s reengagement in the democratic
debate in Africa and give meaning to President Barrack Obama’s speech in
Accra in July.
While there is no guarantee that these initiatives will immediately
bear fruit, they might contribute to a political dialogue that offers
Tandja “an honourable exit from power” and the restoration of a
consensual democratic order and the consolidation of state institutions.
It is clear that, beyond the economic incentives expected from the
uranium deals and oil discoveries, the old-fashioned bigmanship syndrome
and leader’s megalomania could help making sense of Tandja’s assaults
on the constitution and the institutions that made significant
contribution to the political stability and signs of socio-economic
improvements in Niger over the past decade. It should be made clear to
him that there is still time for him to amend his political legacy.