Making Science Secure
blurb:isstoday:20032008sciencesecure
20 March 2008: Making Science Secure
Since the tumultuous events of what we now call simply ‘9/11’ the United States has spent more money on biodefence activities and related research than it has on research into commonly occurring diseases. The fear that chemical, nuclear or biological weapons may be obtained by non-state actors (code for ‘terrorists’) has energised diplomats, government officials, UN employees and NGO task groups, all apparently united in their attempt to prevent a mass destruction event.
Post 9/11 we now have a whole new vocabulary to draw on. One of these new words is ‘biosecurity’ – often used in conjunction with a far older and more commonly understood word – ‘biosafety’. Crudely put, biosafety refers to the measures taken to ensure that scientists working in laboratories are not exposed to, and made ill by, the agents they work with. The term refers also to the measures taken to ensure that dangerous pathogens are not accidentally released from laboratories. Biosecurity is much less easily defined, as we discovered in a meeting of East African scientists in Kampala last week. For some, biosecurity is about putting in place measures to ensure that terrorists don’t get hold of the agents and equipment needed to develop biological weapons. For others - particularly those in the agricultural world - it is a term that has been used for many years to refer to food security.
The meeting called by the Ugandan Academy of Science and its collaborators, including the Institute for Security Studies, was aimed at involving African scientists in discussions about policy. At an international level (for example in the context of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention) there has been much discussion about the need to increase the awareness of scientists of the danger that the rapid advances in the life sciences over the past decade, mainly aimed at improving quality of life, could also be misused to cause harm. Scientists, it has been said, need to be aware of the dual-use nature of their work so that they can act (as far as is possible) to prevent its misuse. However, African scientists have had little input into the debate and discussion. The meeting sought to address this gap by involving East African scientists and policymakers in discussion and debate, starting with the question of whether there is even a problem to be addressed.
Several themes emerged during the meeting that are worthy of comment and highlight the importance of continuing this debate and discussion on the continent.
The meeting agreed that in Africa the primary risk is not that states or terrorists will develop or use biological weapons, but rather the risk of disease outbreaks caused naturally. This being said, there was also agreement that the risk that disease could be caused by an accidental (or even deliberate) release of pathogens from laboratories, cannot be discounted. With that in mind, it was suggested that lessons could be drawn for human and animal research from the comprehensive oversight systems that have been put in place to address the risks that may be posed to nature and humans by genetically modified plants and organisms.
It was startling to hear for example, that in a laboratory in Kenya that works with isolates of highly contagious viruses (including Ebola) there is no inventory of the isolates at the lab, no documentation about quantities, and no record of who works with what and when. This was expressed as a matter of concern by one of the scientists working there. Yet an absence of policy at a national level, indeed the absence of any discussion about the issue at all, means that it may be a while before this concern is addressed.
We also heard that several African academics share concerns about the practices of Western medical institutes, such as the US-based Centre for Disease Control. When African countries experience natural outbreaks of highly contagious diseases such as hemorrhagic fever, agencies such as these are often called in to assist in containing the outbreak, diagnosing new cases, and treating patients. This assistance is necessary because the public health systems in most African countries are over-burdened and under-resourced and thus are unable to cope alone. Yet, when the agency leaves the site of the outbreak, having helped to bring the situation under control, they leave with samples of the disease. For this, they need no permission, and no documentation of what was taken appears to be kept by the host state. It was the perception of several scientists that, for these agencies, obtaining these samples was a matter of priority. Back in their labs at home the samples can be used to develop new medicines or vaccines that are then sold back to African countries at great cost. The ethics of this practice was called into question and it was suggested that policy is needed to prevent Africa from remaining in the cycle of dependency.
Unfortunately, unless African governments become more involved in international discussions and debates about biosecurity, and address the need to start implementing national and regional policies, these matters of great importance are likely to remain unaddressed.
Scientists and policy makers attending the conference concluded with the recommendation that significant efforts be made to educate and sensitise policy makers, regulators, scientists and technical workers and even the public about biosecurity and biosafety. It is my hope that through meetings such as these we may begin to identify an African position on biosecurity that takes us beyond the fear of bio-terrorism to addressing real issues of ethical scientific practice and disease prevention and control –whether deliberate or natural.
Chandré Gould, Crime and Justice Programme, ISS Tshwane
