Do Not Underestimate Economic Intelligence
blurb:isstoday:110808econintel
11 August 2008: Do Not Underestimate Economic Intelligence
In this highly competitive beginning of the 21st century, economic intelligence has become an important strategic tool. It is difficult to find an acceptable definition for economic intelligence because of the complexity of the issue and because so little has been written about it. Generally the term refers to coordinated research, analysis and distribution of information with the aim of using it to the benefit of economic actors. Economic intelligence is thus about studying the evolution of a specific market with the aim of collecting, analysing and using the best information about this market, as well as its environment, in a routine fashion. This information can be either public or confidential – in the latter case it was gathered without the knowledge of the owner. But the most important is that it must be correct, precise and up to date to be able to make decisions both economic and diplomatic. The aim is that the decision-maker can use the economic intelligence in order to anticipateemerging technological and economic needs, especially in the longer term.
Undeniably, private and public companies are the most involved in economic and technological competition. These enterprises aim to put forward their respective assets, and compete with one another, beyond the borders of States, in a tenacious rivalry driven by the permanent quest to be number one. Nevertheless, it has become more and more evident that the economic and technological competition is not only the domain of companies. In fact, the scope and importance of the technological and financial means employed in this grand scale competition is far greater than the capacity of enterprises and necessitates the participation of States. It is evident that mostly due to a lack of adequate information, companies increasingly turn towards the State.
Whether strategic sectors are involved or not, the interest of the State is evident from the moment that the revival of economic activity depends on taking over new markets and greater profitability of companies. This could lead to job-creation and a reduction of unemployment. It is thus logical that the State tries to help national companies to succeed, to protect its interests abroad and to survey the activities of foreign companies on its territory or operating in a third country.
It is important to note that a competitive advantage is not only conceived in terms of commercial advantage, it should also be looked at in terms of power relations. The difference is that a State has to deploy its forces capable of meeting an adversary in terms of the logic of States and power. For example, the United States cannot neglect economic intelligence because of its dominance in the new international geo-strategic context. It needs to maintain its dominance, not only in economic and technological terms (it is a State with companies able to directly influence world economic progress at various technological levels) but on a political level (it is a State that tries to influence the politics of almost all the States in the world) and military (apart from its nuclear capability, the US is without a doubt one of the rare states that is capable of a military presence on practically all continents).
Economic intelligence can be constructed from available information in management reports, press articles, advertising documents, patents, books and databases. This information is gathered based on innocuous research enabling the establishment of a central thesis and to discern the main information for dissemination. From information more or less accessible, it is then possible to call in experts to evaluate their validity – a totally legal procedure.
This so-called open information however is not sufficient because of its limited use. Thus the intelligence services use clandestine methods, those not usually belonging to the sphere of economic intelligence, to collect more targeted and confidential information. These methods are much more discreet and could be technical (intercepting communications) or human (people who are being paid and act voluntarily or manipulated by the intelligence services). Often these methods are assimilated with classic intelligence gathering thathas become more and more diversified: strategic intelligence, operational intelligence, exclusively military intelligence and purely economic intelligence.
Thus, because of the methods used to collect them, economic intelligence seems distinct from classic intelligence. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the essential and the non-essential. The essential is the finality of the two activities, which are the same since they are both part of the same logic of pre-empting and reducing uncertainty. Companies and States need to be informed about the composition, the competencies, the weaknesses, the actions and the intentions of the companies potentially or in fact rivals and to quickly deal with difficult situations like a tough negotiation.
The difference, merely superficial and accidental, is only in the methods and the means deployed. Also, importantly economic intelligence needs qualified and experienced personnel, in sufficient numbers, as well as good structures and equipment, all adapted to deal with the above situations. Especially in Africa, only the State has this kind of intelligence, vastly superior than those of companies, which are mostly rudimentary. Furthermore, the development of new information technology constantly increases the volume of information that is only accessibly to State intelligence services. It is thus possible to conclude that, on a practical level, the activity known as economic intelligence is an integral part of the total intelligence gathering of a State and cannot be distinguished from it.
Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention Programme, ISS Addis Ababa
