Dealing with Causes of Chronic Displacement in the Eastern DRC

The cycle of violence and displacement in the eastern DRC has again spilled over to the region as refugees flee to neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. What can be done to end this vicious cycle?

Published on 23 July 2012 in ISS Today

Sandra Oder, Senior Researcher, Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Division, ISS Pretoria

The current humanitarian crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in North and South Kivu, clearly shows that displacement and conflict are intimately linked. If no effort is made to contain the escalation of the current displacement, the spillover into neighbouring countries will increase, thus regionalising the crisis and increasing the likelihood of creating a vicious cycle of violence and displacement.

Clearly, the current displacement within the eastern DRC and across the border into Rwanda and Uganda – following decades of conflict in the region – is unlikely to stop soon if the root causes of the conflict are not addressed. Both short- and long-term strategies for policymakers and humanitarian actors will be key, since not dealing with the conflict will result in regional insecurity and a continued cycle of displacement.

The current situation remains volatile following renewed fighting in March this year, when clashes between government forces and the March 23 Movement (M23) under its alleged leader Bosco Ntaganda intensified, leaving thousands of displaced persons who may not return home anytime soon. In the wake of renewed fighting there has been disruption of settlement, loss of life and property, sexual exploitation and abuse, abduction of children, looting, plundering, torture and harassment. The displaced persons crossing over into Rwanda and Uganda, face the challenge of meeting their needs in terms of basic services such as healthcare, water and sanitation, food, shelter and clothes. However, there are grave concerns for the safety of those who cannot reach the border points with Rwanda and Uganda.

It goes without saying therefore that the steps taken to reduce risks and the extent to which formal mechanisms can offer protection and mitigation are crucial. What steps can be taken, or should be taken, to deal with the current displacement within and across the borders of the DRC? In the context of the intractable nature of the conflict and the resultant massive displacement, it is worth exploring the durable solutions that could mitigate the crisis and its effect on the Congolese population.

Firstly, it is crucial to deal with the immediate needs of the displaced Congolese who are in need of basic services, in addition to assurances of their safety. Under the Great Lakes Pact and its legal instruments, there exist norms and standards that protect forcibly displaced persons in the region. The Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (‘IDP Protocol’), which the DRC has ratified, ‘establishes a legal framework for the adoption of the guiding principles, and a legal basis for their implementation in national law’. However, while this is clear, a challenge has arisen because responses to IDP protection and assistance are divided between government ministries and agencies at the national, regional and local levels of government. The IDP Protocol commits member states ‘not only to enact national legislation to implement the guiding principles in domestic law, but also to create a practical implementation plan’. The DRC is therefore expected to meet its obligations under international law. Scrutiny of these obligations will reveal that any expectation for the DRC government to timeously respond to the needs of the displaced persons is far-fetched.

A recent report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre notes that measures adopted by the government and the provincial authorities have not met the needs of the IDPs. The relevant line ministry responsible for Congolese IDPs, the Ministry for Solidarity and Humanitarian Affairs, is currently operating without any concrete policies or legislation and does not provide direct assistance to IDPs.

The DRC has nevertheless signed (not ratified) the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, also known as the Kampala Convention. In such circumstances it is not clear whether the deficit in legal protection stems more from a lack of capacity, a lack of will, or both. Needless to say, countries like Uganda that are stable and have budgets for refugees and displaced persons, have been forced by the influx of Congolese refugees to call for increased funding to deal with the problem. In short, the humanitarian systems in the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Uganda are under severe pressure.

However, unless solutions are structured to deal with both the underlying causes and consequences of the conflict, humanitarian assistance will remain only part of the solution. The situation has tarnished the image of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (Monusco), whose mandate is the protection of civilians. Monusco has been working to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the thousands of Congolese who have been affected by the renewed fighting, but because the physical safety of a large section of the population is not being secured, this can arguably be seen as a failure of the peace mission to fully implement its mandate. With a force of about 19 000 uniformed personnel, one would expect some positive shifts in the security terrain in the DRC, especially in the eastern part of the country where security challenges need to be dealt with once and for all.

Significantly, a recent decision at an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of States and Government by the member states of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the security situation in the eastern DRC, held in Addis Ababa on 15 July 2012, directed the appropriate structures of the ICGLR to work with the AU and the UN for the immediate establishment of a neutral international force to eradicate M23, the former Hutu rebels of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and all other negative forces in the eastern DRC, and patrol and secure the border zones. One can only ask what the international force will do more than Monusco, whose extended mandate was in the first place to redeploy in the eastern part of the country with the sole purpose of stabilisation, where clearly there is still instability and violence. Will the proposed international force fare better and have more tangible results? How will the force mitigate the escalation of displacement within and across the borders of the DRC? What will be the implications for the obvious overlapping with the peace mission? At this stage, there are more questions than answers.

Clearly, a political settlement is the desired option, but in the current context of denial by Rwanda of its alleged support to the M23 rebels, tensions are likely to flare up again between Rwanda and the DRC. This doesn’t bode well for the creation of an environment conducive to building consensus around eliminating the endemic insecurity.

A more useful and longer-term approach would be to hold the Congolese government accountable for the situation many of its nationals find themselves in, as well as the many peace, security and humanitarian actors who may have arguably not done enough to stop the violence.