ISS Seminar, Pretoria: Political Crises and Popular Protests in Africa - The Cases of Swaziland and Malawi

Date: 2011-08-12

Venue: , 361 Veale Street , New Muckleneuk , Tshwane (Pretoria) , Parking in Brooklyn Mall & ABSA court for a fee

Presented by the African Conflict Prevention Programme (Pretoria)

Abstract:

At different times in their post-colonial history, various African countries have experienced political crises of different natures and on varying scales. These crises have often been the result of popular demands for better governance and living conditions and the inability of governments to satisfactorily respond to these demands. Coinciding with unprecedented popular revolts in North Africa, both Swaziland and Malawi have been experiencing such acute political crises since the beginning of this year. People have taken to the streets in both countries, calling for better political and economic governance. Yet, unlike North African protesters, few protesters, if any, have called for the ousting of the King in Swaziland or President Bingu wa Mutharika in Malawi. The former is not elected, while the latter is serving his last constitutional term in office, which ends in 2014. This seminar’s aim was to unpack the situation in both countries, by looking at the causes, dynamics and possible future scenarios of the crises and putting forth some policy recommendations as to how they might be managed.

Presenters:   

Discussants: 

Chair:

Introduction:

The chair, Dr. David Zounmenou, welcomed participants to this timely seminar which would, among others, consider the extent to which recent events in Malawi and Swaziland were influenced by the recent revolutions in parts of North Africa or whether they were best conceptualised as unique, context-specific movements.

Frist Presentation

Swaziland - The State and Government and Political Economy of the Fiscal Crisis in Swaziland since 2010

In his presentation, Prof. Hamilton Sipho Simelane sought to demonstrate the most probable cause of the present fiscal situation, and questioned the validity of what he considered subjective and ‘conventional’ interpretations of the causes and driving factors of the present crisis.

He began by noting that the loss of revenue from the South African Customs Union (SACU) was widely considered as one such cause of the current crisis. It is estimated that SACU revenues constituted 62 per cent of Swaziland’s GDP, and the subsequent cuts therefore left the country’s fiscal balances in dire straits. While this was the most common explanation presented to the international community as well as to regional and national organisations, Simelane argued that it was a superficial one. For, while countries such as Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho likewise suffered substantial SACU revenue losses, none of these countries have been threatened to collapse as a result of such cuts. While it was true that the government faced a fiscal crisis and could no longer maintain all public services or pay civil servant salaries, Simelane noted that these difficulties dated further back than the recent SACU revenue reductions and were a result of imbalances in government revenues and expenditures.

In 2010, for instance, after the African Development Bank had refused Swaziland’s request for a loan the previous year, government authorities agreed to adopt an IMF Fiscal Adjustment Roadmap (FAR) to restore fiscal sustainability. This conditional programme stipulated that Swaziland would need to retrench approximately 8000 civil servants to reduce its bloated wage bill. This proposal was retracted due to fears of social unrest and was replaced instead with proposals of salary cuts.  It was eventually agreed that wage cuts vary for higher and lower-paid civil servants, with cabinet ministers’ receiving a 10 per cent cut. The government is also exploring the possibility of increasing taxes as a means of generating revenue wherever possible.

Simelane concluded that the real problem lay in the Swazi governance structure, which continues to lack fiscal discipline. He pointed to increased levels of internal borrowing which, if poorly managed, would precipitate an economic crisis and ultimately crowd out the private sector. He also expressed doubt as to whether the requested loan from South Africa would facilitate economic recovery. Moreover, many civil servants lacked necessary skills, arguably appointed to allow access to state employment as means to an income, rather than as a direct response to the civil needs of society. The governance structure also permitted persistent interference from the monarchy, compounded by pervasive corruption within the ‘monarchical network’, for which the obvious solution was a reform of that very governance system.

Prof. Simelane’s presentation was followed by a discussion from Ms. Dimpho Motsamai, who highlighted additional issues concerning the deep-seated misgivings about political pluralism from the monarchy perceived to undermine its traditional authority.  But she flagged the growing discontent against the Tinkhundla system of governance, which finds its roots in the Swaziland Constitution, which according to her, lies at the heart of political risk in that country. The latter relates to the perceived lack of meaningful participation of Swazis in the conduct of the nation’s affairs. Foremost is that the constitution promulgated in 2005 gives the King absolute power over all branches of government. Motsamai reflected on the perceived root causes of the current liquidity crisis as relatively divergent from government’s self-analysis, including: pervasive corruption; an endemic culture of waste; funding of a multitude of ad hoc structures and dis-appropriate budget allocations to the monarchy. According to Motsamai, non-social expenditure remains high, as well as concentration on non-productive prestige projects.

She further discussed the consequences of bad economic performance in recent months, specifically rapid capital flight and decline in foreign direct investment, with the country’s creditworthiness deteriorating. She further expressed scepticism over the efficacy of Governments’ austerity programme FAR, underlying that a unilateral decision to implement FAR would most likely result in strike action from labour unions - deadlocked in negotiations with government over the plan since last year. Thus, the confluence of economic and social development challenges is the backdrop to the growing calls from Swazi pro-democracy civil society movements for a return to multiparty elections and the resignation of the current cabinet, among others. 

Her subsequent focus on the recent approval of R 2.4 billion five-year loan by the South African government reflected on the different debates and criticism of the loan modality and their significance. Since discussions ostensibly started on the sidelines of the SADC Sandton Summit (11-12 June 2011) with reports that SA would limit its support to financing Swaziland’s budgetary shortfall, Motsamai contended that the budget support modality was not unforeseen. Thus, as Motsamai noted, the critique of the loan has to do more with a perceived lack of detail on political conditionalities; time framed political outcomes; enforcement and compliance mechanisms and oversight of the reform process; as opposed to the actual budget support. Yet, this can be viewed through the lens of Pretoria’s gradualist approach, since the economic intervention is akin to a type of mediation where a non-hostile posture yields more results in the longer term. Read against South Africa’s chairing of the SADC Troika, it may pave the way for a regional based intervention.

The debate, as Motsamai underscored, underline the growing domestic influences on foreign policy from the African National Congress (ANC) and its Youth league as well as its alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP). It has reinvigorated the debate about the role of SA as a donor and the utility and objectives of its development assistance as it establishes the development agency by March 2011, and highlights the crisis of expectations on South Africa from the region. Motsamai also drew attention to the dependency of countries such as Swaziland on the SACU payments, which has created a culture of entitlement where too much emphasis is put on accruing revenue rather than on its prudent use.  She additionally questioned the role of the European Union and the United States in efforts to shift attitudes about democratic reform in Swaziland, questioning whether a more determined use of their economic leverage under their trade arrangements can be made. In conclusion, Motsamai probed whether the monarchy was entertaining reform ideas, and if so, what kind of reform it would engage in, and she closed by pointing to potential lessons that could be learnt from Lesotho’s experience of transition in the 1990s.

Second Presentation:

Malawi - The Perils of Unrestrained Leadership

Mr. Michael Jana’s presentation began with a brief comparative analysis of President Bingu wa Mutharika’s two presidential terms as a means of exploring Malawi’s current political and economic crisis. Jana’s presentation was based on three main arguments, namely: 1) ineffective governance restraint mechanisms are a recipe for leadership excesses; 2) enduring structural and cultural factors in Malawi render formal governance restraint mechanisms ineffective; and finally 3) in emerging poor democracies such as Malawi, concrete social and economic rights seem to take precedence over political rights, and negligence of the same is the main trigger for the erosion of a leaders’ legitimacy.

Jana began the historical contextualisation by noting that there were periods of economic growth during Mutharika’s presidency, particularly if compared to that of his predecessor Bakili Muluzi from 1994 to 2004, who’s administration was marred by stunted economic growth, constitutional tampering and official corruption. Mutharika triumphed in controversial fashion in 2004 and, despite entering office on the UDF ticket, promptly resigned from the victorious United Democratic Front (UDF) to form the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after squabbles with Muluzi over his anti-corruption campaign and Muluzi’s alleged interference in the running of Malawi. Owing largely to a successful fertilizer subsidy scheme that significantly bolstered food production, Mutharika won a landslide victory in 2009 with around 66% of the votes.

Jana proceeded to analyse Mutharika’s first term from 2004 until 2009, a period characterised by persistent political squabbles between the government and the opposition. According to Jana, many government bills were rejected due to the fact that government Ministers of Parliament (MPs) were in the minority. As a result, the minority government survived largely on the basis of popular policies, court injunctions and civil society support. Despite these political controversies, Malawi registered socio-economic successes, with the country moving from being in a food deficit to producing a food surplus thanks to the Farm Input Subsidy Programme and investment in road infrastructure. In summary, strong restraints to sub-standard policies, deriving from critical scrutiny and the high rejection rate of government bills in parliament effectively resulted in good policies. Social and economic rights were prioritised over political rights even if it meant “postponing constitutionalism”.

Jana proceeded to argue that from 2009 onwards, after the DPP secured a two-thirds majority in parliament, crucial bills have been passed with little to no scrutiny, e.g. national annual budgets. Some important government decisions have been made without the required parliamentary approval, authoritarian and unnecessary laws have been passed while the executive violates existing laws and people’s civil rights.  Jana argued that these events signified a turning point in which Malawi has fallen out with key members of the donor community such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, who have frozen or withheld development aid. Jana also criticised Muthurika’s current term, arguing that weak restraint mechanisms to bad government decisions has violated citizens’ social and economic rights and has, in turn, triggered an active citizenry, social unrest, and a government legitimacy crisis.

Jana proceeded to argue that a history of a constitution without constitutionalism, where past leaders have violated and tampered with legislation to serve their vested interest, was further complicated by a lack of public knowledge and appreciation of constitutional checks and balances. As a consequence, leaders are often able to act with impunity, particularly on political and constitutional matters that seemingly have no direct impact on people’s livelihoods. In addition, the state remains the only viable instrument of personal wealth accumulation, as the private sector remains underdeveloped.

Jana concluded by elaborating on three possible scenarios for Malawi. In the first scenario, Mutharika continues governing with impunity. This would likely result in a continued loss of public confidence in government and persistent public unrest, the gradual shrinking of productive sector amidst a sustained aid freeze from the West, increased taxes on citizens, poor social service delivery and ultimately a change in government by 2014.

In the second scenario, Mutharika responds to the current crisis by consulting relevant local stakeholders to find solutions, but does not make an active effort to mend relations with some key bilateral and multilateral actors. Jana argued that the government would most likely win back public confidence in the short term, but when solutions remain unrealized, the government may yet again lose public confidence in the medium term and subsequently achieve the same outcome as in the first scenario.

In Jana’s third and final scenario, Mutharika reacts by consulting relevant local stakeholders to find solutions and also undertakes to mend relations with some key international partners. If this were to occur, it is likely that the government will win back public confidence, especially when people’s needs are met. Moreover, public unrest will subside, and governance-based bilateral and multilateral aid arrangements will resume, albeit at a slow and reduced pace with stiffer conditionalities.

Jana concluded by proposing that Malawi develop a deliberative democracy and development strategy, whilst ending unrestrained governance through the promotion of constitutionalism, strengthening the private sector and encouraging citizen participation. In addition, it should renegotiate frozen bilateral and multilateral arrangements and take austerity measures, although he noted that these issues would require time to be resolved.

Dr Judy Smith-Höhn began her commentary by pointing out that the problems faced in Malawi today were not new. She highlighted three main factors that have led to the recent outbreak of popular protest: 1) the authoritarian leadership style of President Mutharika characterised by an intolerance of criticism, 2) the fact that, throughout Malawi’s post-independence history, political actors have not been held accountable for past injustices; and 3) the fact that opposition parties have remained weak and have therefore not provided the checks and balances to the authority of the ruling party. Smith-Höhn noted that while 2009 may have been a turning in the level of support for the Presidency, it was not a turning point in terms of governance style or approach to policymaking. Instead, Mutharika’s two terms were marked by consistency.

Smith- Höhn also pointed to the fact that Malawi’s impressive economic growth had less to do with government policies and more to do with debt relief. In 2006, for example, debt relief accounted for 20% of GDP. (See “Unrest in Malawi: An Economic Perspective”, published by SAIIA, 8 August 2011) Therefore, while there was growth, debt relief and aid has fed into consumption and not into improving the country’s productive capacity.

Smith-Höhn sought to draw participants’ attention to lessons that could be drawn for external actors from the Malawi experience. Should aid be directed solely at government institutions, or should the approach be multi-pronged so as to feed into both government sectors as well as relevant civil society organisations? What has been the impact of a withdrawal of a significant portion of development aid, if any? While the loss of nearly 40% of its budget seems not to have compelled Mutharika to change his behaviour in the short term, perhaps mid or long-term indirect consequences can be expected as the government is unable to sustain the fertiliser subsidy scheme, thus threatening the president’s rural support base. As foreign currency, fuel and electricity shortages put further pressure on the government, it might be compelled to mend fences with international partners in order for the economy to recover.

Following a round of discussions, Dr. David Zounmenou then closed proceedings, noting that many contentious issues had emerged from the discussion, whilst also questioning the impact of the North African revolutions.

Credits

The African Conflict Prevention Programme wishes to thank the governments of Finland, Sweden and Netherlands for their generous support and funding. General Institute funding is provided by the governments of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Report compiled by Timothy Walker and Arthur Chatora, ACPP Pretoria Office Interns.