15 May 2007: Weapons Stockpile Management in Africa Today

15 May 2007: Weapons Stockpile Management in Africa Today

 

The management of stockpiles of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and other conventional weapons must be enhanced in order to ensure civilian safety as well as to preserve the quality and shelf-life of the weapons. Throughout the African continent, governments have purchased weapons in the cause of national security for use by the military and the police.  This has led to the establishment of armories and the continued purchase of weapons to revamp and supply state arsenals. Many armories throughout Africa were built during the colonial period or in the early days of independence and have not been updated since then.  In light of this, it is important to investigate the current state of stockpile management in Africa and to work towards its improvement. 

 

Following the accidental military stockpile explosion in Mozambique earlier this year, which killed more than 100 people,(1) the state of stockpile management across Africa has become a real issue. The case of Mozambique, a country particularly committed to the collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons, is emblematic not only of the need to asses the management of stockpiles, but also of the need for special approaches to support the different institutions engaged in stockpile management – the police and the military.

 

The concern over weapons stockpile management has emerged as a focus for reform throughout Africa.  In 2002, Nigeria experienced a massive military arsenal explosion in Lagos, which killed more than 1,000 people. In this case, the storage facility was located in a highly populated area, which, together with the perceived lack of government and military management, fostered increased animosity towards the Nigerian military.(2) Because of the scale of this explosion, civil society and international organisations began to express concern over the location and the way weapons stockpiles are managed in Africa. 

 

In 2005 an ammunition arsenal exploded in Juba, Sudan, killing 24 people and injuring more than 50 civilians.(3)  This incidet was attributed to the extreme heat in the region.   Though heat and other acts of God cannot be predicted, storage facilities must be built or modified to account for changes in temperature, floods, and other natural disasters. The mismanagement of weapons stockpiles comes in many forms and includes a lack in:

  • warehouses/storage facilities that are properly designed and structurally maintained;
  • security measures that limit theft;
  • control mechanisms that maintain temperature and the shelf-life of the weapons;
  • the capability to mark and monitor purchase dates of the weapons. 

 

 

These limitations in management of weapons stockpiles result in conditions that create deadly explosions.  In addition to the explosion in Sudan in 2005, on April 7, 2007 a Sudanese army truck carrying weapons exploded in Khartoum.(4)  This raises another aspect of stockpile management: the secure transport of weapons.  Governments are responsible for providing safe and secure means to transfer weapons between military or police arsenals. Safety must start with the transport of the weapons and continue through the housing of the arms to ensure civilian security.

 

Other deadly explosions in recent years have occurred in Guinea and Cameroon.  In March 2001, an explosion at an army base ammunitions dump in Conakry, Guinea, killed 10 people.(5)  In February 2001, an explosion following a fire in a military armory in the center of Yaoundé, Cameroon, disrupted citizens’ lives and caused panic throughout the city.(6)  These tragic events demonstrate the need for increased management of weapons arsenals.

 

In most African countries, regulations and safety measures to manage weapons are frequently thwarted by a deficiency in resources to ensure compliance with minimal standards.  With limited infrastructure, resources and expertise to ensure the security of the storage facility and the preservation of the weapons, there is increased risk of an explosion.  This is further complicated by the different procedures states have for the management of military and the police stockpiles.  The military and the police manage their stockpiles under different authorities.  The management of military stockpiles tends to be a private government affair while the police often partner with international organizations.

 

States throughout Africa are engaging in reforms that target weapons management aligning their national legislation with regional protocols.  Monitoring, storing and registering of small arms, light weapons and conventional arms are implemented by the ministries of the interior and defence, but are often managed by the sub-departments of the police and the military.  In certain instances, donors assist with national reforms, but are often reluctant or cautious when engaging in the activities of the military.  This is coupled with national security precautions that limit the military’s ability to engage with the international community, making it difficult for international donors to support stockpile management of the military.  Police, on the other hand, have received assistance with the management of their weapons through collection, destruction and licensing programs. These activities have been further extended to managing stockpiles and storage facilities to ensure public safety.  This area of activity is supported and often promoted by civil society and national governmental actors. 

 

Stockpile management requires expertise and capital for the development of a secure and safe system to inventory and assess the state of weapons within a national arsenal. A set of guidelines exists for regulating and managing weapons stockpiles and for companies that assist with implementing these guidelines. The Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has a best practices guide to assist nations with stockpile management.(7) Some of the recommendations include procedures for fencing, security systems, stock checks and transportation.  Though these are often difficult to implement because of the lack of the required expertise and resources for developing secure facilities, in order to maintain civilian security adequate safety measures must be taken.  As seen in the cases of Nigeria, Mozambique, Cameroon, Sudan and others, these standards are hard to follow. Nations must have access to affordable management systems, resources and trained experts when implementing stockpile management regulations.

 

Weapons stockpile management in Africa must be further addressed and reviewed to determine the risks involved in the current management system.  Areas requiring assessment include the current state of weapons stockpiles, how many countries have armories, how the weapons stockpiles are maintained, and what emergency measures are in place to assist in the case of an accident.  To prevent another tragic explosion, weapons stockpiles must be checked and evaluated to determine the risk that society faces under the current management policies and the capacity of the government to implement safety regulations.  To move forwards with stockpile management, an assessment of the conditions of African weapons arsenals needs to be carried out and supported by all parties.  Once the state of the armories has been assessed, there are three principal options that states may follow to improve the management of their weapons stockpiles:

  1. Continue with the status quo, to manage their weapon stockpiles under the current conditions.  This involves limited or no reassessment and development of their arsenals to ensure public safety. 
  1. Invest in restructuring and reinforcing existing weapons stockpile facilities.  This would serve to secure weapons arsenals in their current location to include adequate safety measures. 
  1. Rebuild the storage facility to encompass current guidelines away from populated areas.  This requires that states move their weapons stockpiles to minimally populated areas and build new, standardised and secure arsenals. 

 

 

Under option one, states choose to continue with the status quo.  This means that states take no additional action and that the arsenals remain in their current condition. As weapons stockpiles continue to age and facilities become increasingly degraded, the risk of accidents rises.  The unstable environment fostered by the insecure storage facility perpetuates the likely hood of theft and explosion.  This option, to do nothing and remain with the status quo will most likely lead to increased accidents and unwarranted explosions, exposing society to increased insecurity.

 

The second option, to invest in the restructuring of current facilities, is the most affordable and time efficient alternative.  Revamping existing stockpiles meets the needs of the government officials by securing weapons from theft, or loss from damage and explosion.  By securing the arsenals with international standards, option two also meets the interests of society, to secure the weapon stockpiles and reduce the risk of an accident. Though this option does not take into account the location of the arsenal, revamping existing storage facilities even if they are located in the centre of the city, will be faster than finding a new site and constructing a new storage facility.   This option will meet the need to secure stockpile management in the short-term.

 

The third option, to rebuild the armory away from urban and populated areas using the recommended international guidelines, is the safest long-term alternative.  Option three ensures civilian safety and the security of the weapons. It provides for storage facilities to be built in accordance with international standards and improves civilian safety through the implementation of basic regulations.  The action of moving the weapons away from populated areas enhances civilian safety by minimising the direct effects that explosions have on highly populated areas.  In addition, the facilities for weapons storage will be built in accordance with international standards, limiting the risk posed by dilapidated structures.  This option will meet the needs of the government and the public.  However, the process of finding a new location and building a new facility can be extremely time consuming and expensive.  In addition, without proper urban planning, countries faced with land scarcity my face pressure to build houses in areas close to the armory, re-introducing the risks associated with populated areas.  This option provides long-term security but may take time to provide short-term security as opposed to option two, which can have immediate effects. 

 

The option that provides the most feasible alternative and meets the short-term needs of all the parties involved is option two, remodeling existing facilities.  This option improves stockpile security and safety within a short time.  In addition, securing the storage facility will provide safety in the long-term.  Though the weapons may remain in the centre of the city, if the area is secured then there will be a decrease in the risks associated with the safety of the building.  Remodeling existing weapons stockpile facilities requires political will, resources and expertise.  With a growing focus on Security Sector Reform, there is increased opportunity to attract donor funds for assistance in stockpile management reforms made by national governments. When managing weapons stockpiles the most feasible options for African governments is to adopt policies that modernize weapons arsenals with the recommended international guidelines. Securing weapons stockpiles provides a sustainable focal area for development projects within the sphere of human security. 

 

Leslie Anne Schafer, Research Intern, Arms Management Programme, ISS Tshwane (Pretoria)


 

1. BBC News, ‘Human Error `Caused Maputo Blast`’, BBC News, 12 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6549639.stm, (Accessed: 7 May 2007)

2. BBC News, ‘Setback for Nigeria Relief Efforts’, BBC News, 2 February 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1797178.stm, (Accessed: 7 May 2007)

3. BBC News, ‘Heat Started Sudan Arms Explosion’, BBC News, 24 February 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4294287.stm, (Accessed: 7 May 2007)

4. News 24.com, ‘Truck Explodes in Khartoum’, 7 April 2007, http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_2095303,00.html, (Accessed: 7 May 2007)

5. BBC News, ‘Guinea Arms Dump Blaze Kills 10’, BBC World Service, 3 March 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1200330.stm, (Accessed: 7 May 2007)

6.BBC News, ‘Cameroon: Explosion Prompt Fears of Coup’, BBC World Service, 18 February 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1176916.stm, (Accessed: 7 May 2007)

7. The Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons, for more information on the guidelines please access OSCE at http://www.osce.org/fsc/item_11_13550.html, (Accessed: 7 May 2007)