01 Jun 2005: Africa`s New Peace and Security Architecture. Converging the roles of external actors and African interests, Stephan Klingebiel FEATURE  Africa`s New Peace and Security Architecture Converging the roles of external actors and African interests1  Stephan Kingebiel Heads the Sub-Saharan-Africa department at the German Development Institute (GDI). His focus areas of focus are crises / conflict prevention, interfaces between security and development and new concepts of development cooperation. He has done empirical research in a number of African countries  Published in African Security Review Vol 14 No 2, 2005  Peace and security have become priority issues for the African continent, and for the international community. The dynamics that Africa has developed on its own, as well as the dynamics currently involved in outside support for Africa, are concerned not exclusively, but in large measure, with military capabilities. In fact, in the past many examples indicate that mechanisms put in place by African nations themselves or by the international community have been unwilling or unable to intervene militarily in emergency situations to protect civilian populations.  Against this background, the paper seeks to determine how and in what form external actors are supporting African efforts, and what shape future challenges may take. The paper will also discuss whether the ongoing debate on the military dimension is an indication of a ‘backlog’ of issues that demand more attention, or whether the discussion must be seen as an indication of an overly narrow focus on the military. Finally, the implications for development policy will be discussed.  The paper concludes that ongoing African efforts and measures aimed at implementing a new peace and security architecture must be seen as positive. However, a number of structural deficits must still be overcome to implement a truly effective peace and security architecture. Emergence of a more effective peace and security architecture in Africa?2  Peace and security have become priority issues not only for the African continent, but also for the international community. Although these issues were recognised in the past as urgent challenges facing the continent, until recently they had not gained the marked profile they are attaining as political priorities for concrete political approaches and efforts inside and outside Africa. The parameters have clearly shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened political will to act.  The dynamics that Africa has developed on its own, as well as the dynamics currently involved in external assistance in support of Africa, are concerned in large measure with military capabilities. In fact, there are examples that in the past, mechanisms put in place by African institutions themselves (for example the former Organisation of African Unity, OAU) or by the international community (for example the United Nations, key states) have been unwilling or unable to intervene militarily in extreme emergency situations to protect civilian populations. Furthermore, numerous critical doubts have been expressed regarding the raison d’être for military actions by Africa, and the motives informing initiatives and military actions by external actors in Africa.  The immediate importance of the new peace and security architecture is associated with a number of different factors, some of which are interlinked.  First, the creation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 must be seen as a step of crucial importance in the development of a new peace and security architecture. In structural terms, the AU offers a set of entirely new proactive conditions, whereas the OAU, its predecessor, was marked by a largely unsatisfactory record in the field of peace and security, owing to the inhibiting principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the affairs of member states. In connection with some positive developments at regional level3 and with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative, the AU is now seen as constituting a realistic ‘African reform programme’ designed to set new African political accents, and at the same time to consciously seek support from abroad.  Second, the dynamics developed by African reform efforts have been accompanied by an altered outside perception of Africa ’s growing significance to international politics. Today more attention is being paid to Africa’s role in international relations than at the end of the 1980s, after the end of the Cold War and the onset of the mono-polar world.4 This greater measure of attention is associated only in part with ongoing efforts to reduce poverty (such as the Millennium Development Goals, MDGs) and redress structural deficits, especially in sub-Saharan Africa; it has far more to do with new political priorities in international relations.  In the context of the new international security agenda, Africa has come to be regarded as highly relevant in terms of security policy. As a report by the US Council on Foreign Affairs rightly notes: “ Africa affects the G8’s global interests in security.”5 Political structures and dynamics, factors associated with stability and instability, have become key issues for scholarly and political approaches to the continent. Against this background, Africa must be seen as being in the process of developing into a continent in which increasing international capacities for peace missions are concentrated.  Third, apart from the global security perspective, Africa is currently experiencing a geostrategic renaissance. Some African regions are becoming important world oil suppliers. The US, primarily, as well as other countries such as China, is increasingly coming to view parts of the continent from the angle of energy security.  Fourth, against the background of Africa ’s reform dynamics and the new security agenda, external actors are adapting their instruments and rethinking their options. After a series of disappointing and in part problematic peace missions in the 1990s (particularly in Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and Liberia),6 the UN Security Council has begun to renew its peace-related efforts in Africa (Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Liberia, to cite just a few), but more needs to be done to achieve durable peace and prevent a relapse into conflict in some of these countries. An increasing role is being played by certain new, direct approaches – including new military concepts – pursued through development policy and aimed at strengthening Africa ’s peace and security architecture. An important part of these efforts is the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF).7  Fifth, increasingly cross-cutting approaches are being sought that integrate elements from the fields of foreign policy, security, and development policy. Interfaces and overlaps between civil and military spheres have grown at a striking pace in recent years. Approaches cutting across policy fields have come to be a challenge for donors, especially as far as sub-Saharan Africa is concerned.8 This applies to bilateral donors no less than the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). New approaches by external actors  The new peace and security architecture is accompanied by changes in the policies pursued by external actors. Such policy changes can be observed on three levels. First, Africa is beginning to play a more perceptible role in the international security agenda as well as in the ongoing (re)definition of geostrategic interests. Second, a certain measure of change can be observed in the willingness of external actors to commit themselves militarily and/or to dispatch peace missions to Africa. This of course has largely been in the absence of their direct participation in UN peace operations in Africa, especially in the aftermath of the Somalia debacle in 1993 and Rwanda (1994). Third, there appears to be a growing tendency to adopt joint approaches involving foreign policy, security and development policy with a view to building and supporting the new African peace and security architecture. Africa: The international security agenda and geostrategic considerations  Today Africa plays a more perceptible part in the security and geostrategic considerations of outside actors than it did in the 1990s. The debate in the US over Africa ’s new strategic significance – despite its US-specific features – is exemplary. The (US) Africa Policy Advisory Panel argues as follows: First, and arguably most profound, Africa has assumed a new, strategic place in US foreign policy and in the definition of vital US national interests. This shift moves the United States away from the past habit of treating Africa as a humanitarian afterthought and begins to reverse a decade-long decline in the United States ’ presence and engagement in Africa.9 Against the background of the struggle against international terrorism, Africa has come to play an important role in the US National Security Strategy (September 2002).10 The supposed link between fragile states and international threats is an important consideration. After all, roughly one third of African states are regarded as being so unstable that they are unable to exercise effective control over their own national territory and their borders.11 This capacity has to be seen against the background of the general development situation and deficits in a number of African countries. For example, the capacity to provide basic services in remote areas might have a strong influence on territorial integrity and the issue of a ‘virtual state’.  The US sees Africa – above all West and Central Africa – as a region of growing importance to its oil supply. Strategic thinking in the US is increasingly influenced by America ’s growing dependence on African oil. The US currently imports 13–14% of its oil from the region, a figure that is expected to rise to roughly 20% in ten years. This has major consequences for the region’s geostrategic weight.12  The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the EU Council in December 2003 is of similar importance. Viewed against the background of new threat scenarios13 in the face of which the classic concepts of self-defence have lost much of their meaning, sub-Saharan Africa ’s vulnerability to crisis is growing in importance. The ESS points to the interdependence of the problems: “Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.”14  Against the background of the traditionally important role that Britain plays in Africa as well as its G8 and EU presidencies in 2005, the British government’s aim is to accord Africa a higher level of significance on the international agenda. The issue of peace and security is of high priority, as is indicated by the report of the Commission for Africa.15  The discussion in Germany also indicates that German policy is according Africa a relatively higher level of attention. Newly defined security parameters are an essential motive informing the German debate. Germany ’s increased interest in Africa has also found expression – among other things – in official high-level visits to Africa, which were dedicated not least to the issues of peace and security.16 Stability and security rank high in recent government documents dealing with Africa. The German Foreign Office notes that Germany and the other European nations have an immediate interest in security-related stability in sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, military and civil conflict prevention is playing an increasingly large role in cooperation with Africa. Military interventions and peace missions  A large number of military interventions have already been conducted in Africa by external actors.17 Moreover, in the recent past Africa has increasingly become the focus of international attention. Several interventions that contributed (at least temporarily) to shifting the balance of power (for example Côte d’Ivoire) or stabilising the situation (for instance Sierra Leone) show the measure of influence that external actors may have in given situations.18  The African continent has increasingly become the focal point of UN peacekeeping missions after the low ebb of the 1990s. Of the 16 operations under way throughout the world on 28 February 2005, seven were concerned with Africa. Regional interventions were important in order to create the conditions for UN missions in several cases (for example Burundi and Liberia). The UN’s annual budget (July 2004 to June 2005) has earmarked a total of US$3.87 for these missions; the percentage of these funds projected for measures in Africa is high – 74.5%, or US$2.89. The largest mission worldwide, involving 14,943 military personnel and 1,074 civilian police, is currently under way in Liberia,19 while the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) topped the list with over 17,000 troops before its draw-down in 2004. Not least, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes has underlined deficits in the area of peace enforcement and peacekeeping. The report deals with the need to provide the necessary resources to implement the UN mandate.20  The EU’s first out-of-area operation (Operation Artemis) – a mission with a narrowly limited timeframe (from June to September 2003) – was carried out in Africa. The mission, conducted in the civil war-stricken region of Bunia in the east of the DRC, centred on protection of the local civilian population against attacks by warring militias. At the request of the UN, the UN mission in the DRC ( Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en RDC, MONUC) was provided military support by an EU-led multinational rapid-response force whose task was to stabilise the security situation and improve the humanitarian situation. Operation Artemis was not a major step towards improving the long-term security situation of the region, but to gain first experiences with an out-of-area operation.  At present various actors are building the capacities for rapid military interventions, including the NATO Response Force (NRF),21 which reached a preliminary state of operational readiness in October 2004, and the EU’s battle-group concept. The battle-group concept is particularly significant because it is designed for possible missions on the African continent.22 The concept of battle groups was first agreed on bilaterally by Britain and France in November 2003; they were joined by Germany in February 2004, and in November 2004 Europe-wide agreement was reached by a joint initiative of EU ministers of defence. The concept provides for 13 battle groups, each of which is to include 1,500 troops and is to be available within 15 days for, among others, UN missions. It remains unclear how the battle-group concept can be linked in practice to the African frameworks and approaches mentioned above (African Standby Force, and others).  In Germany plans are maturing to deploy the Bundeswehr on the African continent. The Bundeswehr was active in the framework of Operation Artemis in 2003. In addition, in November 2004 the German government decided to provide air transport capacities to ferry troops to mission areas in which the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is active. There are plans to deploy up to 200 Bundeswehr troops in this framework.  Military aid and military training programmes provided for African partner countries mainly by the US23 and other G8 countries (France, Britain and others)24 have increasingly moved into the focus of public attention. At the 2004 G8 summit the US announced its intention to significantly increase the funds it provides in this area (US$660 million over five years), especially for Africa.25 As the ASF becomes operational, these training assistance programmes will need to be harmonised with those of the ASF to gain greater synergy. Cross-policy-field and development-policy approaches  Important features of the support provided to enhance African capacities in the field of peace and security are the joint cross-policy-field approaches of external actors and the contributions of development policy. Both approaches are relatively new and innovative. To cite a few important examples: The UN is increasingly interested in conducting comprehensive peace missions in Africa. Integrated missions with civil and military components were first conducted in Sierra Leone; others have since been carried out in other countries (Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia). The principal aim of these missions has been to provide targeted support for post-conflict peace-building approaches (reconstruction, transformation of the Revolutionary United Front into a political party, etc) and coordinated peace missions aimed at stabilisation.26 However, because these programmes lack substantive funding capacities, many activities focus on “coordination and provision of advice” rather than post-conflict reconstruction. Since its 2002 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the G8 has adopted an action plan (G8 Africa Action Plan) that, as one of the central priorities in its partnership with Africa, provides for support for African capacities to prevent and resolve armed conflict on the continent. In it, the G8 commits itself to providing technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African countries and regional and sub-regional organisations are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter. At its summits in Evian, France, in 2003 and Sea Island, USA, in 2004, the G8 worked out new plans to implement this objective. The G8 thus sees itself as an important driver and supporter of efforts currently being undertaken in Africa.27 The EU`s Peace Facility for Africa plays a major role. The facility, which is based on a proposal by EU Commissioner Poul Nielson, was requested by the AU and has been available since May 2004. It is endowed with €250 million from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF). Its purpose is to fund peacekeeping operations in Africa that are carried out and staffed by Africans. On request of the AU, the EU made €12 million available in June 2004, and then provided an additional €80 million for the AU mission in Darfur in October 2004. 28 It is not clear whether there will be a long-term external funding of peacekeeping operations. In 2001 the British government set up two interdepartmental funding pools – one with a regional focus on Africa – designed to promote joint conflict-related projects of various ministries and departments. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) are involved in these pools. The DFID is responsible for the Africa pool.29 Various donors (Germany, Canada, etc) are providing capacity-building support for the AU`s Peace and Security Directorate, with the UN Development Programme playing a catalytic role.30 The support31 that Germany is providing for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) is innovative in nature in that three ministries are contributing to the efforts. The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Nairobi is also receiving support from the German government, in addition to British and US funding in Âspecific areas. Conclusions: inconsistencies and dilemmas – chances and risks of the African peace and security agenda  Altered constellation of interests: Intervention vs non-intervention  Africa as a whole and sub-Saharan Africa in particular assumed new and greater relevance for political action by external actors.32 This (relative) increase in the continent’s significance is in line with African interests and the long-term interests of Germany, the EU, and the international community. Sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly being seen as an ‘issue’, not only for development policy, but for other policy fields as well.  This interest in Africa is also instrumentalist in nature; it is concerned, in many respects, not with peace and security per se, but with threats faced by third parties (especially the US and Europe) as well as their concrete interests (energy supply, migration, etc). Military approaches such as the EU battle-group concept should not be seen as a response to security interests that are primarily African in nature; indeed, Africa has become a potential operational area for new tasks that have been identified for military security policy, especially given the continuing withdrawal of major Western countries from UN peace operations in Africa.  The dilemma of external military intervention and non-intervention, a legacy of the past, will become even more problematic in future, especially if such interventions continue to be informed by colonial tendencies and agendas. Which military interventions are justified? Which interventions should be seen as justified by urgent humanitarian disasters in the face of inaction on the part of the international community? There is little reason to expect that the development of the ASF will be completed by the target date of 2010 and that these forces will be able to mobilise the military capabilities expected of them. Nonetheless, these external interventions should be coordinated with the AU and RECs, and should seek to complement, and not replace, regional intervention efforts by the AU System through the instrument of the ASF.  The willingness of external actors to intervene militarily (above all, with combat missions) in extreme situations (that do not affect their own interests) is likely to remain low in the future as well. This is particularly relevant in non-classic situations of armed conflict that involve increasing numbers of violence-prone actors and in which – for example – a confrontation with child soldiers, a scenario feared in many quarters. For example, the German Foreign Office argues that, “If conflicts take on the character of confrontations with groups not operating in accordance with the international laws of warfare, however, this will entail a declining willingness to provide troops for peacekeeping missions in Africa.”33  Observers such as John Prendergast correctly point out the risks entailed by the new interest in Africa.34 With US President Bush’s Africa policy in mind, Prendergast sees dangers in the continent’s new strategic role, with peripheral zones assuming a position in strategic thinking that might well be compared to the situation typical of the Cold War. This underscores the need for homegrown African capacities, where required, to create conditions for the deployment of UN peace operations.  Measures designed to help enhance African capacities to engage in peace missions may well be closely linked with a certain reluctance by external actors to dispatch peace missions of their own or as part of UN peace missions. Berman notes that, “Despite Washington’s professed ‘partnership’ with Africa, the initial US capacity-peacekeeping programme to develop African peacekeeping capabilities was essentially a product of its policy of disengagement, and fairly limited.”35  Standards for engagement of external actors  In view of the ongoing debate on the new African peace and security architecture and its direct links to central international discussions, it would make sense to identify standards for support by external actors. Development policy, above all, is faced with many new questions, and there is very little experience to fall back on. The following points might provide some orientation for the development of standards: Civil conflict-prevention efforts must be accorded clear priority, for example the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), sanctions and diplomacy. Development of new military capabilities (internal and external standby forces and the like) must not contribute to an automatism that favours the use of military options. It would, though, be naïve and unrealistic not to proceed on the assumption of situations that call for military measures, but these should always be seen as the ‘ultimate option’. That force can legally be used does not always mean that, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be used.36 It should be clear that priority is accorded to civil options and that there is an equal commitment towards building civil capacities (for example when African structures should be used to stabilise post-conflict situations). Peace missions call for a focus on comprehensive approaches involving sufficient civil components (developmental peacekeeping),37 with the inherent challenge for sufficient post-conflict peace-building funding and capital. Military intervention must always be consistent with and legitimised by international law, which implies that any such measure must pursue clearly recognised objectives in accordance with international normative practices.38 A central consideration is that a given measure should improve the security of the local population. It is becoming increasingly important to establish a ’culture of protection’39 or a ‘responsibility to protect’,40 where prevention fails owing to governments being unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, as may be true of Darfur. The ownership and political leadership of external civil and military interventions must lie with African institutions, that is, the AU and RECs, which rightly claim this role for themselves, owing to their proximity to and the impact of such regional conflicts. The pressure generated by expectations of the new African peace and security architecture is enormous, and possibly exaggerated. It would be presumptuous – not least in view of continuing deficits at UN level (inadequate decisions or inactivity of the Security Council, and so forth), but also bearing other world regions in mind – to expect the AU and African regional security mechanisms to produce viable and effective responses in all crisis and conflict situations. While this may not be possible owing to regional polarisation in some instances, in others it may be because of excessive external interests and influences. Support for military capabilities presupposes verifiable improvements in responsible democratic governance on the part of African partners. A return to the policies of the 1970s and 1980s to stabilise regimes (instead of looking at their governance profile) would not be constructive. AU and NEPAD are currently enjoying a considerable measure of goodwill; however, several dilemmas and unclear policies of African actors are still relevant. For instance: How is Rwanda`s military aggression against the DRC reflected in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)? Or how will Africa proactively deal with the vestiges of military/civilian autocracy in some countries, in order to avert a descent into civil war, as nearly occurred in Togo early in 2005? Ownership vs dependence on external actors  The ongoing African efforts and measures aimed at implementing a new peace and security architecture must be seen as positive. However, many capacities have yet to be enhanced (for example in the fields of strategic sea- and air-lift, mission logistical sustainment and funding for reimbursement of troop and equipment contributions, as well as logistical and training infrastructure, as has been noted in the Darfur mission). Some of the goals are likely to prove unrealistic in practical implementation (for example the creation of all five projected regional standby forces).  How is funding for African peace and security architecture and peace missions in particular to be secured, considering the weak economic conditions and revenue basis of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa? African states also contribute to assessed quotas for UN peace operations globally. There is little doubt that a large share of the costs will have to be borne by external actors, even if AU member states intensify their efforts to lead on funding. This happened with the AU mission in Sudan, where the lion’s share of the costs has been borne by the EU, the US, and other donors.41 Even the EU’s Peace Facility for Africa, with its endowment of €250 million, in view of the funding requirements involved, is unlikely to provide more than intermittent solutions. Theoretically, the facility would be exhausted in roughly two years by the limited mission being carried out in Burundi alone. The question must be addressed with a view to donor budgetary logics – Is it really the task of development policy to fund military peace missions? – and to the willingness of the international community to provide additional resources to fund these tasks continuously Are donors prepared to contribute – in absolute terms – more resources to fund AU missions, as well as enhance long-term capacities?  Although the AU’s ownership approach to peace and security on the African continent is fundamentally correct, it stands in sharp contradiction to the funding and implementation capacities that are available. In the end, the AU will prove effective only if the donors are prepared to support, and above all to fund, the AU’s policies.42 Long-term and broad external engagement  The new peace and security architecture hinges in crucial ways on whether the AU and its member states prove able to change their conduct and policies. To be sure, destabilising effects generated by AU member states and governments will continue to constitute a central risk.43 While, for instance, Rwanda has stood out for its strong and positive engagement in the Darfur crisis, the country is simultaneously engaged in a policy of aggression against its neighbour, the DRC. Lack of transparency of democratisation processes in some of the member states also has enormous import for the region as a whole.  A further risk is posed by a unilateral build-up of military capabilities within individual African countries, if this is not accompanied by a further qualification and development of democratic governance structures. Atwood, Brown and Lyman point to risks in African countries: “All too often … as in Nigeria, African governments deploy their militaries to contain civil unrest, when police capability is inadequate to the task. The result is often excessive use of force and serious human rights violations.”44  Neither in development policy nor in other policy fields should the consequence be to do ‘nothing’ in the face of risks. Instead, mindful of the African peace and security agenda, these policy fields should accord particularly high priority to non-military tasks,45 pay great heed to the basic parameters, to governance requirements in particular, and continue to assign high priority to socioeconomic problems.46 The role of development policy  ‘Security’ is bound to remain – and rightly so – one of the major issues in Africa, partly as a reflection of post-Cold War conditions. But a policy that concentrated solely on military security would be too limited and myopic. There is a need to enlarge the options for short-term responses and peace missions. Seen in these terms, there is still a great deal of work. But long-term efforts must be assigned high priority. If income levels, weak economic growth, and dependence on primary goods are indicators of a country’s vulnerability to conflict, then it is impossible to overlook the immediate links between long-term development goals and phenomena associated with violent armed conflicts. Something similar can be said for the progress needed in the field of governance or for the destabilising impacts of HIV/AIDS and other endemic diseases. Here, too, only longer-term approaches offer any effective chances of structural stabilisation.  Development policy, for the foreseeable future, will remain a central element in shaping policy in sub-Saharan Africa. The greatest challenges for development policy are identifying further points of departure for an effective African peace and security architecture with the means of development policy; crafting joint approaches with other policy fields in this area; and working to improve the effectiveness of development policy. Notes I am grateful to Festus Boahen Aboagye for his highly constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. The use of the terms Africa and sub-Saharan Africa is deliberate. Many ongoing efforts – in particular those of the AU and NEPAD – are continental in scope, that is, their approaches embrace Africa as a whole. However, a number of different questions and issues (for example those pertaining to current social and economic conditions) are relevant either exclusively in or primarily to sub-Saharan Africa – hence the distinction drawn between Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Here, a distinction is made between the continental and the regional levels. The term ‘regional level’ refers to regional arrangements within Africa (for example those specified by the AU’s Peace and Security Council; or groupings such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In some cases reference is also made to a ‘regional’ or ’subregional’ level in connection with Africa as a whole or with individual regions of Africa. The 1998 bomb attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam served, for a time, to focus world attention on this dimension. J Brian Atwood, Robert S Browne & Princeton N Lyman, Freedom, prosperity, and security. The G8 partnership with Africa: Sea Island 2004 and beyond, A Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, New York, 2004, p 2. Progress report of the Secretary General, Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary General on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, UN-Doc A/59/285, 2004, p 8f. The AU has decided to build an ASF by the year 2010. The ASF is to have a force level of 15,000 troops and is to be made up of five regional standby brigades. The ASF is of central importance for an effective security policy that is to include military options, although it must be seen as a particularly ambitious undertaking in view of the highly divergent conditions prevalent in the five regions concerned. Thus far efforts in this direction have made most headway in West and East Africa. Additional difficulties are posed by funding and structural problems, particularly in connection with the question of what regional institutions should develop the standby brigades, an issue of some importance in view of the many overlapping memberships of individual AU countries in other organisations as well as of unclear divisions of responsibilities among regional institutions. See Nelson Alusala, African Standby Force, West Africa moves on, African Security Review 13(2), 2004, pp 113–121. One aspect of crucial importance for the debates currently under way is that, in recent years, various concepts of ‘security’ on the one hand and ‘development’ on the other have begun to converge. The ongoing debate is being conducted against the background of a series of goal convergences that, while not complete, have shown signs of relative progress. In the past there was no such convergence, and the result was a set of separate discourses in the fields of development, security, and foreign policy. This growing convergence has found expression in concepts such as ‘human security’, ‘extended security’, and, most recently, the ‘new security consensus; see UN Panel, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, 2004, p 1. Africa Policy Advisory Panel, Rising US stakes in Africa: Seven proposals to strengthen US-Africa policy, Washington, DC, 2004, p 2. ‘Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists. An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones,’ George W Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, < http://whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. Although at the beginning of his first term in office very little attention was being paid to forging an American-Africa policy, George W Bush was the first Republican president to travel to sub-Saharan Africa (in 2003). See Jeffery Herbst & Greg Mills, The future of Africa: A new order in sight? Adelphi Paper 361, Oxford/New York, 2003, p 21. See David L Goldwyn & Robert E Ebel, Crafting a US energy policy for Africa, Africa Policy Advisory Panel, op cit, pp 6–22; Jeremy Keenan, Terror in the Sahara: The implications of US imperialism for North & West Africa, Review of African Political Economy 31(101), September 2004, p 478f. The ESS discusses five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. Council of the EU (European Union), A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003, p 3. See Commission for Africa, Our common interest, Report of the Commission for Africa, London, 2005. High-level visits may be one indication for policy interests and importance. These visits have to be seen in the context of other policies and activities (for example contributions to peace missions). For example, the role of Great Britain in Sierra Leone and the French intervention in the Central African Republic. See Jean-Francois Bayart, Commentary: Towards a new start for Africa and Europe, African Affairs 103(412), July 2004, p 456. Data from, and in part calculated on the basis of, United Nations Department of Public Information, Background note, DPI/1634/Rev.41, November 2004. See UN Panel, op cit, p 67f. On the current state of the NRF, see the article Die NATO Response Force (NRF), < www.bmvg.de/sicherheit/nato/print/sivep_nato_nrf.php> (25 November 2004). The NRF and battle-group approaches are complementary in nature. On the concept’s focus on Africa, see for example the statements by Tony Blair, < www.euobserver.com/? aid=17478&print=1> (24 November 2004) and the newspaper article EU-Kampftruppen vor allem für Einsätze in Afrika vorgesehen, < http://derstandard.at(druck/?id= 1864145> (24 November 2004). See, for example, Jeffery Herbst & Princeton N Lyman, Crisis diplomacy and peace operations, Africa Policy Advisory Panel, op cit, pp 119–135; and Daniel Volman, US military programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 2001–2003 (mimeo). See Atwood et al, op cit, p 25f. See White House press release of 10 June 2004, Fact sheet: G-8 Action Plan: Expanding global capability for peace support operations. The press release specifies two programmes that will benefit from these funds: the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance programme (ACOTA) and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities programme (EIPC). See Progress report of the Secretary General, op cit, p 8f. There are some ongoing mapping efforts on G8 activities in the area of peace and security in Africa. For example, an analysis of the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto concludes: “Thus, even though G8 countries have taken some positive steps to comply with the commitments they have made since 2002 much work remains to be done.” G8 and Africa Interim Report, March 2005, < www.g8.utornto.ca>. See EU, Securing peace and stability for Africa, The EU-Funded African Peace Facility, Brussels, 2004; EU press releases EU IP/04/727 of 10 June 2004 and IP/04/1306 of 26 October 2004. For more details, see S Klingebiel & StephaKatja Roehder, Development–military interfaces: New challenges in crises and post-conflict situations, GDI-DIE, Bonn, 2004, p 29ff. DFID (Department for International Development), Evaluation of the conflict prevention pools, EVSUM EV647, London, 2004, contains a summary of the results of a first evaluation. See Progress report of the Secretary General, op cit, p 12. Other donors likewise regard the KAIPTC as an important project worthy of support. In this context, the role played by North Africa must be seen as a fundamentally different one. Auswärtiges Amt 2004. Auswärtiges Amt, 2004, Konfliktbewältigung in Afrika, (22 November 2004). John Prendergast, Bush Administration policy on Africa, Reihe: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Kurzberichte aus der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Bonn, 2003, p 5. Eric G Berman, Recent developments in US peacekeeping policy and assistance to Africa, African Security Review, 13(2), 2004, p 133. UN Panel, op cit, 3; emphasis in original. See Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge & Sybert Liebenberg, Developmental peacekeeping: What are the advantages for Africa? African Security Review 13(2), 2004, pp 125–131. On this point, too, the report of the UN Panel (op cit) contains some important suggestions and Âcriteria. See Progress report of the Secretary General, op cit, p 13f. See ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The responsibility to protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, 2001. European Union, Securing peace and stability for Africa: The EU-Funded African Peace Facility, Brussels, 2004, p 7f. The Commission for Africa, op cit, p 169 recommended that donors should fund at least 50% of the AU’s Peace Fund from 2005 onwards. Probably any realistic financing model has to include a strong external funding component. See, for example, Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Prosper Addo, Emma Birikorang & Emmanuel Sowatey, African commitments to conflict prevention and peacekeeping: A review of eight NEPAD countries, African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), AHSI Paper 5, 2004. Atwood et al, op cit, p 28. As regards the risk outlined above, the authors note that “G8 responses to these problems have been very limited”. Atwood et al, op cit, p 28. It should be noted that the AU stresses the importance of balance between the consideration of security and development issues at all levels. See African Union, The common African position on the proposed reform of the united Nation: “The Ezulwini Consens”, AU, Executive Council, Ext/ EX Cl/2 (VII), Addis Ababa, 2005, p 1f.
